"seeks to realize the ideas" of the infinite Spirit, which is the immanent ground of the universe.

Finally, instead of the moral proof, which finds the nature of God the basis of immutable moral distinctions, and the will of God the ground of moral obligation, we have a vague and somewhat sentimental theodicy, which neither conceives the problem of evil correctly, nor affords any reasons whatever for believing that the "immanent ground of the universe," regarded as "the Father of Spirits," has any moral attributes at all. Our author makes far too much of the immanency of God in the universe, for in his doctrine the relation of God to the universe is expressed in terms of pantheism, and this must result in the logical destruction of the transcendency of God, for thereby the numerical distinction between God and the universe is reduced to zero on the side of immanency. A true theistic theory, which shall at once be a rational theology and a theistic cosmology, must hold, in well-balanced relation, both the immanency and transcendency of God in relation to the universe, and also refuse to allow them to be reduced to unity in terms of either the one or the other.

But we gladly lay aside the pen, for criticism is at best but ungracious work. Yet in order to make book reviews of any value, fair and candid scrutiny of an author's opinions must be made. We have perused this able treatise with feelings of interest and pain. The ability and freshness of the thought, and the clearness of the expression sustained interest on to the very last page. But at the same time, it was a source of real pain to find, in connection with a Christian institution, views advocated which can never provide a basis of Christian theism, but rather with a friendly kiss betray it to an old foe. And to hear in the same connection and in the name of the religion of Christ those Scriptures which we hold to be that Word of God which cannot be broken, spoken of as not essentially different from the Vedas or the Zend-a-Vesta, filled us with sadness. These lectures we greatly fear will not add to the reputation of the author, save in the opinion of those who do not wish the prosperity of Christianity as a distinctly supernatural religion. FRANCIS R. BEATTIE.

Columbia, S. C.

BURNEY'S "PSYCHOLOGY."

STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGY. "PÒDE Gεavtó." By S. G. Burney, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in Cumberland University, author of Studies in Moral Science, Soteriology, Atonement and Law Reviewed, etc. Published for the author. Cumberland Presbyterian Publishing-House, Nashville, Tenn. 1890.

This work by the venerable Dr. Burney is a publication of his lectures to his classes, at their request, and is designed to be a college text-book. It is comprehensive; its five hundred pages discuss the intellect, the sensibility and the will in regular order, with an appendix devoted to the last of the three great powers. The views of English, Scotch, and American psychologists are given, usually in extracts from their own writings. The treatment is largely polemic and critical; the Doctor regarding all views but his own as "absurd." It is quite original and interesting. The proof-reading was not well done, as frequent inaccuracies show.

Let us turn the pages and notice some of the more striking views and passages.

In the Introduction, psychology is made the science of self exclusively, and is denied to be founded at all upon observation of the conduct of other men. Page 8, we are told that "one complex object" of the mind's thought "is little less than a contradiction of terms." Can it be that we are confined to simple objects of thought? It would rather seem that the vast mass of our ideas are complex.

Page 27, et seq., we are taught that consciousness is not a cognitive faculty, but the faculty of feeling, and that many accept this view, no one of whom, however, is mentioned. This is the most startling view, perhaps, in the volume. Etymology, lexicographers, usage that is almost unvarying, all avail nothing to the contrary. We are all mistaken when we think consciousness is intellectual, cognitive, a power of knowing. When we are conscious of working a problem in mathematics, we do not know that we are working it, but we feel that we are doing so; when we see the paper which we are now reading, we do not know that we see it, but we feel that we see it. The reasons for this strange doctrine are, some of them, as novel as the doctrine itself. Page 27, one of them is thus given: "A diversity of cognitive faculties is an unsupported, not to say absurd, assumption." On the next page, another, "It is self-evident that a plurality either of emotional or of volitional faculties would destroy the unity of the mind itself." The ground taken is that there is but one faculty of the intellect, but one of the feeling, and but one of the will. Yet, on page 31, we are told that "pure intellect includes (a) sense-perception, (b) rational or supersensible perception, (c) memory, (d) imagination. (2) Feeling includes (a) sensation, (b) affection, (c) desire or motive power. (3) Will includes (a) attention, (b) determinative volition, (c) executive volition"; and, in different chapters of the book, these are treated as the several powers of the mind, just as in our ordinary works on the subject. Aside from this, it is not apparent what the simplicity of the generic powers has to do with determining that consciousness is feeling and not knowing. Another of his proofs is the assertion (page 33) that consciousness and conscience are identical. With regard to this it is manifest that conscience is not identical with consciousness, though they have some points in common; and that conscience is not exclusively feeling, but is a generic name for the mind when occupied with moral questions. We have moral intuitions, judgments, memories, imaginations, feelings, affections, desires, hopes, choices, volitions; and all of these may be said to pertain to the conscience. Another proof is that conciousness is a witness, and therefore is feeling. To most minds the inference would be, that consciousness as a witness must be intelligent; as a witness is called upon to state what he knows, not what he feels. In this connection (page 38), he says that knowlege cannot bear witness to feeling, because feeling is subsequent to knowledge. This seems conclusive; but suppose that knowledge, while antecedent to feeling, continues and co-exists with feeling; or suppose that knowledge reflects upon a past feeling; in either case, may it not be a competent witness to the feeling? Moreover, the theory is suicidal. According to Dr. B., consciousness is the ultimate and universal witness to all mental acts and states, and in this all psychologists agree. Then, according to Dr. B., consciousness is not knowledge, because, if so, it cannot witness subsequent feeling; it must be feeling to witness antecedent knowledge. Very well, if this be so, how can feeling witness subsequent volition? According to his reasoning, consciousness must be volition, in order that, as the subsequent, it may witness both of the antecedents.

We are now attracted by the statement (p. 40) that the "intellect, judgment,

memory, imagination, and volitional power are all the subordinates and servitors of feeling, just as are all means the subordinates and servitors of the ends they are intended to serve." Feeling is supreme, intellect and will the subordinate servitors; feeling is the end, intellect and will the means. Intellect and will "exist and perform their functions solely in the interest of feeling, and are absolutely worthless except so far as they are tributary to feeling." Page 38, he teaches that knowledge is not only the antecedent of which feeling is "the necessary consequence:" but also is the cause of which feeling is the effect: if so, then feeling, the effect, is made supreme, and knowledge, the cause, a subordinate servitor; but causes are usually regarded as superior to their own effects, or at least equal. Again, he makes volition a means to feeling as an end; this would make a subsequent a means. to an antecedent. Again, how does the supremacy of feeling to volition consist with his doctrine of the self-determining power of the will?

P. 20, "All perception gives rise to feeling in some form." P. 29, "Every cognition is followed by a corresponding modification of the sensibility." Yet, (p. 32) we read, "Cognition is not conditioned upon either feeling or volition; for cognition is possible without the action of those faculties." Still again (p 38), "Perception is the invariable antecedent, and feeling the necessary consequence.'

P. 111, "In sensation and sense-perception the mind deals exclusively with material phenomena. Nothing is known in itself, or apart from its phenomena, or its appearing." This is relativism. Dr. B. is a dualist.

P. 116, "We would not predicate extension of any form of subjective phenomena, and yet all such phenomena are objects of sense-perception. What we really perceive in such cases is not material and extended bodies, but the qualities or accidents of such bodies." This seems to be ideal representationism, or, as Sir Wm. Hamilton calls it, cosmothetic idealism.

P. 131, "Sensation is said to be an affection of the sense-organs and not of the mind." This is probably the correct view. Yet (p. 140), he says, "The light reflected from the book produces . . . a feeling in the mind, which, because it comes through a sense-organ, is called sensation.

P. 150, "We often predicate of the object what is true only in relation to our sensations, as when I say the rose is red, sugar is sweet, the odor is pleasant, or the stove is hot." This is the accepted view, but it does not seem to accord with common sense. That is, my sensation is red, but the rose is not; my sensation is sweet, but sugar is not; my sensation is pleasant, but the odor is not; my sensation is hot, but the stove is not. On the contrary, my sensation may be cold, while I am sure This critic believes that the secondary qualities of matter

that the stove is hot.

are as real and as directly cognized by us as the primary.

P. 156, "What is actually furnished by memory seems to me to be . . . but an image of the original.' This is according to usage. The word "image" is objectionable as too narrow; it would confine memory not only to sensible objects, but, strictly construed, to visible things alone. "Idea" seems a preferable term.

P. 158, "To create a special faculty, whose office is to recall knowledge out of unconsciousness into consciousness is to create a nondescript psychological cynosureship, or an officer without duties." This is probably a misprint of "cynosureship" for "sinecureship."

P. 160, "Memory does not conserve, nor retain, nor recall perceptions, or ideas, or knowledge; for when these phenomena vanish from the sphere of cogni

tion and consciousness there is absolutely nothing to conserve, or retain, or recall." This is a novel and startling doctrine; but be patient, the Doctor does not really hold it. Read p. 153, memory "is also appropriately called the retentive faculty;" again, p. 173, "With my eyes fixed upon a house I perceive or cognize it. Turning my eyes away, the perception vanishes in an incomprehensible manner out of consciousness into memory, whence it may be recalled;" again, "It is believed that whatever really becomes an object of memory, or whatever makes a distinct impression upon the sensibility is never utterly obliterated from the mind, though it may fail to be recalled for nearly a whole life-time."

P. 161, "The capacity to know is pure passivity." "In this unique relation [knowing] there is no action of the subject, or the mind, upon the object, the thing known." That is, the mind does not act in knowing, but is merely passive. Yet read, p. 9, "Non-action is proof of non-existence"; p. 172, "Mind or spirit is essentially active. It has absolutely no power not to act."

P. 165, "Past existence and personal identity are not given by memory at all, but by original and direct cognition." "I have had a direct and unbroken cognition of my bodily existence from the dawn of rational consciousness to this moment." That is, the whole of our past life is to us an intuition, a direct cognition, not a memory. Moreover, it is not only direct, but unbroken, by sleep, delirium, somnambulism, multiplicity, or lapse of time; and yet a complex thought is an absurdity.

P. 182, He quotes from Haven the opinion of Rosenkranz, "There are indeed certain limitations or categories of thought, but these so-called laws of association are not to be confounded with these categories." That is, the alleged laws of association are not laws, because their manifoldness does not evince unity; but are properly categories. Dr. B. is probably right in his approval of this view.

P. 184, Dr. B. falls into the common error of making recognition a function of memory. Memory furnishes the data upon which the judgment perceives the relation of identity, or recognizes the present as the reappearance of the former object.

P. 204, "The question has often been forced upon my mind whether . . . all knowledge possessed by mind or spirit unconnected with a physical organization is not intuitive and present knowledge, consequently that with the human mind when disembodied, all past knowledge becomes present knowledge; nothing is remembered, but everything known is intuitively seen. Why should this be a question, when he teaches, on p. 165, that such is really our present condition?

Dr. B. holds to the subjective theory of space, time and beauty. P. 272, "Instead of speaking of unoccupied space [the subjective theory], affirms that unoccupied space (so-called) is nothing." That is, there is no space in an absoute vacuum. P. 273, "Bodies have position, but not in space." "Bodies have position in relation to other bodies, and what intervenes between bodies is distance, but distance is not space." The Bible teaches the subjectivity of time; "for a thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past." So Dr. B. argues.

But nineteen, out of five hundred and thirty-five pages, are given to the exposition of the discursive faculty in all its forms. These are scattered into four chapters, scores of pages apart. This is the most unsatisfactory portion of the discussion; it is so meagre as to be practically of little value. tion is called to the arrangement of matter in the book.

In this connection attenWe have sense-perception

treated in Chapter I., of the intellect, and then again in Chapter IV.; memory in Chapter II., and in Chapters VII. and VIII. ; imagination in Chapter II. and in chapters IX. to XII. It is also to be noticed that, although he regards the sensibility as the supreme faculty, and the intellect and will but subordinate servitors, he gives but thirty-one pages to its treatment.

There are no complex emotions, according to Dr. B.; and yet his love has combined with it a feeling of pleasure; his desire has in it pleasure and love; and his hope is the accumulation of pleasure, love, desire and itself. The joys and sorrows are simple; the loves, desires and hopes are complex.

His position upon the will is, of course, that of contingency, giving it the power of self-determination. He accepts Bledsoe as the exponent of his views. He calls all those who hold to the self-determination of the mind, the theory of moral certainty, necessitarians, and those who agree with him are alone libertarians. Dr. B. possibly would be offended were he called an Arminian; and yet it is supposed he did not mean to be offensive when he classes those who hold to human liberty and accountabilty as loyally as does he with fatalists who deny both. It is a familiar device to bemean your opponent by calling him names. There is genuine analytical ability shown in the discussion. Lexington, Va.

J. A. QUARLES,

BALDWIN'S "PSYCHOLOGY."

HAND-BOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY. SENSES AND INTELLECT. By James Baldwin, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in Lake Forest University. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1889.

The author in the preface justifies "another hand-book of psychology" in a series of propositions somewhat complicated, if not obscure, a careful analysis of which gives the following reasons:

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1. The “rapid growth of psychology," resulting from "enthusiastic and productive specialism.' 2. "New facts, which must be interpreted in a system for educational purposes." 3, "New philosophical conceptions of the sphere and function of psychology should be embodied in special works.” 4, The new conception now prevalent is widely different from that of twenty years ago." 5, This new conception is, "That psychology is a science of fact, its questions are questions of fact," and "the treatment of hypotheses must be as rigorous and critical as competent scientists are accustomed to demand in other departments of research." 6, This book is written in the interest of the recent " ' adjustment of the mutual claims of psychology and metaphysics, the terms of which adjustment are these: "On the one hand, empirical investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be equally free in its own province." 7, "Consequently" he proposes to give "most special attention to the rich and popularly little known results of the new methods in psychometry, psychophysics and neurology"; and to suggest and estimate "hypotheses of their ground and bearing upon the mental life," as far as he may be able. And he adds: "Empirical psychology must be concerned chiefly with the first of these tasks, and with the latter only as far as rational inferences can be confirmed empirically in the stage of development reached."