any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour and force it."

Grant knew Sheridan better than Washington. He instructed him, on August 5, that in pushing up the Shenandoah Valley it was desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. “Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy." Then in September, having put Sheridan in charge of a new division, and having visited him to find out how he lay, he gave the order to "Go in," and Sheridan "went in" at once at Winchester, flashing Grant that he had "sent Early's army whirling up the Valley." Just a month later came Cedar Creek and Sheridan's ride, transforming panicstricken flight into resplendent victory. The little cavalry leader in one summer had dashed into history as one of the great figures of the war and had revolutionized the theory of cavalry service for all wars to come.

"As a soldier, as a commander of troops, as a man capable of doing all that is possible with any number of men," Grant said years later, "there is no man living greater than Sheridan. He belongs to the very first rank of soldiers, not only of our country, but of the world. I rank Sheridan with Napoleon and Frederick and the great commanders of history. No

man ever had such a faculty of finding out things as Sheridan, of knowing all about the enemy. He was always the best informed man of his command as to the enemy. Then he had the magnificent quality of swaying men which I wish I had a rare quality in

a general."

Sherman had no sooner lighted in Atlanta than he began to think of longer flights. Grant had suggested slicing Georgia to the Gulf, but Sherman had a vision of marching to the sea. "If you can whip Lee,” he wrote Grant, "and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks." Hood was getting active; Sherman had sent Thomas to Nashville to protect Tennessee. He would leave Tennessee to Thomas, destroy Atlanta, and move to Charleston or Savannah. "I can make the march and make Georgia howl," he wrote. He thought Hood would be forced to follow him, but at any rate, "I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans." Lincoln and Stanton were solicitous; "a misstep by General Sherman might be fatal to his army." But Grant, though dubious at first, approved the plan. Thomas objected, and Sherman argued with him. He knew he must succeed, for if he failed, "this march would be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool." He

would demonstrate the vulnerability of the South and make its people feel that war and individual ruin were synonymous. Hood crossed the river into Tennessee, and Grant thought Hood should be destroyed before the march began, but Sherman thought it was a scheme to lure him out of Georgia, and Grant said, "Go as you propose." Sherman had perfect faith that Thomas could handle Hood, and having sent him Schofield's corps for an emergency, destroyed Atlanta with its factories and supplies, cut loose November 12 from all communication with the North, and for a month was swallowed up in Georgia with 60,000 men.

Hood, forced to choose between following Sherman or invading Tennessee, began to move toward Nashville with over 40,000 men. At Franklin, on his way toward Nashville, he found Schofield with his corps. of 30,000; made a desperate assault, and was repulsed with frightful loss. He followed Schofield on to Nashville and sat down before the city, his army now reduced to 26,000, while Thomas held the town with nearly twice Hood's force. Thomas had told Sherman to have no fear about Hood. "If he does not follow you I will then thoroughly organize my troops, and I believe I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way very rapidly." He now took time to organize, waiting for Wilson and his

cavalry to get equipments; and thus put Grant and Lincoln to a hard test of patience. With his numerical supremacy they could not understand why he delayed attacking Hood. "This looks like McClellan and Rosecrans strategy, to do nothing and let the rebels raid the country," wired Stanton to Grant. "The President wishes you to consider the matter."

Grant had never valued Thomas at his real worth, and he knew that in Hood's place he would himself set out at once on an invasion of the North, eluding Thomas and crossing the Ohio. Were Hood to do this, it would be a heavy blow. All would be criticized for letting Sherman disappear; it might be necessary to divert troops from Virginia, which perhaps would mean a loss of months in getting Lee. And Grant was later justified in his belief, when Hood himself wrote that he then had dreams of conquest, defeating Thomas, seizing Nashville for a base, raiding Kentucky, threatening Cincinnati, and marching a victorious army through the gaps of the Cumberland Mountains to join Lee, whip Grant and Sherman in succession, and sweep down on Washington with the combined armed forces of the Confederacy. Fate had now delivered Hood into the hands of Thomas and Thomas seemed to toy with Fate. Grant sent dispatches on December 2 urging

1 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. IV, p. 427.

him to take the offensive. Thomas replied that in two or three days he would probably be ready. Four days passed and Grant dispatched a peremptory order: "Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remount of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River." Thomas answered that he would obey, though "I believe it will be hazardous with the small force now at my service."

Nothing happened. Then Grant lost his patience; for once seemingly cast aside his usual restraint and poise. "If Thomas has not struck yet," he wired to Halleck on December 8, "he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas; but I fear he is too cautious to ever take the initiative." The next day he directed Halleck to relieve Thomas and put Schofield in command. Thomas, hiding his grief, replied with dignity: "I regret that General Grant should feel dissatisfaction at my delay in attacking the enemy. I feel conscious that I have done everything in my power to prepare and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this, and that if he should order me to be relieved I shall submit without a murmur. A terrible storm of freezing rain has come on since daylight which will render an attack impossible until it breaks." Grant sus