54

some twelve millions at 6 per cent, when it could be de monstrated that, with a proper administration of the finances, they could raise ten times the amount at 5 per cent.

Doubtless this difficulty, however serious, is one which is inherent in the present state of our social organization, and which our Constitution neither causes nor can cure. But it is plain that this uncertainty in the mode of their administration is increased very much by the uncertainty of the powers themselves, and that some provision must be made for ascer taining and giving surety to those powers, before any method can be adopted of carrying them into effect. Our Constitu tion was contrived for the express purpose of rescuing the country from just such a situation as we are now in; and it is impossible to believe that, properly administered, it would not have prevented the total relapse which has now taken place; or that this would have taken place, had it been properly provided in its own mechanism, with some power which should give constancy and perpetuity to its motive It is the uncertainty of essential parts which has thus pa alyzed it. What great power is there which has been exercised by our government, affecting the great interests of the country, even those expressly named as the objects of its formation, which has not been affirmed, in peached, and reaffirmed, until it has lost all efficacy for go —and until all confidence has been lost in its permanence, in the possibility of its being made permanent?

the

Another advantage of the proposed change in our Consit tion is the necessity it would create of separating the ques tions of constitutionality and of policy, and of former, eliminated from all the other considerations in which it is often and sometimes studiously perhaps enveloped. T borrow an illustration from the rules of special pleading, " altercations of the parties in controversy would necessar

xpediency, to be sep its own merits. I

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55

so to confuse them as to render the distinction invisible to the people; and to appear to do out of a regard to the Constitution what no other motive could justify. The genius of the Constitution is often invoked, so studiously enveloped in a cloud of other considerations, that it is impossible to see whether he wears a smile or a frown. There is a certain theoretical sacredness very properly attached to the Constitution as the charter of our liberties, which makes each man's interpretation of it a sort of religion, and his constitutional creed a matter for his private conscience only; which brings all the questions which grow out of it within that circle of individual responsibility, which admits of no delegation, and which makes obstinacy faith, and the insubordination to authority martyrdom. In a royal government this difficulty might be surmounted. A king sometimes deputes the custody of his conscience, as he does that of his seal, to his high officers; but in our republic, not even those high priests of he Constitution, the Judges of the Supreme Court, not even he most venerable of their chiefs, can be trusted to be the he keepers of the conscience of an American President. The nost bigoted of monarchs have allowed the opinion of their hostly confessors to stand between their conscience and their od; but our Presidents, with a reverence more devout, with n awe more oppressive for the divinity of the Constitution, aclave often not submitted to any mediation between their onsciences and that sacred instrument. By removing the uestion of the constitutionality entirely from the consideraon of the President, we shall bring his conscience, in the se of the Veto, down to the level, place it on a more easy Stoting with the rest of his faculties, which it should at least isnsult before it decides, and divest it of that awful religious estige which seems to frighten them into silence. If he ally have the presumption to think himself wiser than his ntemporaries and predecessors, or if he is really actuated any other interest than that of his whole country, the nsy pretext of a delicate conscience can no longer be made cover the vanity of the one, or the criminality of the other

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some twelve millions at 6 per cent, when it could be demonstrated that, with a proper administration of the finances, they could raise ten times the amount at 5

per cent. Doubtless this difficulty, however serious, is one which is inherent in the present state of our social organization, and which our Constitution neither causes nor can cure.

But it is plain that this uncertainty in the mode of their administration is increased very much by the uncertainty of the powers themselves, and that some provision must be made for ascertaining and giving surety to those powers, before any method can be adopted of carrying them into effect. Our Constitution was contrived for the express purpose of rescuing the country from just such a situation as we are now in; and it is impossible to believe that, properly administered, it would not have prevented the total relapse which has now taken place; or that this would have taken place, had it been properly provided in its own mechanism, with some power which should give constancy and perpetuity to its motion. It is the uncertainty of essential parts which has thus paralyzed it. What great power is there which has been exercised by our government, affecting the great interests of the country, even those expressly named as the objects of its formation, which has not been affirmed, impeached, and reaffirmed, until it has lost all efficacy for good,

and until all confidence has been lost in its permanence, or in the possibility of its being made permanent?

Another advantage of the proposed change in our Constitution is the necessity it would create of separating the questions of constitutionality and of policy, and of presenting the former, eliminated from all the other considerations in which it is often and sometimes studiously perhaps enveloped. To borrow an illustration from the rules of special pleading, the altercations of the parties in controversy would necessarily involve distinct issues of right or of expediency, to be separately considered and decided, each on its own merits. It is sometimes difficult even for those who are so disposed to make up properly these distinct issues; but it is easy enough

so to confuse them as to render the distinction invisible to the people; and to appear to do out of a regard to the Constitution what no other motive could justify. The genius of the Constitution is often invoked, so studiously enveloped in a cloud of other considerations, that it is impossible to see whether he wears a smile or a frown. There is a certain theoretical sacredness very properly attached to the Constitution as the charter of our liberties, which makes each man's interpretation of it a sort of religion, and his constitutional creed a matter for his private conscience only; which brings all the questions which grow out of it within that circle of individual responsibility, which admits of no delegation, and which makes obstinacy faith, and the insubordination to authority martyrdom. In a royal government this difficulty might be surmounted. A king sometimes deputes the custody of his conscience, as he does that of his seal, to his high officers; but in our republic, not even those high priests of the Constitution, the Judges of the Supreme Court, not even the most venerable of their chiefs, can be trusted to be the the keepers of the conscience of an American President. The most bigoted of monarchs have allowed the opinion of their ghostly confessors to stand between their conscience and their God; but our Presidents, with a reverence more devout, with an awe more oppressive for the divinity of the Constitution, have often not submitted to any mediation between their consciences and that sacred instrument. By removing the question of the constitutionality entirely from the consideration of the President, we shall bring his conscience, in the use of the Veto, down to the level, place it on a more easy footing with the rest of his faculties, which it should at least consult before it decides, and divest it of that awful religious prestige which seems to frighten them into silence. If he really have the presumption to think himself wiser than his contemporaries and predecessors, or if he is really actuated by any other interest than that of his whole country, the flimsy pretext of a delicate conscience can no longer be made to cover the vanity of the one, or the criminality of the other motive.

some twelve millions at 6 per cent, - when it could be demonstrated that, with a proper administration of the finances, they could raise ten times the amount at 5 per cent.

Doubtless this difficulty, however serious, is one which is inherent in the present state of our social organization, and which our Constitution neither causes nor can cure. But it is plain that this uncertainty in the mode of their administration is increased very much by the uncertainty of the powers themselves, and that some provision must be made for ascertaining and giving surety to those powers, before any method can be adopted of carrying them into effect. Our Constitution was contrived for the express purpose of rescuing the country from just such a situation as we are now in; and it is impossible to believe that, properly administered, it would not have prevented the total relapse which has now taken place; or that this would have taken place, had it been properly provided in its own mechanism, with some power which should give constancy and perpetuity to its motion. It is the uncertainty of essential parts which has thus paralyzed it. What great power is there which has been exercised by our government, affecting the great interests of the country, even those expressly named as the objects of its formation, which has not been affirmed, impeached, and reaffirmed, until it has lost all efficacy for good, - and until all confidence has been lost in its permanence, or in the possibility of its being made permanent?

Another advantage of the proposed change in our Constitution is the necessity it would create of separating the questions of constitutionality and of policy, and of presenting the former, eliminated from all the other considerations in which it is often and sometimes studiously perhaps enveloped. To borrow an illustration from the rules of special pleading, the altercations of the parties in controversy would necessarily involve distinct issues of right or of expediency, to be separately considered and decided, each on its own merits. It is sometimes difficult even for those who are so disposed to make up properly these distinct issues; but it is easy enough