commission to make any other than such acts. There is in fact no reason to suppose that they intended to surpass their powers; no reason to suppose that they meant to give to this act any other than its legal and customary effect, any other character than what Mr. Tyler calls its "character in theory," which he admits, by this expression, may well be different from that which he has always regarded it as import

ing."

Another reason besides its name, which has erroneously led some persons to imagine that the compromise act had some character different from other acts, is, that it contains regulations relating to different and distinct points in the future, and changing as to those points. These appear like an assumption of a power to prescribe and regulate peremptorily for the future. But there was this implied and necessary condition arising from the nature of the act of regulation itself, —“ provided no future act of Congress otherwise ordains," of which the Congress could not by any terms, expression, or power of theirs divest it. Why should an act, relating to particular and fixed points of time, have more authority, or any other authority, than one which, like most acts, is for all time, unless, —unless in both cases, it is otherwise ordered by the competent power. The condition is understood for both. It is equally efficacious for both; and I do not understand why it does not apply with equal force to a law of which the effect at different times is different, as to one of which the effect is intended to be forever the same.

This measure, (the suspension of the Distribution act,) says Mr. Tyler, is "in my judgment called for by a large number, if not a great majority of the people of the United States." What is this but that eternal pretext of usurpation, since usurpation was ever heard of, the alleged will of the people? Is it not the everlasting pretended warrant of every power which has, in the history of mankind, made itself despotic, at the expense of the other departments of the State? Was it not by this assumption, and by none other, that

Augustus, that Cromwell, that Napoleon (those three names which are the type to every man's mind of the transition from the rankest democracy to the most absolute despotism) absorbed all the powers of the State? What security is there for the powers and the functions of any department of the State, if another may invade them upon a supposition so easily assumed, so difficult to disprove? If it may take for granted not only all that it hopes, but all that it wishes? What security have the legislative department of the government against the absolute dictation of the executive, if the executive is to be the judge of what acts of their predecessors have a moral obligation upon them, of what acts "the majority of the people" call for, what acts are necessary to produce harmony, and many other benefits, resulting from preceding legislation? of what acts enjoy a general acquiescence ? of what acts are called for by "the state of the public credit and finances?" and if the executive is to reject a money bill of the House of Representatives, because in his opinion there is a more proper way, a way prescribed by a former legislature, or formerly preferred by the present legislature, or a way impliedly pledged to the public creditors of raising the funds required, and that he shall not allow them to have recourse to any other?

Mr. Tyler asserts that "the Distribution act could not have become a law without the guaranty in the proviso of the law itself." Guaranty! Guaranty to whom, by whom? - who are the parties to this guaranty? The word in this application is nonsense. Does it mean that at the passage of every law those who vote for it guaranty to those, who only vote for it under certain conditions, the perpetual adhesion of all

* There is a confused canting about the Tyler messages which are not unlike some of those homilies of old Noll, by which he always prefaced some deed of daring usurpation. One can hardly give Mr. Tyler credit, however, for any deep laid schemes, or any purpose beyond the ostensible object. It shows, however, that the style of reasoning of usurpation is very much the same, whether that usurpation be from instinct or design, from imbecility or ambition.

future legislatures to those conditions? It is then the Members of Congress who are both the guarantors and the guarantied. By what right? Congress may, I admit, pledge the faith of the country to third persons; but where they have not done so, can they guarantee to each other the perpetuity of their own laws, and of every part of them? If they may thus guarantee a part of a law why not the whole? If Congress can abrogate the whole of a law, a fortiori, they can abrogate a part. If one Congress can pass a law which a former Congress rejected altogether, and upon any conditions whatsoever, they may surely pass a law, without a certain condition, which with a former Congress would have been indispensable. It was perfectly within the power of a former Congress to pass a Distribution law, with or without the proviso in question; it is equally in the power of the present Congress to do the same, or to annul the law altogether. The whole argument, then, rests upon a single idea, in point of theory, (and there is no other in the whole message,) that one Congress may, by so intending, in all cases, control all succeeding ones, and by a single assumption in point of fact, that they did so intend. The whole argument, in short, rests upon a single idea and a single fact, both of which are equally false.

Another argument of the same kind is, that it "would divert from the treasury a fund sacredly pledged for the general purposes of the government, in the event of a rate of duty above twenty per cent being found necessary for an economical administration of the government." One would think that, if the public creditor was interested in having this fund pledged to him, it would be as long as the government refused to appropriate more than twenty per cent duties, refused, in short, to assess itself at a sufficent rate to pay its expenses and debts, whatever they might be, and that as soon as it showed a disposition to appropriate a sufficient sum for that purpose, although it should exceed twenty per cent on the importations, it would become a matter of indif

ference to him, whether another fund was appropriated to the same use or not. If the raising the duties above twenty per cent diminished the fund to which the public creditor was to look for the payment of his claim, he would have a right, or if not a right, an interest to complain of the giving away of the fund coming from the public lands to the States; but as it increases it, it is difficult to see why he should make one increase of this fund a ground in honor for asking for another increase; why he should wish to make one addition to the fund a condition of another addition.

If Congress gave away the fund, and at the same time neglected to make a sufficient appropriation, the public creditor might have cause to complain; but how is their faith to him violated, whatever they may do with this fund, if, independently of this fund, they appropriate enough to satisfy all his claims. The word "pledged" is, like the word "guaranty," in this application, sheer nonsense. To whom was the public faith pledged? pledged by the members of Congress to each other, as the proviso was said before to be guarantied by them to each other? The public faith is pledged by the contracting of the debt, but not pledged for any particular fund of payment. As well might the public creditor in England complain that Sir Robert Peel, in proposing a new mode of levying the taxes, although it increases the produce of the taxes, had proposed a violation of the public faith. As well might he pretend that the exact amount of duty on timber, on corn, and on everything which was levied at the time of contracting the debt, was sacredly pledged to its payment. It assumes, in short, that the mode of raising the public revenue can never be changed as long as a single debt remains unpaid.

Congress proposes to appropriate a sufficient amount of customs to pay the expenses of the government, and the principal and interest of the public debt; and Mr. Tyler tells them, "This would be a violation of the public faith, you have promised to pay your public creditor out of the proceeds of

the public land."

It is really too inhuman in those persons, who are making use of Mr. Tyler, not to furnish him with better reasons, when there are so many, which, if they did not justify, would at least have the merit of corresponding to the boldness and magnitude of the attempt which he has, apparently unconsciously, been making upon the prerogatives of the legislative department. It is unwise to allow him to appear both criminal and contemptible in the eyes of the nation, instead of making him appear, as he might, merely criminal.

But absurd as is this extraordinary document as an effort of reason, the logic of it is hardly so provokingly puerile as the spirit of it is insulting. There is throughout a mixture of wheedling and dictation, of coaxing and of force, of flattery and reproach, of humility and self-sufficiency, of facility and obstinacy, of a readiness to concur in everything, at the same time that he refuses to concur in anything, — of a desire of concession and harmony, with a determination to concede nothing himself, which, coming from a great man, might inspire alarm, but from Mr. Tyler, produces only irritation. He speaks of the "superior wisdom of the Legislature," and of his having the "sincerest wish to acquiesce in its expressed will," at the same time that he attributes to them an insensibility to moral obligations, and a disregard of the public faith; at the same time that he annuls their acts as immoral, erroneous, and dangerous, asserts that a law, which they abrogate because they consider it prejudicial to the interests of their constituents, is "replete, if adhered to, with good to every interest of the country;" insinuates that they are resuming "a scheme of indirect taxation, founded on a false basis, and pushed to a dangerous excess"; and undertakes to tell them, the Representatives of the people, them, the very persons, by being pinned to whose skirts he was dragged unnoticed into power, that they are doing what is, "in his judgment," opposite to the wishes of a large number, if not a great majority of the people of the United States." He expatiates with much unction upon