eternally separate from each other and distinct from the body, senses, and mind, yet capable of apprehension, volition (or effort), desire, aversion, pleasure, pain, merit, and demerit.

In the Vaiseshika Aphorisms (III. 2. 4) other characteristic signs (lingāni) of the living soul are given, such as the opening and shutting of the eyes, the motions of the mind and especially life'. The commentator, in commenting upon this, describes the soul as the 'governor or superintendent over the body.' Here is the passage (Gough, p. 110):

Vitality is a mark of the existence of the soul; for by the word 'life' the effects of vitality, such as growth, the healing of wounds and bruises, are implied. For as the owner of a house builds up the broken edifice or enlarges a building which is too small, so the ruler of the body effects by food, &c., the increase and enlargement of the body, which is to him in the stead of a habitation, and with medicine and the like causes what is wounded to grow again and mutilated hands or feet to heal. Thus a superintendent of the body (dehasya adhishṭhātā) is proved like a master of a house.

It should be added that souls are held to be infinite, ubiquitous, and diffused everywhere throughout space, so that a man's soul is as much in England as in Calcutta, though it can only apprehend and feel and act where the body happens to be.

The Nyaya idea of the mind or internal organ (Manas) is that it, like the soul, is a Dravya or 'eternal substance.' Instead, however, of being diffused everywhere like the soul, it is atomic, like earth, water, fire, and air. Indeed, if it were infinite, like the soul, it might be united with all subjects at once, and all apprehensions might be contemporaneous, which is impossible. It is therefore regarded as a mere atom or atomic inlet to the soul, not allowing

1 Plato (Phaedrus 52) defines soul as rò autò avtò kivoûv, quoted by Cicero, Tusc. Quaest. I. 23.

the latter to receive more than one thought or conception at a time. So in Nyāya-sūtra I. 3. 16, and in Vaiśeshika VIII. 1. 22, 23, it is affirmed as follows:

'The characteristic of the mind is that it does not give rise to more than one notion simultaneously.' 'Ether, in consequence of its universal pervasion, is infinitely great, and so likewise is soul. In consequence of non-existence of that universal pervasion, the internal organ (mind) is an atom1.'

In regard to the authority to be accorded to the Veda, the views of the Nyaya appear by no means unorthodox. Gautama, in his Aphorisms (II. 58-60, 68), declares plainly that the Veda is not false, that it is not chargeable either with self-contradiction or tautology, and that it is an instrument of true knowledge. Similarly, the third Aphorism of Kanāda may be regarded as a kind of confession of faith in the Veda, intended apparently, like that of Gautama, to counteract imputations of heterodoxy.

In further proof of the Theism claimed for the Nyāya I here give a short passage from the Kusumānjali, a Naiyāyika treatise by Udayana Acarya, which will serve as a specimen of the sort of arguments employed to prove the existence of a personal God (Iśvara) in opposition to atheistical objectors. This work has been ably edited and translated by Professor E. B. Cowell. The following is merely the opening of the fifth chapter, with a portion of Hari-dasa's comment:

An omniscient and indestructible Being is to be proved from the existence of effects, from the combination of atoms, from the support of the

1 The theory propounded by Lucretius was that the mind is composed of exceedingly subtle atoms; he says (III. 180) of it, 'Esse aio persubtilem atque minutis Perquam corporibus factum constare.' As to ether, see note 2, p. 93.

2 I have referred to his edition and to Dr. Muir's extracts in the appendix to the third volume of his Texts.

earth in the sky, from traditional arts, from belief in revelation, from the Veda, from its sentences, and from particular numbers.

Comment: The earth must have had a maker, because it is an effect like a jar. Combination is an action, and therefore the action which produced the conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of a creation must have been accompanied by the volition of an intelligent being. Again, the world depends upon some being who wills to hinder it from falling, like a stick supported by a bird in the air. Again, the traditional arts (pada) now current, as that of making cloth, &c., must have proceeded from an independent being. Again, the knowledge derived from the Veda is derived from a virtue residing in its cause, because it is true knowledge', (this virtue consisting in the Veda's being uttered by a fit person, and therefore necessarily implying a personal inspirer.)

From this brief statement of the distinctive features of the Nyāya school it is clear that this system, at least in its Vaiseshika cosmogony, is dualistic in the sense of assuming the existence of gross material eternal atoms, side by side either with eternal souls or with the supreme Soul of the universe. It sets itself against any theory which would make an impure and evil world spring from a pure and perfect spirit. Nor does it undertake to decide positively what it cannot prove dialectically,-the precise relation between soul and matter.

1 Those who wish to pursue the argument should consult Professor Cowell's translation. It is interesting to compare Cicero, De Natura Deorum (II. 34): 'But if all the parts of the universe are so constituted that they could not be better for use or more beautiful in appearance, let us consider whether they could have been put together by chance or whether their condition is such that they could not even cohere unless divine wisdom and providence had directed them (nisi sensu moderante divinâque providentiâ).'

レ

LECTURE V.

The Sankhya.

THE 'HE Sānkhya1 philosophy, though possibly prior in date, is generally studied next to the Nyaya, and is more peremptorily and categorically dualistic (dvaitavādin). It utterly repudiates the notion that impure matter can originate from pure spirit, and, of course, denies that anything can be produced out of nothing.

The following are Aphorisms, I. 78, 114-117, propounding its doctrine of evolution, which may not be altogether unworthy of the attention of Darwinians :

There cannot be the production of something out of nothing (nāvastuno vastu-siddhiḥ); that which is not cannot be developed into that which is. The production of what does not already exist (potentially) is

1 Kapila, the reputed founder of this school (sometimes fabled as a son of Brahmā, sometimes as an incarnation of Vishnu and identified with the sage described in the Rāmāyaṇa as the destroyer of the sixty thousand sons of Sagara, who in their search for their father's horse disturbed his devotions), was probably a Brahman, though nothing is known about him. See Mahā-bhārata XII. 13703. The word Kapila means of a tawny brown colour,' and may possibly have been applied as a nickname, like Aksha-pāda and Kaṇāda. He is the supposed author of two works, viz. a. the original Sān-khya Sūtras, sometimes called Sānkhya-pravaćana, comprising 526 aphorisms in six books; b. a short work called the Tattvasamāsa or 'Compendium of Principles' (translated by Dr. Ballantyne). The original Sūtras are of course accompanied with abundant commentaries, of which one of the best known is the San-khya-pravaćana-bhāshya, by Vijnana-bhikshu, edited with an able and interesting preface by Dr. FitzEdward Hall. A very useful and popular compendium of the doctrines of this system, called the San-khya-kārikā, was edited and translated by Professor H. H. Wilson,

impossible, like a horn on a man (nāsad-utpādo nri-śringavat); because there must of necessity be a material out of which a product is developed ; and because everything cannot occur everywhere at all times (sarvatra sarvadā sarvāsambhavāt); and because anything possible must be produced from something competent to produce it1.

'Thus,' remarks a commentator, 'curds come from milk, not water. A potter produces a jar from clay, not from cloth. Production is only manifestation of what previously existed.' Aphorism 121 adds, 'Destruction is a resolution of anything into its cause.'

In the Sankhya, therefore, instead of an analytical inquiry into the universe as actually existing, arranged under topics and categories, we have a synthetical system propounded, starting from an original primordial tattva or eternally existing essence',' called Prakriti (a word meaning that which evolves or produces everything else').

1 See the note on the dogma Ex nihilo nihil fit, p. 63. We are also here reminded of Lucretius I. 160, &c.:

Nam si de Nihilo fierent ex omnibu' rebus

Omne genus nasci posset; nil semine egeret ;
E mare primum homines, e terrâ posset oriri
Squammigerum genus et volucres; erumpere caelo
Armenta, atque aliae pecudes: genus omne ferarum
Incerto partu culta ac deserta teneret :

Nec fructus iidem arboribus constare solerent,

Sed mutarentur: ferre omnes omnia possent.

'If things proceed from nothing, everything might spring from everything, and nothing would require a seed. Men might arise first from the sea, and fish and birds from the earth, and flocks and herds break into being from the sky; every kind of beast might be produced at random in cultivated places or deserts. The same fruits would not grow on the same trees, but would be changed. All things would be able to produce all things.'

2 It is usual to translate tat-tva, 'that-ness,' by 'principle;' but such words as 'essence,' 'entity,' and in some cases even 'substance,' seem to convey a more definite idea of its meaning. It corresponds to the barbarous term 'quiddity' (from quid est ?), discarded by Locke and modern English philosophers. Certainly nature' is anything but a good equivalent for Prakriti, which denotes something very different from matter