bodies for thousands of miles to some place of pilgrimage; of others who sleep on beds of iron spikes. One man was seen at Benares (described in the Asiatic Researches, vol. v. p. 49) who was alleged to have used such a bed for thirtyfive years. Others have been known to chain themselves for life to trees; others, again, to pass their lives, heavily chained, in iron cages. Lastly, the extent to which some Indian ascetics will carry fasting far exceeds anything ever heard of in Europe, as may be understood by a reference to the rules of the lunar penance given by Manu (VI. 20, XI. 216–220). This penance is a kind of fast which consists in diminishing the consumption of food every day by one mouthful for the waning half of the lunar month, beginning with fifteen mouthfuls at the full moon until the quantity is reduced to o at the new moon, and then increasing it in like manner during the fortnight of the moon's increase.

Of course all these mortifications are explicable by their connection with the fancied attainment of extraordinary sanctity and supernatural powers.

As a conclusion to the subject of Yoga, I quote a remarkable passage from Professor Banerjea (Dialogues, pp. 69, 70):

The Yogi may not see or hear what passes around, he may be insensible to external impressions, but he has intuition of things which his neighbours cannot see or hear. He becomes so buoyant, or rather so sublimated by his Yoga, that gravitation, or, as Bhāskarācārya calls it, the attractive power of the earth, has no influence on him. He can walk and ascend in the sky, as if he were suspended under a balloon. He can by this intuitive process inform himself of the mysteries of astronomy and anatomy, of all things in fact that may be found in any of the different worlds. He may call to recollection the events of a previous life. He may understand the language of the brute creation. He may obtain an insight into the past and future. He may discern the thoughts of others. He may himself vanish at pleasure, and, if he choose to do so, enter into his neighbour's body and take possession of his living skin.

By these and other doctrines of Hindu philosophy we are often reminded that the human mind repeats itself according to the sentiment expressed in Ecclesiastes i. 9, 'The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.' Certainly almost all extravagant ideas now current seem to have their counterpart, if not their source, in the East. The practisers of self-imposed superstitious restraints and mortifications, not to speak of the votaries of animal magnetism, clairvoyance, and so-called spiritualism, will find most of their theories represented or rather far outdone by corresponding notions existing in this Yoga system invented by the Hindūs considerably more than 2000 years ago, and more or less earnestly believed in and sedulously practised up to the present day.

OUR

LECTURE VI.

The Pūrva-mīmāṇsā and Vedānta.

UR next subject is the Mīmānsă of Jaimini', which is sometimes connected with the Vedanta, this latter being called the Uttara-mimānsā or Brahma-mīmānsā— as founded on the Upanishads or latter part of the Vedas -while Jaimini's system is styled the Purva-mīmānsā or Karma-mimānsā, as concerned with the Mantras and Brāhmaṇas only. It is more usual, however, to indicate the opposition of the two systems to each other by calling the one Mimānsã and the other Vedānta. In fact, Jaimini's system, like the Yoga, cannot suitably be called a subdivision of any other system, for it is in real truth not a system of philosophy, but rather of ritualism. It does not concern itself, like the other systems, with investigations into the nature of soul, mind, and matter, but with a correct interpretation of the ritual of the Veda and the solutions of doubts and discrepancies in regard to Vedic texts caused by the discordant explanations of opposite schools. Its only claim to the title of a philosophy consists in its mode of interpretation, the topics being

1 Jaimini, as usual, enunciated his doctrines in aphorisms. His work called the Mimānsā-sūtra or Jaimini-sūtra is in twelve books. It has been partly edited and translated by Dr. Ballantyne. A commentary on it was written by Sabara-svāmin, which is being published in the Bibliotheca Indica, and this again was commented on by the celebrated Mīmānsā authority, Kumārila (also styled Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, Kumārila-svāmin), whose work was again followed by numerous other commentaries and treatises. A compendious explanation of the system, called Jaiminiyanyāya-mālā-vistara, was written by Madhavacārya. Jaimini must have been a learned Brāhman, but nothing is known as to the date of his life.

THE SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY—PŪRVA-MĪMĀṆSĀ.

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arranged according to particular categories (such as authoritativeness, indirect precept, &c.), and treated according to a kind of logical method, commencing with the proposition to be discussed, the doubt arising about it, the Pūrva-paksha or primâ facie and wrong view of the question, the Uttara-paksha or refutation of the wrong view, and the conclusion. The main design of the whole system appears to be to make a god of ritualism. Hence it consists chiefly of a critical commentary on the Brāhmaṇa or ritual portion of the Veda in its connection with the Mantras, the interpretation given being an exposition of the obvious literal sense and not of any supposed occult meaning underlying the text, as in the Upanishads and Vedanta. Jaimini was, in point of fact, the opponent of both rationalism and theism. Not that he denied a God, but the real tendency of his teaching was to allow no voice or authority to either reason or God. The Veda was to be everything. A supreme Being might exist, but was not necessary to the system. The Veda, said Jaimini, is itself authority and has no need of an Authorizer. His first Aphorism states the whole aim and object of his system, viz. a desire to know duty (dharma-jijñāsā). When amplified, it may be thus stated:

Understand, O student, that, after studying the Veda with a preceptor, a desire to know Dharma or duty is to be entertained by thee.

The fifth Aphorism asserts the strange doctrine of an original and perpetual connection between a word and its sense. It is thus paraphrased:

The connection of a word with its sense is contemporaneous with the origin of both. In consequence of this connection, the words of the Veda convey unerring instruction in the knowledge of duty.

But it is to be understood that Dharma or duty consists in the performance of the ritual acts prescribed by the Veda because they are so prescribed, without reference to

the will or approval of any personal god, for Dharma is itself the bestower of reward. Some recent Mīmāṇsakas, however, maintain that Dharma ought to be performed as an offering to a supreme Being, and that it is to be so performed as a means of emancipation. Even a verse of the Bhagavad-gītā is quoted in support of this view. Krishna, regarded by his worshippers as a manifestation of the supreme lord of the universe, says to Arjuna,—

Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest away, whatever austerity thou practisest, do that as an offering to me (IX. 27). (See Lecture VII on the Eclectic School and Bhagavad-gītā, p. 143 of this volume.)

Some singular speculations occur in Jaimini's system. As he maintains the inherent authority of the Veda, without any dependence on an eternal Authorizer or Revealer, so he asserts its own absolute eternity, and declares that only eternally pre-existing objects are mentioned in it. This theory is supported by affirming that sound is eternal, or rather that an eternal sound underlies all temporary sound. From Aphorism 18 we gather the following:

Sound must be eternal, because its utterance [exhibition] is intended to convey a meaning to others. If it were not eternal it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist.

If, on the other hand (says a commentator), it continues to exist for any period, however short, after ceasing to be perceived, it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discontinuance of its existence, whence its eternity is inferred 1.

This eternity of sound is further pretended to be established by the two following short passages, one from the Rig-veda (VIII. 64. 6) and one from Smriti, with which I close this brief notice of the Mīmānsā :

1 See Muir's Texts, vol. iii. pp. 53, 57; Dr. Ballantyne's Mīmānsāsūtra, p. 23.