to tell of a mode of being endowed with rupa, yet without the kama, or sensuous impulses held to be bound up with rupa, when the term is used in its wider sense.1 Nor does it enlighten us on the more impalpable denizens of a plane of being where rupa itself is not, and for which no terms seem held appropriate save such as express high fetches of abstract thought. We must go back, after all, to the Nikayas for such brief hints as we can find. We do hear, at least, in the Digha Nikaya, of beings in one of the middle circles of the Form heavens termed Radiant (Abhassara), as 'made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light, traversing the firmament, continuing in beauty." Were it not that we miss here the unending melody sounding through each circle of the Western poet's Paradise, we might well apply this description to Dante's 'anime liete,' who, like incandescent spheres:

'Fiammando forte, a guisa di comete,

E come cerchi in tempra d' oriuoli
Si giran.' . . .

Liker to those brilliant visions the heavens of Form seem to have been than to the quiet air' and 'the meadow of fresh verdure' on that slope of Limbo where

who

'Genti v' eran con occhi tardi e gravi,'

perhaps to the inference that in the two superior planes it was not required.

1 See pp. 168-170: All form is that which is ... related, or which belongs to the universe of sense, not to that of form, or to that of the formless.'

See the four Äruppas, pp. 71-75.

3 D. i. 17. Again we read (D. i. 195), that of the three possible personalities' of current tradition, one was made of mind, having form, and a complete organism, and one was without form and made of consciousness, or perception (arupi sanйàmayo).

There is no lack of music in some of the lower Indian heavens. C., c.g., M. i. 252, on Sakka the god enjoying the music in his sensuous paradise. And see Vimana Vatthu, passim.

'Parlavan rado, con voci soavi.'

Yet the rare, sweet utterances of these devas of Europe, discoursing with the Master of those who know,' may better have accorded with the Buddhist conception of beings made of mind' than the choric dances of the spheres above.

Among these shadowy beings, however, we are far from the fully bodied out idea of the all form' and the 'skandha of form of the second and third Books of the Manual. It may be that the worlds of rúpa and arupa were so called in popular tradition because in the former, visible, and in the latter, invisible, beings resided. But whereas attributes concerning either are 'sadly to seek,' there is no lack of information concerning the attributes of form in the 'sensuous universe' or kamavacaram. If the list given of these in the first chapter of Book II. be consulted, it will be seen that I have not followed the reading of the P. T. S. edition when it states that all form is kāmȧvacaram eva, rupavacaram eva, that is, is both related to the universe of sense and also to that of form. The Siamese edition reads kāmavacaram eva, na rupavacaram eva. It may seem at first sight illogical to say that form is not related to the universe of form. But the better logic is really on the side of the Siamese. On page 331 of my translation, it is seen that the avacaras were mutually exclusive as to their contents. To belong to the universe of form involved exclusion from that of sense. But in the inquiry into all form' we are clearly occupied with facts about this present world and about women and men as we know them-in a word, with the world of sense. Hence the all form of Book II. is clearly not the form of the rupavacaram. It is not used with the same implications.

Further than this, further than the vague avacarageography gathered already from other sources, the Manual does not bring us, nor the Commentary either.

1 §§ 1251-1281 of the P. T. S.'s edition.

We come then to rupam in the sensuous plane of being, or at least to such portion of that plane as is concerned with human beings: to sabbam rupam and to its distribution in each human economy, termed rupa kkhandho. Whether taken generally, or under the more specialized aspect, there seems to be unanimity of teaching concerning the various manifestations of it.1 Under it are comprised four ultimate primary, or underivable constituents and twenty-three secondary, dependent or derived modes. Thus:

To enter with any fulness of discussion into this classification, so rich in interesting suggestions, would occupy itself a volume. In an introduction of mere notes I will offer only a few general considerations.

We are probably first impressed by the psychological aspect taken of a subject that might seem to lend itself to purely objective consideration. The main constituents of

Cf., e.g., S. iii. 59, with Dh. S., § 584, and Vis. Mag.

the material world, classified in the East as we know them. to have been classified, contemporaneously, in the West, are set down in terms of subjective or conscious experience. The ipo-dhatu is not called explicitly the Intangible; virtually, however, it and the other three Great Phenomena,' or literally Great things that have Become," are regarded from the point of view of how they affect us by way of sense. We might add, how they affect us most fundamentally by way of sense. In the selection of Touch among the senses the Indian tradition joins hands with Demokritus. But of this no more at present.

Again, in the second table, or secondary forms, the same standpoint is predominant. We have the action and re-action of sense-object and sense, the distinctive expressions of sex and of personality generally, and the phenomena of organic life, as sensed' or inferred, comprehended under the most general terms. Two modes of form alone are treated objectively: space and food. And of these, too, the aspect taken has close reference to the conscious personality. Akaso is really oka so, room, or opportunity, for life and movement. Food, though described as to its varieties in objective terms, is referred to rather in the abstract sense of nutrition and nutriment than as nutritive matter. (Cf. p. 203, n. 3.)

1 Better in Greek và gyóμeva, or in German die vier grossen Gewordenen. How the Buddhist logic exactly reconciled the anomaly of a podhatu as underived and yet as inaccessible to that sense which comes into contact with the underived is not, in the Manual, clearly made out. In hot water, as the Cy. says, there is heat, gas, and solid, and hence we feel it. Yet by the definition there must be in fluid a something underived from these three elements.

The Buddhist Sensationalism was opposed to the view taken in the Upanishad, where the senses are derived from prajǹà (rendered by Prof. Deussen 'consciousness '), and again from the World Soul. In the Garbha Up., however, sight is spoken of as fire. The Buddhist view was subsequently again opposed by the Sankhya philosophy, but not by the Nyaya.

Or we may be more especially struck by the curious selection and classification exercised in regard to the items of the catalogue of form.

Now, the compilers of this or of any of the canonical books were not interested in rupam on psychological grounds as such. Their object was not what we should term scientific. They were not inquiring into forms, either as objective existences, or as mental constructions, with any curiosity respecting the macrocosm, its parts, or its order. They were not concerned with problems of primordial An, of first causes, or of organic evolution, in the spirit which has been operative in Western thought from Thales (claimed by Europe) to Darwin. For them, as for the leaders of that other rival movement in our own culture, the tradition of Socrates and Plato, man was, first and last, the subject supremely worth thinking about. And man was worth thinking about as a moral being. The physical universe was the background and accessory, the support and the fuel' (u pādānam), of the evolution of the moral life. It was necessary to man as ethical (at least during his sojourn on the physical plane), but it was only in so far as it affected his ethical life that he could profitably study it. The Buddhist, like the Socratic view, was that of primitive man- What is the good of it ?'-transformed and sublimated by the evolution of the moral ideal. The early questioning: Is such and such good for life-preservation, for race-preservation, for fun? or is it bad? or is it indeterminate? becomes, in evolved ethics: Does it make for my perfection, for others' perfection, for noblest enjoyment? does it make for the contrary? does it make for neither?

And the advance in moral evolution which was attempted by Buddhist philosophy, coming as it did in an age of metaphysical dogmatism and withal of scepticism, brought with it the felt need of looking deeper into those data of mental procedure on which dogmatic speculation and ethical convictions were alike founded.1

1 G. Croom Robertson, Philosophical Remains,' p. 3.

d