Those emotional, perceptual and synthetic states, as well as those of intellect applied to sense-impressions, which arise in connexion with states that are past. . . future... present.1 [101] Which are the states that are personal ?2 Those states which, for this or that being, are of the self, self-referable, one's own,3 individual, the issue of grasping; in other words, the five skandhas. [1015] Which are the states that are external ? Those states which, for this or that other being, for other individuals, are of the self, self-referable, their own, individual, the issue of grasping;5 in other words, the five skandhas. [1016] Which are the states that are personal-external ? States which are both [personal and external]." [1017-1019] Which are the states that have an object of thought concerning the self. . . concerning that which is 1 Cf. § 1022. On ajjhatta and bahiddha cf. §§ 742, 743. The Cy. distinguishes four varieties in the connotation of ajjhattam, namely, gocarajjhattam, niyakajjhattam, ajjhattajjhattam and visayajjhattam, two of which are identical with two of the three meanings cited by Childers. The specific meaning used here is said to be the second. 3 For niyata read niyaka. That is, all beings except one's self.' Asl. 361. Tad ubhayam is the curt answer. It is to be regretted that Buddhaghosa's fertility in illustration was not applied to this species of dhamma. Incidentally one gathers that they alternate between self-reference and reference to other selves. For whereas the dhamma in the first and third questions are said to be either limited' or enlarged' (see $$ 1019-1021), and those in the second are said to be 'infinite,' states that are infinite' are said 'not to take as their object that which now relates to the external, now to the self.' (Asl. 361, 362.) external [to the self] .. concerning that which is 'personal-external'? Those emotional, perceptual, synthetic states, as well as those of intellect applied to sense-impressions,1 which arise in connexion with states of the self . . . states that are external... states that are personal-external. [1050] Which are the states that are both visible and impingeing 22 The sphere of visible form. [1051] Which are the states that are invisible, but impingeing? The spheres of the five senses and the spheres of sound, odour, taste and the tangible. [1052] Which are the states that are both invisible and non-impingeing? The four skandhas; that form, moreover, which, being invisible and non-impingeing, is yet included in the sphere of [mental] states; also uncompounded element. [End of] the Triplets. 1 Cf. § 1022 et seq. 2 See § 597 et seq., § 657 et seq. [CHAPTER II. The Group on Cause (hetu-gocchakam).]1 I. [1053] Which are the states that are causes? (A) The three causes of good (karma). In connexion with the statement ($ 595) that form is that which is not a cause,' the Cy. distinguishes, as did Aristotle, four varieties of cause. The coincidence, however, scarcely extends beyond the number. Hetu is either (a) cause as cause (hetu-hetu); (b) cause as condition, or necessary antecedent wherewithal' (paccayahetu); (c) cause as ultimate or supreme (uttama-hetu); and (1) cause as an attribute held in common (sadharanahetu). Asl. 303. These distinctions are shown to be applied as follows: (a) the trinity of threefold cause given in § 1053. Here the word is always paraphrased by root,' root, conversely, standing for productive agent in general (see the list in note to § 981), and, of course, for moral agency especially. (b) I have declared, bhikkhu, that the four great phenomena are the causes, are the conditions of the form-skandha.' When the paccayo is ma terial, it may be said to coincide with Aristotle's second formal principle ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. Possibly paccayo was this conception so generalized as to include the immaterial wherewithal requisite for the effect. Colebrooke, however (Life and Essays,' ii. 419), said that the Bauddhas distinguish between hetu as proximate cause and pratyaya (paccayo) as concurrent occasion. (c) When good (karma) takes effect, it is the object ultimately or supremely desired '-and the opposite, of course, in the case of bad karma. This may possibly approximate (B) The three causes of bad (karma). (C) The three causes of the indeterminate. The nine causes operative in the sensuous universe. The six causes operative in the universe of form. The six causes operative in the universe of the formless. (D) The six causes operative in the life that is the Unincluded. (A) In this connexion, [1054] Which are the three causes of good karma? The absence of lust, hate and dulness. In this connexion, [1055] What is the absence of lust? The absence of lust, lusting, lustfulness is the absence of infatuation, of raving, of passionateness; the absence of covetousness, that absence of lust which is the root of good (karma).1 [1056] What is the absence of hate? The absence of hate, hating, hatred; love, loving, loving disposition; tender care, forbearance, considerateness; to Aristotle's final cause (rò où éveka). (d) As the essence of the elements of earth and water (solid and liquid) are the condition of sweet or not-sweet, so is ignorance the common base-element of the syntheses (sanskaras). In our present connexion the term is said to be used in its first-named meaning. 1 Cf. § 32. The Pali terms coincide in both answers. In the following answer, the terms differ considerably from those in § 33. 2 The printed text has mettam; the Cy. and K. read metti. 3 The mental condition of one who is possessed by love, and through love is loosed from clinging.'" (Asl. 362.). Cf. note on p. 66. Anuddă, anuddayana, anuddayitattam. The Cy. paraphrases by rakkhati, showing the reference there is in these terms, usually rendered by pity,' 'compassion,' to the protective, shielding aspect of altruism and benevolence. Cf. its use in C. vii. 3, 13; S. ii., p. 218, where it seeking the general good, compassion; the absence of malice, of malignity; that absence of hate which is the root of good (karma). [1057] What is the absence of dulness? Knowledge about ill, about the uprising of ill, about the cessation of ill, and about the way leading to the cessation of ill; knowledge about the former things, about the latter things, about both taken together; knowledge about the assignable causation of causally determined states--even that kind of wisdom which is understanding, search, research, searching the Truth, etc. [continue as in § 31]. These are the three causes of good (karma). (B) In this connexion, [1058] Which are the three causes of bad (karma)? Lust, hate, dulness. In this connexion, [1059] What is lust? That which is passion (rago), infatuation (sarago),3 fawning (anunayo),* compliance (anurodho), is used to express that attitude of forbearance in the interests of the weaker brethren recommended by St. Paul to Roman and Corinthian adherents. 1 Hitesită. See C. ix. 5, 7. By all these words (i.e., from 'love' to compassion '), concludes Buddhaghosa, the advance (upacara) and conception (appana) of love is described. Possibly the procedure in the induction of Jhana was in his mind in using these technical terms. Cf. Rhys Davids, Yogavacara's Manual,' p. xi. 3 Meaning strong rago.' Asl. 362. This is opposed to patigho or repugnance in Mil. 44; c. 122 and 322. The comment (Asl. 362)—visayesu sattanam anunayanato-may indicate that the fawning is by way of pandering to the sensual appetites of others. This is opposed to virodho, pativirodho. See |