qualities which, taken singly, give inclusion, inclusion under the opposite, or exclusion from both; or which, taken in pairs, afford three combinations. We then get pairs of qualities taken together, affording four combinations. After that comes consideration of Form under more inductive classifications, e.g., the four elements and, fifthly, their derivatives, and so on, as given below.

[CHAPTER I.

Exposition of Form under Single Concepts (ekakaniddeso).]

[595] All form is that which is

not a cause,

not the concomitant of a cause,

disconnected with cause,'

conditioned,2

compound,3

endowed with form,"

mundane,"

co-Intoxicant,"

Na hetum eva. On the Commentator's analysis of the meanings of cause,' see under § 1053. The special connotation here is that form as such is not the ground or root,' or psychical associate of any moral or immoral result. Asl. 303. The two following terms are dealt with under §§ 1074, 1076.

3

Sappaccayam. Cf. § 1083.

Sankhatam. This quality is involved in the preceding quality. See § 1085. See also above, p. 166, n. l. Rupiyam, or rupam eva. The table of contents (584) gives the former; K. has here the latter. Either the one or the other has been omitted from the present section of the printed text. The Cy. gives the latter term -Rupam eva ti rupino dhamma, etc. Asl. 301. Lokiyam; the antithesis of lok uttaram.

$1093.

Sasavam. See § 1096 et seq.

Cf.

favourable to

the Fetters,1

the Ties,

the Floods,

the Bonds,

the Hindrances;

infected,2

favourable to grasping,3

belonging to corruption,*
indeterminate,

void of idea,"

neither feeling, nor perception, nor synthesis, disconnected with thought,

neither moral result, nor productive of moral
result,?

uncorrupted yet belonging to corruption,
not that where conception works and thought
discursive,"

not that wherein is no working of conception, but only of thought discursive,'

void of the working of conception and of thought discursive,'

1 Saññojaniyam, etc. This and the four following terms are severally discussed in connexion with the ethical metaphors of Fetters and the rest. See § 1113 et seq. Paramattham. See § 1174 et seq.

Upadaniyam. See § 990 and § 1213 et seq.
Sankilesikam. See § 993 and § 1229 et seq.

* Anārammanam, the idea or mental object belonging, of course, to the arupa-dhammo.

Acetasikam. See § 1022.

* See § 989.

> See § 994.

This and the two

Na savitakka-savicaram. following technical terms mark off form' from the mental discipline of Jhana, even though Jhana may be practised for the sake of passing from a sensuous existence to the 'universe of Form.' Cf. §§ 160, 168, 161, and 996-998.

not accompanied by joy,'
not 'accompanied by ease,'

not accompanied by disinterestedness,"
not something capable of being got rid of
either by insight or by cultivation,

not that the cause of which may be got rid of
either by insight or by cultivation,

neither tending to, nor away from, the accumulation involving re-birth,

belonging neither to studentship nor to that which is beyond studentship,

limited,

related to the universe of sense,

not related to the universe of form,3

nor to that of the formless,

included,

not of the Unincluded,

not something entailing inevitable retri

bution,

unavailing for ethical) guidance,

cognizable when apparent" by the six modes. of cognition,

1 Cf. $$ 999-1001. These are all mental states, characterizing the other four skandhas, not the rupak khandho. Similarly, the four following doctrinal expressions are only applicable to mental and moral categories. Cf. §§ 1007-1118.

2 Parittam. See § 1019.

Read na rupavacaram.
See p. 165, n. 2.

This and the following term belong to ethical, immaterial categories of thought. See $$ 1028-1030 and 1291; also 1288, 1289, and 277.

I.c., remarks the Commentator, when it is present (in consciousness). For, strictly speaking, with reference to visual and other sense-cognition, they (read na hi tani) do not cognize the past and future; that is the function of representative cognition (manoviññāṇam)' (Asl. 304).

impermanent,'

subject to decay.

Such is the category of Form considered by way of single attributes.2

1 Aniccam, inasmuch as, having fallen into this stream of sense-cognition it (form') has become mere flotsam, has become something gone, something that is not' (ibid.). This shows well the idealist or psychological standpoint of the Buddhist tradition. Form is impermanent for the individual perceptive consciousness.

The Cy. gives as the reason for there being no catechism on each of the foregoing attributes the fact that there is no correlated opposite, as in the next category, from which each term is to be differentiated (Asl. 303). This, in view of the procedure in Book I., is scarcely adequate. However, every term is examined in the sequel, as the foregoing notes will have indicated.