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certain extent herein by the very thoroughness of its methods of getting at the moral life by way of psychical training. We see, as in our Manual, and other canonical records, elaborate systems for analyzing and cultivating the intellectual faculties, the will and feeling, and we take these as substitutes for overt moral activity, as ends when they are but means. And if the Dhamma-Sangani seems to some calculated to foster introspective thought to a morbid extent, it must not be forgotten that it is not Buddhist philosophy alone which teaches that, for all the natural tendency to spend and be spent in efforts to cope, by thought and achievement, with the world without, it is in this little fathom-long mortal frame with its thinkings and its notions that the world"1 itself and the whole problem of its misery and of the victory over it lies hid.
If I have succeeded to any extent in connecting the contents of this Manual with the rest of the Buddhist Pitakas, it is because I had at my disposal the mass of material accumulated in my husband's MS. Pali dictionary. Besides this, the selection of material for Sections II. and III. of my Introduction is his work. Besides this I owe him a debt of gratitude indefinitely great for advice and criticism generally.
1 See second quotation, p. vii.
THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS
PART I.-GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the Sensuous Universe (Kà mà vacara-attha-mahacittāni).]1
 Which are the states that are good ?2
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe3 has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and associated with knowledge, and has as its object a
The brackets enclosing this and all other headings indicate that the latter have been transposed from the position they occupy in the text. There each heading stands at the end of its section. 3 Ibid.
Nana-sampayuttam. According to the Cy., a good thought deserves to be thus distinguished on three grounds: from the karma it produces, from the maturity of the faculties it involves, and from the remoteness of mental and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76). Sampayuttam-lit., con-yoked-is, in the Kathavatthu, quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the following relations (between one 'state' and another): concomitant (sahagata), connate (sahajātā), contiguous
sight, a sound, a smell, a taste, a touch, a [mental] state,3 or what not, then there is.......
(i) contact (§ 2),
(ii) feeling (§ 3), '
(samsattha), having a common origin (ekuppādā), a common cessation (ekanirodha), a common basis or embodiment (ekavatthukā), a common object of attention (ekārammaṇā). In the present work the term is subsequently rendered by 'connected,' e.g., in § 1007, etc. The preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam, which I have rendered 'accompanied by happiness,' is virtually declared by the Cy. to be here equivalent to somanassa-sampayuttam, inasmuch as it is to be interpreted in its fullest intension. Of its five distinguishable shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of 'conjoined' (samsattham). And of the four distinguishable connotations of conjoined,' the one here selected is that of connate.' Hence 'accompanied by' means here 'commate. And further, inasmuch as the concomitance is not between two corporeal phenomena, or between a corporeal and an incorporeal phenomenon, it is of that persistent and thoroughgoing kind-persisting beyond the common origin-which is described under the word 'associated.'
Thus far the intricate Buddhaghosa. But I have yet to discover any attempt to analyze the laws governing the process of association between mental states, such as we first find in Aristotle.
On happiness,' see §§ 10, 18.
Ruparammanam, saddarammanam, etc., i..., either as a present sensation or as a representative image relating to the past or future; in the language of Hume, as an impression or as an idea; in the more comprehensive German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See Introduction.
Literally, an object that is tangible-the standard Pali term.
Dhammarammanam-the object,' that is, of representative imagination or ideation (mano, cittam, Asl, 71, just as a thing seen is the object of sight. Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammarammanam is something outside the range of the senses, and cites M. i. 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas
(iii) perception (§ 4),
(vi) conception (§ 7),
(vii) discursive thought (§ 8), (viii) joy (§ 9),
(ix) ease (§ 10),
(x) self-collectedness (§ 11),
(xi) the faculty of faith (§ 12),
(xii) the faculty of energy (§ 13),
(xiii) the faculty of mindfulness (§ 14),
each sense has its specific field, the mano has all these five fields as its scope. At the moment when an object enters the door of the eye' or other sense, it enters also the door of the ideating faculty causing the consciousness, or one's being, to vibrate (bhavangacalanassa paccayo hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment, strikes the bough and casts a shadow (ibid. 72).-As we might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied by representative cognition-Then, in the course of the mental undulations arising through this disturbance by way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed Mahacittani may emerge. But in pure representative cognition (suddha-manodvare) there is no process of sensory stimulation,' as when we recall past sense-experience. The process of representation is illustrated in detail, and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology. In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant sensations are described as being simply revived during a subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch, it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator is not here interested in 'association by contrast' as such.
Lit., or whatever [object the thought] is about.' The gist of the somewhat obscure comment is that, while no new class of objects is here to be understood over and above those of present or past sensations, there is no serial or numerical order in which these become material for thought.