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knowledge, power, and justice, which cannot be said of a lie, where there is nothing to carry the mind to any reflection upon the Deity, or the divine attributes at all.

2. Perjury violates a superior confidence. Mankind must trust to one another; and they have nothing better to trust to than one another's oath. Hence legal adjudications, which govern and affect every right and interest on this side the grave, of necessity proceed and depend upon oaths. Perjury, therefore, in its general consequence, strikes at the security of reputation, property, and even of life itself. A lie cannot do the same mischief, because the same credit is not given to it.*

3. God directed the Israelites to swear by his name;† and was pleased, "in order to show the immutability of his own counsel," to confirm his covenant with that people by an oath neither of which it is probable he would have done, had he not intended to ropresent oaths, as having some meaning and effect, beyond the obligation of a bare promise; which effect must be owing to the severer punishment with which he will vindicate the authority of oaths.

V. Promissory oaths are not binding, where the promise itself would not be so: for the several cases of which, see the Chapter of Promises.

VI. As oaths are designed for the security of the imposer, it is manifest they must be interpreted, and performed in the sense in which the imposer intends them; otherwise, they afford no security to him. And this is the meaning and reason of the rule, “jurare in animum imponentis; which rule the reader is desired to carry along with him, whilst we proceed to consider certain particular oaths, which are either of greater importance, or more likely to fall in our way than others.

Except, indeed, where a Quaker's or Moravian's affirmation is accepted in the place of an oath; in which case, a lie partakes, so far as this reason extends, of the nature and guilt of perjury. Heb. vi. 17.

+ Deut. vi. 13. x. 20.

CHAPTER XVII.

OATH IN EVIDENCE.

THE witness swears, "to speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, touching the matter in question.

Upon which it may be observed, that the designed concealment of any truth, which relates to the matter in agitation, is as much a violation of the oath, as to testify a positive falsehood; and this whether the witness be interrogated to that particular point or not. For, when the person to be examined is sworn upon a voir dire, that is, in order to inquire, whether he ought to be admitted to give evidence in the cause at all, the form runs thus : "You shall true answer make to all such questions as shall be asked you ;" but when he comes to be sworn in chief, he swears "to speak the whole truth, without restraining it, as before, to the questions that shall be asked: which difference shews, that the law intends, in this latter case, to require of the witness, that he give a complete and unreserved account of what he knows of the subject of the trial, whether the questions proposed to him reach the extent of his knowledge or not. So that if it be inquired of the witness afterwards, why he did not inform the court so and so, it is not a sufficient, though a very common answer, to say, "because it was never asked me."

I know but one exception to this rule; which is, when a full discovery of the truth tends to accuse the witness himself of some legal crime. The law of England constrains no man to become his own accuser; consequently, imposes the oath of testimony with this tacit reservation. But the exception must be confined to legal crimes. A point of honour, of delicacy, or of reputation, may make a witness backward to disclose some circumstance with which he is

acquainted; but will in no wise justify his concealment of the truth, unless it could be shewn, that the law which imposes the oath, intended to allow this indulgence to such motives. The exception of which we are speaking is also withdrawn by a com pact between the magistrate and the witness, when an accomplice is admitted to give evidence against the partners of his crime.

Tenderness to the prisoner, although a specious apology for concealment, is no just excuse; for, if this plea be thought sufficient, it takes the administration of penal justice out of the hands of judges and juries, and makes it depend upon the temper of prosecutors and witnesses.

Questions may be asked which are irrelative to the cause, which affect the witness himself, or some third person; in which, and in all cases, where the witness doubts of the pertinency and propriety of the ques tion, he ought to refer his doubts to the court. The answer of the court, in relaxation of the oath, is authority enough to the witness for the law which imposes the oath may remit what it will of the obligation; and it belongs to the court to declare what the mind of the law is. Nevertheless, it cannot be said universally, that the answer of the court is conclusive upon the conscience of the witness; for his obligation depends upon what he apprehended, at the time of taking the oath, to be the design of the law in imposing it: and no after requisition or explanation by the court can carry the obligation beyond that.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE.

"I DO sincerely promise, and swear, that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majesty King GEORGE." Formerly the oath of allegiance ran

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thus: "I do promise to be true and faithful to the King and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear, of life, and limb, and terrene honour; and not to know or hear of any ill or damage intended him, without defending him therefrom :" and was altered at the Revolution to the present form. So that the present oath is a relaxation of the old one. And as the oath was intended to ascertain, not so much the extent of the subject's obedience, as the person to whom it was due, the legislature seems to have wrapped up its meaning upon the former point, in a word purposely made choice of for its general and indeterminate signification.

It will be most convenient to consider, first, what the oath excludes, as inconsistent with it: secondly, what it permits,

1. The oath excludes all intention to support the claim or pretensions of any other person or persons, to the crown and government, than the reigning sovereign. A Jacobite, who is persuaded of the Pretender's right to the crown, and who moreover designs to join with the adherents of that cause, to assert this right, whenever a proper opportunity, with a reasonable prospect of success, presents itself, cannot take the oath of allegiance; or, if he could, the oath of abjuration follows, which contains an express renunciation of all opinions in favour of the claim of the exiled family.

2. The oath excludes all design at the time, of attempting to depose the reigning prince, for any reason whatever. Let the justice of the Revolution be what it would, no honest man could have taken even the present oath of allegiance to James the Second, who entertained at the time of taking it, a design of joining in the measures which were entered into to dethrone him.

3. The oath forbids the taking up of arms against the reigning prince, with views of private advancement, or from motives of personal resentment or dislike. It is possible to happen in this, what frequent

ly happens in despotic governments, that an ambitious general, at the head of the military force of the nation, might, by a conjuncture of fortunate circumstances, and a great ascendency over the minds of the soldiery, depose the prince upon the throne, and make way to it for himself, or for some creature of his own. A person in this situation would be withheld from such an attempt by the oath of allegiance, if he paid regard to it. If there were any who engaged in the rebellion of the year forty-five, with the expectation of titles, estates, or preferment; or because they were disappointed, and thought them. selves neglected and ill used at court; or because they entertained a family animosity, or personal resentment against the king, the favourite, or the minister; if any were induced to take up arms by these mo tives, they added to the many crimes of an unpro voked rebellion, that of wilful and corrupt perjury. If, in the late American war, the same motives deter mined others to connect themselves with that opposition, their part in it was chargeable with perfidy and falsehood to their oath, whatever was the justice of the opposition itself, or however well founded their own complaints might be of private injury.

We are next to consider, what the oath of allegi ance permits, or does not require.

1. It permits resistance to the king, when his ill behaviour, or imbecility is such, as to make resistance beneficial to the community. It may fairly be presumed, that the convention parliament, which introduced the oath in its present form, did not intend, by imposing it, to exclude all resistance; since the members of that legislature had many of them recently taken up arms against James the Second: and the very authority by which they sat together, was itself the effect of a successful opposition to an acknowledged sovereign. Some resistance, therefore, was meant to be allowed; and, if any, it must be that which has the public interest for its object.

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