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ropeans, and forbidden the overt profession of the Christian religion. He had refused to admit the two bishops into his presence, according to former usage, and when one of them lately presented himself, he insulted him by offering him a piece of money as a common beggar."

With the two French Mandarins, MM. Chaigneau and Vanier, the British envoy held frequent, and very agreeable and beneficial intercourse. Vanier, the senior, had dwelt in Cochin-China thirty-three years, served in all Gia-Long's wars, and gained a high rank and title. He began his professional career in the French navy-was present with the combined French and American army, to which Lord Cornwallis surrendered at Little York, as well as in the action between Lord Rodney and the Comte de Grasse. This share in our revolutionary struggle, excites additional interest in his biography and situation. M. Chaigneau, had been twenty or twenty-nine years in the country; returned to France in 1819, and brought back a French wife, and the appointment of Consul General for Cochin-China, from the French court. The spouse of M. Vanier, was a Cochin-Chinese, "a fine looking woman, tall, and as fair as the natives of the south of Europe." Both the gentlemen and ladies dressed in the indigenous fashion, but the repasts which they gave to the British embassy were entirely French. Mr. Crawfurd states, that it was their devotion to royalty which fixed the two mandarins, and the greater number of their countrymen, in this remote quarter of the world, and he adds, "in short, it was the French revolution which achieved the revolution in Cochin-China, and established the existing order of things there." Many are the remote, unexpected and important incidents of every great political revolution. Our own will have a longer and more diffusive train, than any which has occurred in modern times. To the page in which Mr. Crawfurd has celebrated the politeness, hospitality, and real kindness" of his French friends, he has appended this note. "These gentlemen have all quitted Cochin-China since, and I had the pleasure of seeing the greater number of them at Singapore, on their way to France, in 1825." The French party, so called, in Cochin-China, is now extinct; but the people continue to be styled the French of India, on account of their vivacity, gaiety, and other social qualities.

On the 17th of October, the British Embassy quitted Hué, proceeded by land to Touran, and embarked thence for Singapore. Nothing was gained from the court of Cochin-China. It manifested an invincible reluctance to maintain any diplomatic relations with the delegated government of India. Mr. Crawfurd relates, that, after the breaking out of the Burmese war, a second mission was despatched by the governor-general, to Siam, the object of which was to gain the assistance of the Siamese,

and to improve the commercial intercourse. The Siamese sent armies into the field, and made a show of co-operating with the British; but when they discovered that they could acquire nothing substantial for themselves, they receded, and remained neuter, with warm professions of friendship for both belligerents; intensely hating, in fact, their inveterate enemy, the Burmese, yet dreading more the British power and policy. Our author also mentions, that some intelligent and extensive efforts were made by the merchants of Singapore, backed by the capital of London and Liverpool, to enlarge the British trade with Siam, by a direct intercourse. Those efforts totally failed, and the end is deemed hopeless. Mr. Crawfurd expatiates on the peculiar and close affinity subsisting between the races of men that inhabit the wide regions between Bengal and China, excepting, however, the Annam, upon which the Chinese character is so deeply stamped. The leading nations in this wide range, are the Burmans, the Siamese, and the Peguans. Their dialects bear a common resemblance in structure and idiom. There is a striking accordance among themselves, in all essential points, and a dissimilitude to all other Asiatic races, no less obvious. They have the same form of religion, the same laws, the same literature, the same civil and political institutions. They appear never to have been victims to foreign force or rule; but while exempt from foreign aggression, their own history is one of constant internal warfare, and alternations of conquest and subjection. The public annals of mankind, and the narratives of travellers, whether concerning the East or the West, betray at least the same general outline, and the same complexional traits, of human nature. In every part of the globe, our species fall into like vanities, follies, and vices, though mere usages and fashions may differ. Much of what we have abstracted respecting the Siamese and CochinChinese, may smite the conscience of nations far more refined and exalted. For various reasons, the various divisions of mankind may be careful, too, in judging each other-backward in pretending to interpret what they do not understand. "To speak correctly," says Barrow, "of the manners and opinions of foreign nations; to trace the motives of their actions, and the grounds of their prejudices; to examine the effects produced on the temper and disposition of the people, by the civil and religious institutions; and to inquire into their ideas of moral right and wrong, their notions of taste, of beauty, and happiness, and many other subjects necessary to be investigated, before a thorough knowledge can be obtained of their true character and condition, require not only a long residence in the country, but an intimate acquaintance with all the various classes of society; and after all, an accurate portrait is hardly to be expected." Here is the testimony of a great authority on the subject. We leave it as a

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caution to those who shall peruse Mr. Crawfurd's splendid and ponderous volume, rich as this is in evidence of the author's sound sense, comprehensive information, and scrupulous research.

ART. IX.-NEW MARITIME ARTILLERY.

Nouvelle Force Maritime et Application de cette force a quel ques parties du Service de l'Armée de Terre; ou Essai sur P'état actuel des Moyens de la force Maritime; sur une espèce nouvelle d'Artillerie de mer, qui detruirait promptement les Vaisseaux de haut-bord; sur la Construction de Navires à voile et à vapeur, de grandeur modérée, qui, armés de cette artillerie, donneraient une Marine moins Couteuse et plus puissante que celles existantes; Et sur la force que le système de bouches-a-feu proposé offrirait a terre, pour les batteries de siége, de place, de côtes et de campagne. Par H. I. PAIXHANS. Ancien élève de l'Ecole Polytechnique; Chef de bataillon au Corps Royal de l'Artillerie; Chevalier de l'Ordre Royal et Militaire de Saint-Louis; Officier de l'Ordre Royal de la Legion-d'Honneur. 1 vol. 4to. pp. 458-7 plates. Paris.

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New Maritime Force, and the application of it to certain parts of the Land Service; or an Essay on the actual System of Maritime Force; on a new species of Marine Artillery, which would promptly destroy ships of the line; on the construction of both sailing and steam vessels, of moderate size, which, being armed with this New Artillery, would furnish a less costly and more powerful force than the present marine; and on the advantages which the New System of Artillery would offer by its employment on shore, either in battering or field pieces, or in the defence of Towns and Coasts. By H. I. PAIXHANS, Pupil of the Polytechnic School; Chef de Bataillon of the Royal Artillery; Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis; and Member of the Legion of Honour.

It is now more than fifty years, since Gribeauval and other scientific artillerists and engineers, commenced a system of improvement in land artillery, which has so much increased the effects of this potent engine, in determining the fate of pitched battles; the ardour with which the French have sought after, and adopted every thing tending in the slightest degree to the perfection of this branch of the service, and the consequent su

periority of their field artillery, both as regards structure and management, have contributed essentially to the success of some of their most brilliant campaigns. The great desideratum in field artillery, is rapidity of movement; and it would be perfect, if it could be brought up, manœuvred, and carried to the various parts of the field of battle, with the celerity of cavalry; this has been obtained to a certain degree; but the French were the first to introduce these improvements, by using guns lighter than those formerly brought into the field, which, together with a reduction in the weight of their "appareil," and a better mode of draught, rendered it for a time the most formidable in Europe. It is obvious, however, that advantages derived from improvements of this kind, must be temporary, and would soon be shared by all alike; and this branch of the military forces has in fact attained nearly the same degree of excellence in every service: if there is any difference, the English field artillery, (according to the opinion of a French officer,) is superior to that on the continent.

It may seem strange, that while the artillery used in land fights was receiving important improvements, the same weapon which constituted the whole force of the marine, should have undergone few or no material changes; for, with the exception of carronades, which were introduced into the British navy in 1779 or 1780, the armament of ships of war does not differ essentially from that of fifty years ago. There have been various experiments made, with a view to this object, and many hints and suggestions for material changes, but none of any consequence have been carried into effect. A little reflection will explain the causes of this seeming neglect. The situation of the fleets and armies of the belligerent powers, during this period, was very different; -the latter were in constant and fearful collision with each other; and, whatever might be the successes of either party, they were never so great as to render them indifferent to the improvement of all those means on which they depended for victory; but the French marine, which at no time had obtained more than a temporary and partial superiority over that of England, and the elements of which are very inferior to those of their insular neighbours, never made a successful stand after the 1st of June 1794. From this period, the star of Britain prevailed, and a series of victories ensued-terminating with Trafalgar, which annihilated the navy of France. The superiority on the part of England, was such as to render increased exertion unnecessary; it was useless to augment the effect of means already more than sufficient to accomplish their purpose; for every succeeding effort on the part of the French, only served to render their decline more obvious. This state of things very naturally led to the belief that the British navy was the

best possible in every point of view. So confident were they rendered by success, that they vaunted the superiority of some of their smaller guns over the heavier calibers in use in other navies-thus attributing to it a perfect combination of the materiel, as well as of the personnel; but in fact they were entirely indebted to the latter, to their superior management of this materiel-to their skill in seamanship;-for the moment they came in contact with seamen equal, and in many respects superior to their own, though opposing with their favourite class of ships, armed with a caliber they professedly considered the best, they were at once foiled, and the disparity between them and their new enemy, was greater than had ever been exhibited in their repeated triumphs over the French. It is not our intention to refer to their different modes of accounting for what was a very natural occurrence; but those who saw the true state of the case, also saw that the only remedy-if indeed remedy were now possible-was to oppose their enemy with the same, or heavier weapons, and endeavour to excel in the use of them. Here is, we conceive, under all circumstances, the true secret of victory. This led to some changes of armament hitherto considered unnecessary, and it has for a few years past been a matter of consideration to increase the intensity of the ordinary means in use in the different navies; but when the greatest degree of absolute force has been given to this part of the national defence, as the progress of all will be nearly alike, the relative force of the respective marines will be the same as at present, so that 'however the navies of Europe or the United States may go on improving in this respect-that which is most powerful will still continue so, and the overwhelming superiority of England can only be counterbalanced by the introduction of some means which shall change the whole face of affairs, and produce an entire revolution in naval warfare.

It is to this subject Mr. Paixhans has directed his researches; and the object of the work before us is the introduction of a new armament, whose use and principles, though long known, yet, from a variety of causes, were not carried into operation; but by the successful application of which, he now thinks to produce results highly important, not only to France, but to every nation in any degree dependent on a marine for prosperity and safety. The means thus proposed are bomb-cannon; and he endeavours to show that vessels armed in this manner are competent to the destruction of any class of ships whatever, and of course the present fleets of line of battle ships rendered in a great measure, if not entirely useless; and naval despotism will in future be'exceedingly difficult, if not impossible.

The project of destroying the supremacy of the British navy, or putting it hors de combat, by means apparently so simple,

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