objections which may be made to the doctrine that personal identity is an undeniable truth, and also the opinion of several philosophers on this subject, particularly Locke's; for these we shall refer the reader to the Lectures themselves.-11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th.

All reasoning must take for granted the truth of certain selfevident propositions; therefore there can be no such thing as reasoning against self-evident truths generally. If there be first truths, personal identity is one of the most unquestionable. It does not depend on any series of propositions, but arises in certain circumstances from a principle of thought as essential to the mind as its power of perception or memory, or as reasoning itself. There is to be found in it every circumstance required to substantiate it as a law of intuitive belief. It is universal and irresistible. These first truths Stewart has called the elements of human reason. They are, says Brown, essential to philosophy, in all its forms, as they are physically essential to the preservation of our animal existence. The rash and unphilosophical extension of them by some philosophers, and the misapprehension of them by others, render it necessary to state with precision their reality and importance.

Having shown that the phenomena of mind may be the subject of science, no less than those of matter, and having established the necessity of admitting self-evident truths, and in particular that of personal identity, as the foundation of all reasoning, Brown enters upon the arrangement of mental phenomena. It might seem on first reflection, (he says,) a hopeless task to reduce under a few heads the almost infinite variety of thoughts and feelings. But nature has not left us without a clue in this labyrinth. The single power by which we discover resemblance and relation, is sufficient to reduce this confusion to order. Our elassification of objects depends on certain relations which we discover in their phenomena. Some of these are more obvious than others, but it often happens that the least obvious afford the best ground of classification. Many divisions of mental phenomena have been made; the most common is that of the understanding and the will. But this division, though very ancient, (says Brown,) is very illogical. As none of the classifications of mental phenomena which have yet been made are accurate or complete, he attempts a new arrangement. He begins with a caution against the supposition that any change in the arrangement of objects can alter the true nature of their phenomena; although a misapprehension of this simple truth, has given rise to many absurdities; for no sooner were certain affections classed together as belonging to the will, or the understanding, than they were considered as not belonging to the same substance, and each faculty was made an independent mind.

of external causes, with our notion of resistance. Indeed, in speaking of Dr. Reid's theory of perception, he says, "there is no doubt, that the sensations of fragrance, &c. give us the idea of an external cause, but not of a fragrant body." This is all for which we contend; the sense of smell or taste, cannot give us the feelings which belong to the senses of sight or touch, but they convey their own appropriate information, as distinctly as these last senses, and give us a belief as certain of an external cause. But Brown evidently did not intend to admit so much; for he says again, (Lect. 27,) "we have shown, that, in all the senses except touch, though the idea of a cause of the sensation is suggested, yet that this would not be perceived to be a material body, or even a cause, without ourselves, were they not associated with ideas of resistance and extension; that is, of matter previously acquired in another way." In our opinion, much of the confusion in the reasonings of philosophers on this subject, is owing to the distinction which has been falsely made, between what are called primary and secondary qualities. There is not that generic difference which has been ascribed to them. The primary are, as Brown has said, (though he does not appear to realize the whole force of his observations on this subject,) "relative no less than the secondary; for all that we can know of matter is, that it is the cause of certain sensations which we experience." Now, though we have more distinct and familiar notions of primary qualities, because their sensations are more frequently repeated, yet to us it appears, that we become acquainted with the secondary qualities, in the same way as with the primary. To a being who had only the senses of taste, smell, and hearing-flavour, fragrance, and sound, would be primary qualities. We have learned from experience," says Brown, that all our sensations must have some cause; that is, invariable antecedents. When we experience the sensation of resistance, we can ascribe it to no cause within ourselves; and this suggests the idea of an external cause." Does not the same reasoning, we ask, apply to the sensations of taste, smell, or hearing? They are not invariably consequent on any mental affections; therefore, on this very principle of Brown's, we must ascribe them to something without; and, consequently, get the idea of external causes of our sensations. That this notion of an external cause, combined only with the feelings obtained from the organs of taste, smell, hearing, or even sight, should be called matter, we are far from demanding; for that term, as it is now used, means the sensations of resistance and extension, combined with the belief of an external cause of these sensations. We merely give it as our opinion, an opinion which we express with diffidence, (since minds far wiser than our own, have been misled by these subtle inquiries,) that, could we have been so formed,

66

he can make, the true theory of perception. It is with some hesitation, that we attempt to comprise within the narrow limits to which we have restricted ourselves, the results of his refined and ingenious speculations on this part of his subject. It is probable, he thinks, that our belief in an external world is derived in many instances from associations transferred from sense to sense; and that the instances in which it is primary, that is, immediately consequent on our sensations, are fewer than has been supposed. The qualities of bodies, generally, supposed to be made known to us by the sense of touch, are extension, magnitude, divisibility, roughness, smoothness, hardness, figure, motion. He reduces all, except motion, to two; resistance and extension. These are not made known to us as qualities of objects without, by the sense of touch merely; this gives us the simple tactual sensation or feeling, peculiar to the organ; and this is all that rightly belongs to it, as the sensation of colour is all that rightly belongs to the organ of sight, till it has received the aid of experience and the other senses. It is by the combined action of this simple tactual sensation, the use of the muscles, (which Brown calls another sense) and experience, that we become acquainted with the primary qualities of matter. The first motion an infant makes, is accompanied with a certain feeling, which is the consequence of his willing the motion; but if, on attempting the action again, he meets with something which impedes it, he has the feeling of resistance, which he perceives was not caused, as that of motion was, by any thing in his own mind, and he thus gets the idea of something without-a cause not originating in himself; and thus, (as Brown evidently believes,) arises our notion of an external world. The repeated use of the muscles, causes a succession of feelings; and this succession suggests, that is involves the idea of time and of divisibility. Time is length, not metaphorically, but literally; therefore the idea of extension also will be obtained from this source; if the idea of resistance be added, we have, by this union, the very notion of matter; viz. that which has parts, which resists our efforts to grasp it, and which is without ourselves.

Brown is of opinion, that the senses of smell, taste, hearing, and even sight, give us, originally, no information of an external world; that we should not refer their sensations to any thing without, any more than we should the emotions of joy or grief, were it not for the aid of associations of the feelings of resistance and experience. We think this is going too far; although we may admit that the notion of resistance is obtained in the manner he has described, we do not see that it is therefore necessary to admit, that this is the sole origin of our belief in an external cause of our sensations. We think this error in Brown, (if it be one,) arises from his confounding the notion

tions or images of the past, which arise one after another in our minds, according to certain laws of suggestion, and the other set are perceptions of relations, which our various conceptions bear to one another. These two divisions comprehend all our thoughts and feelings, included under the head of intellectual states. The first are called simple suggestion, the second relative suggestions. With these two capacities of suggestion, different emotions may be combined, especially that most common of all emotions, desire; and as the desire does or does not concur with them, they appear different, and by those who do not make the necessary analysis, are supposed to be indicative of different powers. They may all, however, be reduced to two classes. The laws of simple suggestion, (called primary as being of universal influence) are resemblance, contiguity, and contrast, resemblance includes analogy.

To the faculty of simple suggestion, we are indebted for memory. We can hardly conceive that we could exist without this faculty, which enables us to avail ourselves of all that we have ever known. If our ideas did not arise according to a certain order, that is, were it not for the laws of association, memory would be of little use. We are obliged for want of room to pass over the lectures on the laws of association of ideas, though we regard as important the views they exhibit. The result is, that our associations are merely simple suggestions, which succeed in a particular order according to certain relations, as those of resemblance, proximity, contrast; and that they are not linked together by some mysterious connexion, in consequence of having once existed in succession in the mind.

Conception, which has been called a distinct power of the mind, is nothing more than simple suggestion.

The phenomena of imagination have also been ascribed to a peculiar power. If we analyse the process of the mind in the exercise of the imagination, we shall find that having selected a subject, the desire to treat it keeps the attention fixed on this subject, till one after another all the images and thoughts which the mind has treasured up, rise according to the laws of spontaneous suggestion. We perceive by the exercise of judgment, that some of these images are adapted to our purpose better than others, and it is this feeling of approval which fixes the attention on these, while others, pass away and give place to new suggestions. The combinations thus obtained, are called creative, because they exhibit to us results different from any we have before known.

"Thus nature is as she always has been in every age, the only true and everlasting muse. The inspirer to whom we are indebted for all that is magnificent in art, as well as for those glorious models of excellence which in the living and inanimate scene of

things, she has presented to the admiration of the genius which she inspires." Lect. 42.

Another class of phenomena, which may be analysed into modes of simple suggestion, is comprehended under the name of habit.

Besides these classes of general phenomena, which flow from the primary laws of simple suggestion, there are accidental associations, which Brown calls, secondary laws of suggestion. These modify our taste, our genius, our understanding, and our morals.

The influence of these secondary laws, is greatly modified by original constitutional differences. This influence is of two kinds; 1st, that of increasing the effect of all the primary laws of suggestion; 2d, that of rendering some more powerful than others. It is in this last modification of the suggesting principle, that the whole, or the greater part of genius consists. Some minds are influenced chiefly by associations depending on contiguity. This is the most general principle of association, and a poet whose trains of thought depended on this principle, though he might have, in consequence of more extensive reading or observation, a greater number of images than those around him, could have none that had not occurred to other minds. To minds of a higher order, images are suggested by analogy, and new and striking combinations and trains of thought will arise. The inventions of poetic genius are the suggestions of analogy; the prevailing suggestions of common minds are those of contiguity and it is this difference of the occasion of suggestion, and not of the images suggested, which forms the distinctive superiority of original genius. It is the same in philosophy. He alone has a philosophic genius, who not only produces the same effects by the same means as others have done before, but who, in consequence of the suggestions of analogy, is enabled to produce new effects, or to produce those already known, by new and simpler means. The primary laws of association are much affected by diversisities of temper. How different are the images, which the same object will suggest to a gloomy or cheerful mind? "To the cheerful, in the very darkness of the storm, the cloud which hides the sunshine from the eyes, does not hide it from their heart; while to the gloomy, no sky is bright, no scene is fair." Lect. 37.

Those feelings of relation, which have been classed under the head of relative suggestion, are essentially different from our simple suggestions, or from any combination of these, in the groupings of fancy. There is an original tendency in the mind, by which, on perceiving together different objects, we are instantly, without the intervention of any other mental process, sensible of their relation in certain respects. The number of these relations, even of external things, is almost infinite; and