mind the impression, that man must renounce his rational faculties in order to pay due respect to the truth of God, or that any position is to be held true in theology which is false in fact; they know well that their work of seduction is all but completed. That great wicked man, of whom it is hard to say whether the brilliance of his wit or the maliciousness of his impiety existed in the higher degree, perpetually avails himself of this sophistry;* and his unhappy disciples have been servile imitators of this, as of his other artifices.

"Whatever opinion agrees not with reason is inadmissible in divinity."† "To admit any doctrines which are contrary to common sense, we neither can nor ought to be induced by the express words of the Spirit of God himself." "Whatever the reason of man finds out to be false, is on no account to be considered as true or right in religion."§ If the authors of these hardy and irre

* For example: "We believe by faith, and not by our reason, which we take good care never to listen to; for, when faith speaks, it is well known that reason must not say a word." Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique; art. Miracles.

+ Quæ cum ratione non convenit opinio, ea etiam in Theologiâ nullum locum habere potest. Smalcius contra Frantz. Disp. iv. de Justif.

Ut ea quæ naturæ refragantur admittamus, ipsius Divini Spiritus apertis verbis adduci nec possumus nec debemus. Socini Op. tom. i. p. 784.

§ Quicquid ratio humana falsum esse reprehendit, id nullo pacto pro vero aut justo in divinis habendum est. Episcopii Op. tom. ii. pars. ii. p. 449.

verent declarations had duly considered the meaning of words, it is to be hoped that they would not have uttered expressions which, in their most favourable acceptation as supposing an impossible case, are trifling truisms clothed in "great swelling words of vanity;" or, if not thus mitigated, are in terms absurd, and in sentiment most impious.

Is it correct to say, Reason is the judge in religious controversies ?-Before we could answer this question, we should ask the querist to define his terms: What does he mean by reason?—the faculty of discernment and argumentation, or any set of admitted principles already enthroned in the mind? And, how does he use his metaphorical appellation, a judge?-does he intend an authoritative power of dictation; or the exercise of the mind in examining, distinguishing, and forming its best conclusion according to the evidence?—I venture to think that the truth of the case might be unexceptionably expressed thus: The faculty of human reason, in its most careful and conscientious employment of proper means and instruments, is appointed by God as the judge, to each individual's own mind, of the validity of evidence in every case; and for this exercise, each individual is judicially accountable to God alone.

But I must own that to me it seems a preferable style of expression, to say of religious truth that

the Judge is God; that the expression of his judgment, and the rule of ours, is to be sought in the holy scriptures; and that the best employment and most dignified office of human reason is to be the grateful and docile learner.

All these observations on the use of reason would be applicable to the mental exercises of a sinless angel. Far different are our intellectual circumstances. Is our reason unclouded? Is it debased by no servitude? Is it enfeebled by no moral disease? Is it manacled by no prejudices?— If, in respect to the intellectual exercises which are far removed from the domain of religion, the father of philosophy saw it necessary to caution us against "the idols of the cave;" how much more pressing and solemn must be the necessity of such a guard in disquisitions, with respect to which truth unhappily lies in opposition to some of our strongest passions and feelings, and error is pleasingly congenial with our favourite propensities! Little must be his self-acquaintance, and superficial his observation of others, who has not perceived how powerful is the control which moral prejudices exert over our reasonings and all our intellectual habits.

This subject will come more directly under attention in a subsequent chapter, on the moral state of the mind and affections with relation to the present inquiry.

But it is with pleasure that I adduce a better citation from one of the authors whose indecorous language has been just reprehended. It would have been well for himself and for his readers, had he sufficiently considered and with consistency applied the truth which he has here admitted. "We readily acknowledge that there are many things in the Christian religion which are above reason, and yet must of necessity be by us believed; because, how much soever they surpass our reason, they are revealed in the scriptures, and are perfectly agreeable to the very reason which they surpass. I am not, however, satisfied that in the last clause a dangerous implication does not lurk. If the bottoming motive, the "ob id ipsum," of our faith in a doctrine, be not only and simply that it is clearly revealed in the scriptures of God, but that it is "perfectly consentaneous with our reason," who does not see that the MAJESTY OF DIVINE VERACITY is insulted, and that an entrance is opened for the ambiguities, absurdities, and profaneness which we have protested against. However, the same author very properly adds: "A thing may be above reason and yet be approved by it. Such

* Nos verò ultrò fatemur plurima esse in religione christianâ quæ rationem superent, et tamen nobis necessariò sint credenda, ob id ipsum, quia, quantumvis rationem superent, tamen in sacris literis prodita extent, et rationi nostræ quam superant sint maxime consentanea. Smalc. contra Frantz. Disp. iii. de Sacram.

are almost all the doctrines of religion, and more especially of Christianity."*

No apology is needed for concluding this chapter with a citation from Bishop Stillingfleet, a writer whom few have equalled, and probably none have excelled, in strength and clearness of understanding.

"I shall endeavour to state the due bounds between Faith and Reason, and thereby to shew that, by those grounds on which we receive the doctrine of the TRINITY, we do not give way to the entertainment of any absurd opinion, nor overthrow the certainty of reason.

"1. We have no difference with them [Unitarians] about the use of our reason as to the certainty of a revelation. For, in this case, we are, as much as they, for searching into the grounds of our faith; for we look on faith as a reasonable act of our minds, and if we did not allow this, we must declare ourselves to believe without grounds. And, if we have grounds for our faith, we can express them in words that are intelligible: and, if we can give an account of our faith in an intelligible manner, and with a design to give others

Potest enim aliquid rationem superare, et tamen eidem applaudere. Quale ferè sunt omnia quæ in religione, præsertim christianâ, continentur. Smalc. contra Frantz. Disp. iii. de Sacram.