A Theory of FreedomCambridge University Press, 1988 - 338 pages This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts can be rationally resolved, the objectivity of value, the concept of moral personality, the principles of non-interference and respect of persons, the ideals of autonomy and community and various aspects of individual rights--focusing on the rights to freedom, welfare, and privacy. |
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accept according action commitments agent akrasia Alan Alan's autarchy autono autonomy axiotima belief commitments Bernard Williams Bettelheim Betty Bruno Bettelheim capacity Chapter choice choose chooser claim coherent collaboration communitarian concept concern conflict consequentialist consistent course critical culture decide decision defective depends deriving desire Desmond ence enterprise epistemic ground H.L.A. Hart heterarchic heteronomous human rights Humean Ibid ideal individual instance interests interference judgment justify kibbutz kind liberal ment merely moral personality natural person nevertheless nomos notion object one's oneself options overriding perhaps political positive freedom possible practical rationality preference principle of respect projects rational action reasons for action recognize relations relevant requires resentment respect for persons role sense simply situation social society someone standard structure Stuart Hampshire superego T.H. Green telos theory of freedom thing tion treat truth unfree unfreedom value-centered