James, St. John, and St. Jude. If the evidence produced is not fuch as their writings will justify to

be the truth; the writer of these pages will most readily acknowledge himfelf to be in an error, and retract the whole of what he has faid; the truth, let it be on which fide it will, is all that he aims at, both for himself and for others; and, if the truth really is, that the Son of GoD is not GOD, neither will he prefume to affirm the contrary. But, what is truth? and what is its ftandard? Is imagination, or the effort of an uninformed mind, the measure of it? or does it depend upon the Revelation of the GOD of truth? If the former, then will it be as changeable and fluctuating as the human mind, which to day adopts what to-morrow it rejects. For a length of time, ideas were fuppofed to be innate to the human mind. Mr. Locke has now demonftrated, that ideas are not innate, and the mind acquiefces with that demonftration. But fome future Demonftrator may perhaps arife, who will bring us back to the old ftandard. Capricious as the mind then evidently has been in this inftance (and a thousand inftances of a fimilar nature might be mentioned), how is it poffible, that the mind can be the measure of truth? The reafoning of the human mind may be all juft, regular, and conclufive, and yet be deftitute of truth; for, truth does not depend merely upon the comparison of ideas, but upon the primary idea; which if false itself, the regularity of our reasoning, and the conclufions which we draw

I 4

draw from it, will not render it true*. It is a primary idea, that the moon is a habitable world like our own; thence we reafon that it hath rivers, and feas, and mountains in it, as our own; and, because our earth hath volcanos in it, we conclude the fame of the moon; and by the help of our glaffes the conclufion feems to be confirmed to us. But, is it therefore true that the moon hath all these things in it, because there is no defect in our reafoning from the primary idea? Suppose any perfon, by fome ftrange capricious turn of mind, fhould adopt it as a primary idea, that the moon was nothing else but a large mirror; might he not reafon as plaufibly and regularly from his idea as we do from ours? and might not fancy help him to discover in it a reprefentation of the Atlantic Ocean? and of the earthly volcanos which our glasfes feem to tell us really have an existence in the moon? But it will be faid, our primary idea, that the moon is a habitable world like our own, hath nothing unreasonable in it. I will own, that it hath nothing that is impoffible in it, as far as I am acquainted with the bounds of poffibility: but, if it is truth, it will not be poffible that it should be any thing else; but, as this will not be faid, our reasoning upon this fubject, and our conclufions,

* Upon this fubject, the reader cannot, but with great satisfaction to himself, confult the very excellent publication of Dr. Beattie, on the Immutability of Truth.

will

will be all arbitrary; and fo will they be upon every other fubject, where the primary idea is not actual truth.

Now, if the primary idea must be actual truth, in order to give the fanction of truth to our reasoning and conclufions; upon what must this idea reft, that it may be established to be actual truth? As for instance: it is our primary idea concerning God, that he is only one GOD; upon what does this idea reft? Innate it certainly is not; for, if it was, every mind would have it, which we all know is not the cafe; for, the far greater majority of mankind, for a long continued ferjes of ages, were impressed with the idea of holy Therm. Is it the pure genuine production of the mind itself, and the refult of thought and contemplation? How know you that it is true? Your thinking it to be true doth not eftablish it to be the truth without fome other authority. Polytheism may avail itself of a plea of this kind as well as of the unity of GODA but all your reafon in every inftance perfectly coincides with the idea, and therefore you know it to be true; this is not a right conclufion. All your reafon coincides with it, because it is true; but it is not therefore true, because your reafon coincides with it. Some ages fince, all the world agreed, that there was no void in nature, that nature abhorred a vacuum; all the reason of the wifeft men coincided with the idea; but, if that coincidence established it to be a truth,

what

what are we to think of what we now receive for truth, that the operations of nature cannot be carried on without a vacuum? Here then manifeftly is a coincidence of reafon, with two directly contrary ideas; the one, that there is, the other, that there is not, a vacuum. Now, as both connot be true, therefore reafon in one inftance or the other coincided with what is falfe; confequently an idea is not therefore true, because your reafon coincides with it. It will be ufelefs to urge, that new lights broke in upon the mind, new difcoveries were made, which determined the mind in the rejection of a plenum; for, this only ferves to fhew the impotence of reafon in eftablishing actual truth. If, as in the prefent inftance, what was established for truth an hundred and fifty years back has been rejected, on account of new lights and difcoveries; who knows, but an hundred and fifty years hence ftill newer lights may break in upon us? And then we may have neither a vacuum nor a plenum, but fomething elfe; for, if new lights will juftify reafon in varying from an established truth in one inftance, it will in another; confequently the coincidence of reafon with an idea is no proof of its being actual truth.

Now, if fuch be the fluctuation and defect of reafon in the establishment of truth, as hath been exemplified in the foregoing inftance, and in a cafe wherein our fenfes alfo were concerned; what,

and

and how great, must be its defect, where GoD, his being, and our own future being, are concerned.

Is it the voice of reafon, that there is no other Gop but one only? When was this voice ever heard? Look into the hiftory of mankind from its earliest ages; is there any thing of the kind to be found there? does not the fact proclaim the contrary in all ages, and among all nations, except the Jews? and even in the little glimmering of the idea which is to be met with among fome of the Philofophers, was it not all derived from their intercourse with the Jews? for, prior to fuch intercourse, no fuch idea occurs in the whole hiftory of mankind from the one end of the world to the other. Upon what then does the idea reft, that there is only one GOD? If only upon its conformity with our reason, how know we that some new light may not hereafter break in upon our reason, and caufe us to reject this idea in order to introduce a different one? Such has been the cafe in other inftances; and fuch may be the cafe in this, if the truth of God's unity refts only on its idea being conformable with our reafon. Reafon does undoubtedly moft ftrongly and fully approve of the idea, and so it did of a plenum; but this latter it has rejected, as what it can no longer adopt. And what affurance is there that it will never reject the unity of GOD? Time, and new lights (whether true or falfe I enquire not), may in future fet reafon at variance with the idea, and most

probably