that he should destroy all law and religion, and divest men of that which is at present their distinguishing character, reason and understanding: for if every thing is to be done by a superior force, there is an end of all law, and of all the use and exercise of reason. It is said to be a crime in some eastern country for the subjects to look on the prince; and therefore when he appears, they fall down and hide their faces. Now this law or custom necessarily supposes that the subjects have eyes; for should the emperor blind all his subjects, it would be ridiculous to charge them not to look on him. The same would be the case with respect to all laws in general, should God necessarily overrule the wills of them; for to bid men not do that which it is impossible they ever should do, is absurd and ridiculous.

Since then offences must needs come, the question is, properly asked, why are not men as certainly distinguished by rewards and punishments as they are by virtue or vice? This would be a mighty encouragement to virtue, and what is to be expected from the justice of God. The first return to this question is to let men know that they inquire not wisely concerning this matter, for the thing is too high for them: for since the deserts of men must necessarily be estimated by a rule which they are not masters of, that is, by the sincerity of their hearts, they can never judge when rewards and punishments are duly administered: and therefore their reason fails; for a due administration of rewards and punishments in this world would not tend, as they suppose, to the encouragement of virtue, because men cannot judge when there is such an administration or when not; and possibly too they may be mistaken in those very cases, which they think deserve to be made signal examples of vindictive justice. The next return to the question is, that what they require is inconsistent with the present condition of men and the goodness of God. As to the condition of men, they are in a state of trial and probation, and therefore it is fit they should have time to show themselves; which they would not have, were every offence to meet with its due recompense of reward immediately. As to the goodness of God, it would ill become him to destroy men, as long as there are hopes of their amendment; and therefore to bear with the sins of

men, in prospect of their repentance, is both just and merciful. Thus to bear with the sins of men is inconsistent with punishing the sins of men, as soon as the world thinks they deserve it; for who can say when men are past all hope? But farther, even as to incorrigible sinners, though nothing can be said for them, yet much may be said to show that this world is no proper place for their punishment: for the good and bad are here so united together, that it is not possible to separate them in temporal punishments; and therefore God bears with them out of mere mercy to the righteous.

Thus then the case stands and now consider who has reason to complain. Examine your own conscience; if you are a sinner, it ill becomes you to call for vengeance; if you are righteous, or think yourself so, why should you murmur, since it is for your sake that the wicked are preserved from immediate ruin, that you may not be overwhelmed in their destruction? Consider also, which is the conclusion of the whole matter, that God hath appointed a day in the which he will judge the world in righteousness;' in which all the seeming inequalities of Providence shall be set right, and every tongue shall confess that the Lord is just, and righteous, and holy in all his ways.

DISCOURSE XL.

PART II.

IT now remains that we consider the text as furnishing us with a principle of reason and equity applicable to many

cases.

It is the more necessary to make this inquiry, because the rule in the text is liable to be misapplied, unless we carefully attend to the reasons on which it is founded, from which only we can learn in what cases the rule is applicable, in what not. The mercy of God is the best pattern that we can copy after,

and our Lord has recommended to us to be merciful, even as our heavenly Father is merciful.' Since therefore God spares the wicked who deserve punishment, nay, who are ripe for final destruction, for the sake of the righteous, that they may not partake in their sufferings, what shall we say? Is it reasonable that men should act in like manner? that magistrates, who are dispensers of temporal punishments, should release the guilty, because of the innocent who are nearly concerned in the fortunes of the guilty, and who must share either in the shame or the loss of the punishment? At first sight, perhaps, you may imagine there is a parity of reason in these cases; and yet on farther consideration you will find that thẹ same reason which justifies God in delaying the punishment of the wicked, would condemn the magistrate, should he permit the guilty to live unpunished.

To come at this view clearly, we must attend to the difference between the reason of justice and the rules of justice. By the rules of justice, I understand the general principles and maxims of justice by which the laws of all countries are governed and directed. By the reason of justice, I understand the fountain from which all maxims and all laws are derived, which is no other than right reason itself: for laws are not just, as partaking of the authority of the lawgiver, but as partaking of his reason. And hence comes the distinction between good and bad laws, though both derived from the same authority; which shows, that authority, though it may make a valid law, yet it cannot make a good one, unless acting on the reason of justice. Now between the reason of justice and the rules of justice there is this great difference; the reason of justice takes in all circumstances of every case, and therefore cannot err in its judgment; but the maxims of justice have no relation to the particular circumstances of any case, but are formed on general abstracted ideas, and consequently they often may and do fail, when they are applied to single instances: from whence it often happens that the reason of justice, and the maxims of justice, stand in direct opposition to one another. And this gave occasion to that proverbial speech, summum jus, summa injuria; for the words in themselves, unless you have respect to the different rules to which they refer, are a plain contradiction. For it is not to be affirmed that what is summum jus according to the

law, is, according to the same law, summa injuria: but the truth of the proverb is to be understood by referring the parts of it to their proper rules. Summum jus regards the written law; summa injuria regards the original reason of all law. And then in many cases it happens that the letter of the law contradicts the reason of the law and the cause of this I before observed, because laws and maxims of law have no regard to the circumstances of particular cases, which circumstances nevertheless do sometimes intirely alter the nature of the case.

Hence it plainly appears how liable we are to mistake, as long as we form our judgments by applying general rules of law or equity to particular cases. Thus, for instance, it is a right maxim of justice, that all sinners should be punished; and the maxim is derived from the certain difference of virtue and vice, from the ends of reward and punishment, which are adapted to promote virtue and discourage vice. Place then before you a particular sinner: by the rule of justice he must die; but what if it should appear, from the circumstances of his case, that you cannot punish him consistently with the ends of justice, that is, you cannot promote virtue, or discourage vice, you cannot distinguish good from evil in his case, but must afflict both alike? What will you say? Shall the general maxim prevail contrary to the very reasons on which the maxim itself is founded? Or shall the reasons of justice and equity prevail to supersede a general law, which is not applicable to the present case?

Now there is the same difference between the judgments of God and the judgments of men, as there is between the rules of law and the reason of law for men are tied down to judge by the rules which the law prescribes; but the judgment of God does not arise from any rule or maxim of law, but in every instance follows the reason of the thing to be judged of; otherwise his judgments would not in every case be reasonable. It is mere weakness that makes men go by rules; and because they are not able to judge accurately on all emergent cases, therefore they have general rules for their direction. But how absurd would it be to imagine God as acting by any such rules, as having recourse to stated laws or maxims for the direction of his judgment in particular instances? As reason is in all cases the fountain of justice, and of all laws and principles of law, so

the divine reason, which is perfect, is in every case the true measure of justice. From hence it evidently appears, that since the judgments of God are not formed on the general notions and principles of justice which we are conversant in, those notions can be no safe rules for us in the examination of the ways of Providence, because our rules do not always extend to the reason of particular cases; but the judgments of God do always regard the reasons and circumstances of every case.

Farther; these considerations will help us to form distinct notions of justice and mercy, and discover to us, if not what they always are, yet at least what they always should be. Justice is thought to be a thing fixed and certain, and to have its proper bounds and limits, which it cannot transgress without losing its name; but mercy is taken to be of a more variable, uncertain nature, to have no rule to go by, but to arise from the will of the governor and consequently we usually speak of justice and mercy as opposites to each other, and suppose that mercy can have no place unless justice recedes to make room for it. What does or may happen in the world we are not concerned to inquire; our business is to search after the true notions of justice and mercy, not the corrupt practices in either. Now mercy and justice would not be distinguished were it not for the intervention of general and particular alws, which often fall very heavy on particular persons; whence it is that we complain of the rigor and hardness of the law; but were men perfect both in their reason and in their wills, so that they could neither judge amiss nor act amiss, they would then do that which is exactly right and reasonable in every case, and there would be no room to correct the rigor of justice by the interposition of mercy; for there is no rigor in that which is perfectly right and reasonable. For consider what are the pleas for mercy: do they not arise from the circumstances of the person or the action, which show that the law is too hard in his case, and that he ought in reason to be eased against the extremity of the law? But had all these circumstances been weighed in the first judgment, and justice adapted to the very merits of the case, all the pleas for mercy had been prevented, and consequently there had been no room for mercy; for mercy without reason is a mere effect of arbitrary power, and not of goodness.