wards, Kellermann having been obliged 13. These disasters on the frontiers to weaken his right by large detach- of Provence induced the government to ments, to suppress a revolt at Toulon, detach seven thousand men from the the Imperialists resolved to take the army of the Eastern Pyrenees, and ten lead by offensive operations against the thousand men from the army of the French forces stationed in the Maritime Rhine, to reinforce the combatants on Alps. For this purpose a simultaneous the Alps. Their arrival, towards the attack was made on the Republican end of August, restored the superiority posts at St Giacomo, Bordinetto, and to the Republican side, while no corVado, which were all fortified. Though responding addition was made to the the French gained an advantage at the forces of the allied generals-another Col de Tende, their line was forced proof, among the many which these back after several days' fighting, and campaigns afford, of the total want of the Republicans were obliged to eva- concert which prevailed between the cuate all their positions in the Maritime Allies on the vast circle of operations Alps. The allied forces occupied Lo- from the Rhine to the Mediterranean, ano, Final, and Voltri, with the whole and the inestimable advantages which magazines and artillery which had been the French derived from the unity of collected there, and threatened the government, and interior line of comcountry of Nice and the territory of munication, which they enjoyed. The the Republic. Had the allied gene- consequences soon proved ruinous to rals pushed their advantages with vi- the allied armies. Kellermann, engour, the whole right wing of the abled by this powerful reinforcement to French army might have been driven resume the offensive, and encouraged from the mountains, or destroyed; for by the evident discord between the they could have collected thirty thou- allied generals, formed the design of sand fresh troops, flushed with victory, separating the Sardinian from the Austo crush twenty thousand, harassed trian forces by a concentrated attack with fatigue, destitute of shoes, and upon the centre of their line, and comliterally starving. Kellermann, with pelling the latter to give battle alone in the aid of his chief of the staff, Berthier, the valley of Loano. But before this exerted the utmost degree of skill and plan could be carried into effect, the ability to compensate the inferiority peace with Spain enabled the governof their force; but it was with the ment to detach to the support of the greatest difficulty, and only by pledging army of Italy the army of the Eastern their private credit for the supplies of Pyrenees, which arrived in the Marithe army, that they were enabled either time Alps before the end of September, to procure provisions for the troops, or and the command of the whole was inspire them with the resolution to de- given to General Scherer, Kellermann fend the rugged and desolate ridge in being detached to the command of the which the contest was carried on. Their forces in Savoy. This great addition situation was rendered the more despe- rendered the Republicans nearly double rate by a naval action between the the allied forces in that quarter; while British and Toulon fleets in the Bay of the courts of Turin and Vienna took Frejus, in the course of which the Al- no steps to avert the storm preparing cide, of seventy-four guns, blew up; to burst upon their heads. In truth, and the French squadron, severely shat- the Piedmontese government, experitered, was compelled to take refuge in encing the fate of all weak states in althe harbour of Toulon. Fortunately liance with powerful ones, began to be for the Republicans, divisions between as jealous of its friends as its enemies; the allied generals at this time para- while the Imperial generals rendered lysed their movements, and prevented it too evident, by their manner and conthem from following up the advantages duct, that they had no confidence either which their recent successes, and the in the sincerity of the government or open communication with the British the efficiency of their soldiers. Devins, fleet, seemed to afford. the Piedmontese general, trusted for

his support, not to the strength of the mountains which he occupied, but to the co-operation of the British fleet in the Bay of Genoa-a signal error, which soon led to the most disastrous consequences.

with an overwhelming force, and from that vantage-ground to take the remainder of the line in flank and rear. After haranguing his troops, he led them to the assault. The Austrian centre, commanded by Argenteau, made an obstinate resistance at the posts of Bordinetto and Melogno, and drove back the first assailants; but such was the vehemence of the fresh columns which the Republicans brought up to the assault, that they were compelled at length to retire to a second line on the right bank of the Bormida. Massena soon forced that position also, and by so doing got into the interior of the Austrian line, and was able to take all their positions in rear. The result of this first day's combat was, that, the centre of the Allies being forced, their left wing was liable to be overwhelmed by the combined attacks of the French centre and right wing. No sooner was the Austrian general made sensible of this disaster than he took the most precipitate steps to draw back his left wing. But he was not permitted to do this without sustaining the greatest losses. By break of day Augereau was climbing the heights of the Apennines, while his victorious battalions were

14. The Austrian army, consisting of forty thousand men, was posted in an extensive and fortified position, having its left resting on the little seaport town of Loano, and its right extending to the summit of the impending heights to the northward, from whence it communicated by a chain of fortified posts with the strong places of Ceva, Mondovi, and Coni, held by the Piedmontese troops. The position was strong; but this strength was balanced by the circumstance that, in case of disaster, the left wing had no means of retreat. The Republicans occupied a position in front of their opponents, their right resting on the little village of Borghetto on the sea-coast, their left extending to the Col de Tende and the summits of the Maritime Alps. The army at first consisted only of thirty-seven thousand men, but it was raised, by the successive arrival of the columns from the Eastern Pyrenees, before the middle of November, to sixty thousand men. Massena,* who had acquired a remark-driving everything before them. able knowledge of the localities of that rugged district during the preceding campaigns, and whose great military abilities had already become conspicuous, was intrusted with the command of the attack. Notwithstanding the vast accession of force which the Republicans had received, and the increased activity which they had for some time evinced, the Austrian commander was so little aware of his danger that he lay at La Pietra, detained by an abscess in his mouth, while his officers were chiefly assembled at Feriole, where they were roused from a ball by the sound of the French cannon, at six o'clock on the morning of the 23d November.

15. Scherer, the general-in-chief, commanded the right wing, Massena the centre, and Serrurier the left. Massena's design was to force the Austrian centre *See a biography of MASSENA, infra, chap.

XX. § 49.

In conducting their retreat, the Imperialists did not display the vigour or decision which could alone save them in such perilous circumstances, and which, on the preceding day, had extricated the division commanded by Roccavini from equal danger.

16. The consequence was, that one column was beset on all sides in a ravine, which formed their only line of retreat; the head of the column, seized with a panic, was driven back upon the centre, and thrown into utter confusion; and, in the midst of an unparalleled scene of carnage and horror, fortyeight pieces of cannon and one hundred caissons were abandoned. The other column of the left wing only escaped by betaking themselves to almost inaccessible paths, and abandoning all their artillery, and at length, with great difficulty, effected their retreat by the road of the Corniche. Five thousand prisoners, eighty pieces of cannon, and an

immense quantity of ammunition and | adopted but by the party by whom such magazines, fell into the hands of the a superiority is felt; it will never be victors; the total loss on the side of successful but where such a superiority the Austrians was not less than seven exists. thousand, while that of the French hardly amounted to one thousand men. This great victory, which terminated the campaign of 1795 in the Alps, was of decisive importance to the Republic. It gave the French winter-quarters at Loano, Savona, Vado, and other places on the Italian side of the Apennines, and, by rendering them masters of the valleys of the Orba, the Bormida, and the Tanaro, afforded every facility, at the commencement of the following campaign, for achieving the great object of separating the Austrian from the Piedmontese troops. In Savoy, the early fall of the snows precluded active operations at that rigorous season; but the French continued to occupy their elevated position on the summits of the ridge of Mont Genevre, Mont Cenis, and the Little St Bernard.

17. This battle, the most decisive yet gained from the commencement of the war by the Republican forces, is well deserving of consideration. It was the first instance of the successful application by the French troops of those principles of strategy which were afterwards carried to such perfection by Napoleon. It is the first victory in which the strength of the adverse army was at once broken by the number of prisoners and artillery which were taken. The same principle which the English adopted under Rodney and Howe-that of breaking the line, and falling with an overwhelming force upon one wingwas here carried into execution with decisive effect. It is worthy of observation, that this system was thus fully understood and practically exemplified by Massena, before Napoleon ever had the command of an army; another proof among the many which exist, that even the greatest genius cannot by more than a few years anticipate the lights of the age. Such a plan is the natural result of conscious prowess, and an experienced superiority in combat, which leads the attacking force to throw itself, without hesitation, into the midst of the enemy's columns. It will never be

18. The war on the Spanish frontier, during this campaign, was speedily brought to a successful termination. In the Western Pyrenees, the Republicans, during the winter, had sustained the greatest losses from sickness. No less than twelve thousand men had perished in the hospitals since the troops went into their cantonments, and twenty-five thousand were still sick: only twenty-five thousand, out of a nominal force of sixty thousand, were in a condition to take the field; and they, having long been reduced to half a ration a-day, looked more like spectres than men. It was not till the beginning of June that the Republican forces were so much strengthened, by reinforcements from the interior, as to be able to take the field. The fall of Figueras and Rosas gave the French a secure base for their campaign in Catalonia; but the operations there, though upon the whole successful, were not of any decisive importance. The Spanish army in that quarter was stationed on the river Fluvia. Several combats of inconsiderable importance took place, the most remarkable of which was that of Bezalu, where Augereau, with a small force, defeated all the efforts of the Spanish army. The opposing armies were still on the Fluvia, when the treaty of peace between the two powers suspended all further hostilities.

19. It was in Biscay that the decisive action took place which hastened this important event. Twelve thousand men, detached from the army of La Vendée, and replaced in that quarter by the troops who had been engaged in the reduction of Luxembourg, at length put the French commander in a condition to take the field. Towards the end of June, the campaign commenced by an unsuccessful attempt of the French upon the corps commanded by Filangieri; but in the beginning of July Moncey forced the passage of the river Deva, and, by a vigorous attack with his centre, succeeded in dividing the Spanish army into two parts, and inter

21. The principal conditions of this treaty were the according the free and undisturbed exercise of their religion to the inhabitants of the insurgent district; the establishment of a corps of two thousand territorial guards, composed of the natives of the country, and paid by government; the immediate payment of two millions of francs for the expenses of the war; various indemnities to the greatest sufferers from

posing a hostile force between them. | terminable, and which consumed in General Crespo, who commanded the intestine war a large portion of the Spanish left, was so vigorously pursued forces of the Republic. At the sugges by the Republicans that he was com- tion of Carnot, they published a propelled to abandon both Bilbao and clamation, couched in terms of reconVitoria, and found himself driven to ciliation and amity; and this having the frontiers of Old Castile, with a force led to an address in similar terms from reduced by the sword and desertion to the Royalist chiefs, conferences took seven thousand men. The left wing of place between the contending parties, the invading army was not so success- and a treaty was concluded at La Jaulful; and preparations were making for nais for the final pacification of the the investment of Pampeluna, when west of France. hostilities were terminated by the intelligence of the treaty of Bâle, concluded on the 12th July between the hostile powers. By this treaty Spain recognised the French Republic, and ceded to France the Spanish half of the island of St Domingo; an acquisition more embarassing than valuable, in the state of anarchy to which the precipitate measures for the emancipation of the negroes had reduced that once flourishing colony. In return, the Re-its ravages; the removal of the sequespublic relinquished all its conquests in Spain, and the frontiers of the two states were fixed as before the commencement of hostilities. The principal advantage gained to France by this treaty, and it proved in the end a most important one, was the command which it gave the government of two experienced and courageous armies, which were forthwith transferred to the seat of war in the Alps, and powerfully contributed to the great achievements which in the following campaign signalised the progress of the army of Italy.

tration laid on the property of the emigrants, and all those condemned by the Revolutionary Tribunal; the tacit permission to the people to retain their arms, and an exemption from every kind of tax, levy, or requisition. On their side, the Royalists engaged to submit to the laws of the Republic, and, as soon as possible, surrender their artillery. There were also secret articles, the exact nature of which has never been ascertained; but Charette and the Royalist party always maintained, that they contained an engagement on the part of the Convention, as soon as the state of public feeling would admit of it, to restore the monarchy. This treaty, though not at the time embraced by Stofflet and the Chouans, was shortly after acceded to by them also. Nine days after the signature of this treaty, Charette and his officers made a trium

20. During the whole winter of 1794, the unconquerable Charette maintained, with a few thousand men, the contest in La Vendée. The increase of the Republican forces, the diminution of his own followers, seemed only to augment the resources of his courage. So highly was his perseverance prized, that Suwarroff wrote with his own hand a let-phal entry into Nantes, amidst the acter expressive of his admiration; and clamations of the inhabitants. Disall the princes of Europe looked to him charges of artillery announced the pasas the only man capable of restoring sage of the Loire, the scene of so many the royal cause. But after the fall of Republican atrocities, by the Royalist Robespierre, and the execution of Car-hero, who was mounted on a splendid rier, more moderate ideas began to pre-charger, dressed in blue, with the Royvail in the French government; and alist scarf, and a plume of white feathers the Committee of Public Salvation be- on his head. Four of his lieutenants came weary of a contest apparently in- | rode by his side, arrayed in the same

manner, which formed a striking con- | among the emigrants in Britain and trast to the dress of the commissioners Germany, and the prisoners of war in of the Convention, distinguished chiefly the British prisons. The government by the red cap of liberty. judged, perhaps wisely, that, as the ex22. But after the first tumults of pub-pected movement was to be wholly lic joy had subsided, it became evident national, it would be inexpedient to that the treaty was a truce rather than give the command of the expedition to a final pacification, and that the seeds of a British commander, or support it by inextinguishable discord subsisted be- any considerable body of British troops. tween the opposite parties. The Royalists The forces embarked consisted of six and the Republicans each associated ex- thousand emigrants in the pay of Great clusively with their own party. The offi- Britain, with a regiment of artillerymen cers of Charette appeared at the theatre from Toulon, and they carried with with the white cockade; though he him- them eighty pieces of cannon, with all self, who had so often rivalled Coligny their equipages and arms, and clothing in war, surpassed him in prudence and for eighty thousand men. They were caution during peace. Carefully avoid- divided into two corps; the first coming every menacing or hostile expres- manded by Puisaye, whose representasion, he was yet reserved and circum- tions had caused the adoption of the spect in his demeanour; and it was evi- plan; and the second by the Count de dent to all that, though anxious to avoid Sombreuil. A third division of British an immediate rupture, he had no con- troops was destined to support the two fidence in the continuance of the ac- first, when they had made good their commodation. The members of the landing on the French coast. The Committee of Public Salvation were command of the whole was given to the impressed with the same conviction. Count d'Artois, and great hopes were The answer they made to their friends, entertained of its success, not so much when pressed on the subject of the from the numerical amount of the forces treaty, was "We have little reliance on board, as the illustrious names which on the submission of Charette; but we the nobles bore, and the expected coare always gaining time, and preparing operation of the Chouans and Vendeans, the means of crushing him on the first who had engaged, on the first appearsymptom of a revolt." In truth, the ance of a prince of the blood, to place Republican pride had too good reason eighty thousand men at his disposal. to be mortified at this treaty. Conquerors of all their other enemies, they were yet seemingly humbled by their own subjects; and the peasants of La Vendée had extorted terms which the kings of Europe had in vain contended for. It is painful to think that the renewal of hostilities in this district, and its tragic termination, was owing to the delusive hopes held out by, and the illjudged assistance of, Great Britain.

23. Induced by the flattering accounts of the emigrants, the British government had long been making great preparations for a descent on the western coast of France, by a corps of those expatriated nobles whose fortunes had been rendered all but desperate by the Revolution. Its success appeared to them so certain, that all the terrors of the laws against them could not prevent a large force from being recruited |

24. The naval affairs of the French, on the western coast, had been so unfortunate as to promise every facility to the invading force. In winter the Brest fleet, in obedience to the positive orders of government, put to sea; but its raw and inexperienced crews were totally unable to face the tempests, which kept even the hardy veterans of Great Britain in their harbours. The squadron was dispersed by a storm, five ships of the line were lost, and the remainder so much damaged that twelve line-of-battle ships were alone able in June to put to sea. This fleet, accompanied by thirteen frigates, surprised the advanced guard of the Channel fleet, under the command of Admiral Cornwallis, near Belle-Isle, on the 7th June; but such was the skill and intrepidity of the British admiral, that he suc ceeded in maintaining a running fight