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in check, should he, on being informed of Sir Arthur's departure, again attempt to advance; besides, under any circumstances, it would not have been consistent with humanity to have removed more of the sick and wounded than were really brought off. General Cuesta, whose force remained nearly entire, having taken little share in the action, promised Sir Arthur to maintain the position which the British had so successfully defended, but in a few hours after their march, the Spanish leader abandoned his post, and with the whole of hi army followed the route of the British. This conduct of the Spanish general increased the embarrassments of the situation in which the British army was already placed by Marshal Soult's arrival at Placentia ; and, accordingly, Sir Arthur determined to 'withdraw his troops over the bridge of Arzobispo, with a view of covering Seville and the south of Spain, and at the same time to preserve his communication with Lisbon. In pursuance of these objects, Sir Arthur resumed his march on the following morning, and arrived with the main body of his infantry in the valley watered by the Elevante, on the 11th of August. In this spot the British halted for that repose which the fatigues and privations during the retreat had rendered necessary.
In the beginning of September Sir Arthur placed his whole army upon the line of the Guadiana, and established his headquarters at Badajos. His motives for taking up this position appear to have been, ist,—the security of the province of Andalusia, as the enemy could not venture to penetrate across the Sierra Morena with the British army on their right flank ; 2dly --in order to give confidence to the army of La Mancha; and lastly, to encourage the people to persevere in the cause, by affording the Spanish nation an opportunity of reforming its government, and of choosing new men to direct their measures in the cabinet, and conduct their armies in the field.
The unfortunate result of the battle of Oçana, in which the army of La Mancha, under the command of Lieutenant-General Ariesaga, was totally defeated, and dispersed, laid the whole south of Spain open to the incursions of the enemy, and it became no longer necessary or desirable, in a military point of view, to retain the British army on the borders of Estremadura. Lord Viscount Wellington, which rank he had attained in this year, therefore withdrew. bis army from Spain, in the month of December 1809, and in the course of three weeks, the whole of his force was placed on a new and extended position, along the frontiers of Portugal: head-quarters in the city of Vizeu. The British troops passed the following six months in a state of comparative tranquillity, while the French army, now amounting to upwards of 100,000 men, under the command of Marshal Massena, was making the most vigorous preparations for the conquest of Portugal. The overwhelming numbers of the enemy, and the confidence with which he proclaimed his intention of driving Lord Wellington and his army into the sea, inspired a feeling of apprehension for the final issue of the campaign, which not even the reliance placed by the British on the skill and gallantry of their leader could entirely dissipate.
On the 11th of June, 1810, the enemy invested the fortress of Cuidad Rodrigo with a force of 30,000 infantry, and 5000 cavalry. On the night of the 25th the French batteries were opened against the city; and, after a most gallant defence, during which about 700 of the inhabitants were killed by the bombardment, the Governor, Don André Herrasti, seeing no hopes of relief, and his provisions and ammunition being nearly exhausted, surrendered by capitulation on the 10th of July. The Marquess de la Romana came from Badajos to intreat Lord Wellington would advance to its relief, but departed perfectly satisfied with the propriety of the British leader's reasons for declining to make a forward movement; which, by endangering the safety of his army, might ultimately compromise the general cause of the Peninsula.
On the 4th of August, 1810, the following Proclamation to the Portuguese was issued by this officer. It was intended to counteract an invidious Proclamation, published by Massena, dated Cuidad Rodrigo, August 1st, and abounding in the greatest calumnies against the conduct and intentions of the Britisha army.
“ The time which has elapsed, during which the enemy has remained on the frontiers of Portugal, must have proved to the
Portuguese nation what they have to expect from the French. The inhabitants of some villages have remained in them, confiding in the promises of the enemy, and hoping that, by treating the enemies of their country well, they might conciliate and mollify them, and inspire them with humane sentiments; that their property would be respected, their females preserved from brutal violation, and their lives secured. Vain hopes! The inhabitants of these submissive places have suffered all the evils which a cruel enemy could inflict; their property has been plundered, their habitations burnt, their women atrociously violated; and those, whose age and sex did not provoke the brutal violence of the soldiers, have fallen victims to the imprudent confidence which they placed in promises made only to be broken.
“ The Portuguese must now see that no other means remain to avoid the evils with which they are threatened, but a determined and vigorous resistance, and a firm resolution to obstruct, as much as possible, the advance of the enemy into the interior of the kingdom, by removing out of his reach all such things as may contribute to his sustenance, or facilitate his progress. These are the only and most certain means to prevent the evils with which the country is threatened. The army under my command will protect as large a portion of this country as is possible; but it is obvious that the people alone can deliver themselves by a vigorous resistance, and preserve their goods by moving them out of the reach of the enemy. The duties, therefore, that bind me to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to the Portuguese nation, oblige me to make use of the power and authority with which I am furnished, to compel the careless and the indolent to make the necessary efforts to preserve themselves from the dangers which threaten them, and to save their country. In conformity with this, I make known and declare, that all magistrates and persons in authority, who shall remain in the villages or towns, after having received orders from the military officer to remove from them ; and all persons, of whatever class they may be, who shall maintain the least communication with, or aid and assist in any manner the enemy, shall be considered as traitors to the state, and tried and punished as such enormous crimes require.
« WELLINGTON. • Head-quarters, August 4th.”
The fall of Almeida, on the 27th of August, after a bombardment of only one day, but in reality occasioned by the explosion of the grand magazine, removed the principal obstacle to the entrance of Marshal Massena's army into Portugal, but he proceeded with great caution in his movements, and was retarded by the necessity of bringing forward his supplies, as no dependence could be placed on the resources of a country so long occupied by British troops. The French were undoubtedly foiled in their plans by the prudent defensive system adopted by Lord Wellington, as it was a principal object of Marshal Massena, in undertaking the siege of Cuidad Rodrigo, and Almeida, to draw the British from their strong hilly positions to the plains on which these towns are situated, where, if at all, the superior number of his cavalry might be expected to give him the advantage. About the middle of September Marshal Massena made a feint of coming down upon the left bank of the Mondego, and actually pushed his reconnoitring parties to Cortiço and Lin-hares, in that direction, but apprehensive of meeting a check at the strong pass of the Ponte de Marcella, he, on the 18th, 19th, and 20th of September crossed that river with bis whole army, at the bridge of Foruos, below Celerico, advancing upon Coimbra hy the way of Vizeu. This movement of the enemy was mnet by Lord Wellington with his usual foresight; and the intentions of the French leader being now clearly developed, the 2d division of the army, under the orders of Lieutenant-General: Hill, made a parallel movement with General Regnier's corps d'armée, by the route of Sobriera Formosa and Pedro-gao, when the whole of the combined army, with the exception of MajorGeneral (now Sir Henry) Fane's division of cavalry, and General Le Cor's brigade of Portuguese infantry was placed upon the right bank of the Mondego, with a celerity which set all ordinary: calculation at defiance. Whilst the French continued their
approach upon Coimbra, by the roads leading over the Sierra de Busaço, the main body of the allied army continued in the adjoining villages, Lord Wellington being particularly desirous not to expose
his troops to the heavy dews at the season of the year.
Before day-break, on the 26th September, the several divisions of British and Portuguese troops began to ascend the heights of Busaço, from whence the whole of the enemy's force, amounting to not less than 60,000 infantry, and a very heavy body of cavalry was distinctly discerned. About five in the evening, the French piquets made an attack upon the Portuguese Caçadores, who returned their fire with great steadiness and resolution. The next morning, at dawn of day, the enemy made two desperate attacks upon the right and centre of the allied army. The French column on the right inoved up the hill, receiving the fire of the light troops, with great intrepidity, and had gained the summit, when it was charged, whilst deploying into line, by Colonel (the late Major-General) Mackinnon's brigade, the 45th and 88th regiments, and the 9th Portuguese, directed: by Major-General Picton, supported on the right by part of Major-General (the late Sir James) Leith's corps, and on the left by Major-General Lightburne's brigade, and the Guards, which had moved to the right on the first indication of the enemy's intention. The enemy foiled in this attack, made another more to the right, where he was again repulsed at the point of the bayonet. This second attack was supported by: some heavy artillery, but an ammunition tumbril having blowa up, the French ceased their fire on this point. Finding their attack on the right unsuccessful, the enemy directed his principal efforts against the left of the centre, and in a charge made by the 43d and 52d regiments, General Simon was wounded and takep. Brigadier-General Coleman's brigade of Portuguese infantry which was in reserve, moved up to support BrigadierGeneral Craufurd in his charge, and a battalion of the 19th Portuguese regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas, made a successful charge upon another body of the enemy, which was endeavouring to penetrate in that quarter. Besides these attacks, the light troops were engaged throughout the day