to provide with the means of defence, the Dutch having wholly neglected to supply this place, as indeed most of the others.

H. R. H. had detached a strong corps to his right, which rested on the island of Bommel, the defence of which, however, had become more difficult from the loss of the fort of Crevecouer, which had been shamefully surrendered on the 29th September by the Dutch Commandant. A body of cavalry was also sent to observe the Rhine from Shenkenschantz to Wesel, to maintain as far as possible a communication with the Austrians.

The enemy had invested Bois le Duc, but although they had not the immediate means of attacking it, the Prince of Hesse Philippestahl surrendered this place a few days after (on 10th October). This acquisition was a most important one to the enemy, and afforded great facilities to their further operations on the line of the Maese. Graves had been invested on its left bank about the same time. They had occupied Fort St. André, but were driven from it by Lieut.-Gen. Abercromby on the 11th October.

On the 19th the enemy crossed the Macse in force, above Graves, and attacked the advanced line of posts on the right, which they forced after considerable resistance, particularly at Appelthern and Druten, where Major General Hammerstein and Major General Fox commanded. The 37th regiment, in its retreat, having unfortunately mistaken some French hussars for the corps of Rohan, was broken, and in great measure taken. The infantry of Rohan's corps also suffered severely.

The communication with Graves, with a view to its supply, had been the Duke of York's principal motive for occupying the position in front of Nimeguen, and this object having been effected previously to the enemy's attack upon his advanced posts, H. R. H. withdrew the chief part of his army across the Waal on the 20th, leaving General Walmoden with a corps to maintain possession of Nimeguen as long as the imperfect state of its defences, and the deficiency of heavy artillery, (which the Dutch had neglected to supply) would admit.

H. R. H. had some time before taken measures for the construction of a bridge of boats, across the Waal, and

for establishing batteries on the prominent points of the right

bank.

The enemy appeared before Nimeguen on the 23d, and completed the investment of Graves on the right bank of the Maese. On the 28th they drove in the out-posts in front of Nimeguen, and established themselves within a short distance of the works. Every exertion was making to repair the neglect of the Dutch Government.

Venlo had yielded to the French on the 26th, as easy a conquest as other places held by Dutch garrisons.

On the 28th General Clerfayt came to Nimeguen, and agreed to send eight battalions and 14 squadrons of Austrians under Lieut. Gen. Werneck, which should reach Nimeguen on the 3d November, and t ence co-operate in an attack upon the enemy, for which the greater part of H. R. H.'s corps would assemble at the same point. Lieut. Gen. Werneck arrived on the 30th October, and held out hopes that his troops would join on the 1st November, and it was the Duke of York's intention to have crossed the Waal on the 2d, and to execute the attack without loss of time; but on the 1st General Werneck declared that he could not be ready to co-operate until the 7th, and proposed a diversion to be made by his corps crossing the Rhine at Wesel, instead of the direct attack from Nimeguen. H. R. H. finding it in vain to expect more, yielded to an alternative which ill agreed with his own sentiments, and from the result of which he hoped for no benefit.

The enemy broke ground before Nimeguen on the night of the 2d November, and H. R. H., in the hope of protracting its reduction, was induced to augment the garrison on the 4th, the Prince of Orange having also engaged to add six Dutch battalions to it. On the afternoon of the same day General Walmoden directed a sortie to be made by nine battalions (of which six were British) under Major Gen. De Burgh, supported by some squadrons of cavalry; which succeeded in partially destroying the enemy's works, spiking their guns and checking their progress until the 6th, when they opened six batteries upon the bridge and one upon the town. The bridge was soon so much damaged that H. R. H. determined to withdraw from the town

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all the troops, excepting the picquets, (about 2,500 men), and the Dutch battalions which were left in it, under Major General De Burgh, with a view to maintain the place until the result of General Clerfayt's promise of co-operation should be known.

It was, however, soon evident that no material aid was to be looked for from that quarter, and the enemy's fire having rendered the preservation of the bridge hourly more precarious, H.R. H. ordered Nimeguen to be finally evacuated on the night of the 8th. The British troops withdrew without loss; but a proportion of the Dutch troops, who were crossing on the flying bridge, were taken, in consequence of an accidental shot carrying away the top of the mast on which the hawser was fastened, and of their not admitting of the measures proposed by Lieutenant, now Admiral Sir Home, Popham, of the British navy and his seamen, for their relief.

The bridge of boats was burnt, and the flying bridge, of which the French had obtained possession, destroyed by the fire of the British batteries.

The diversion held out by the Austrians was confined to the passage of two battalions and two squadrons across the Rhine at Burich, which were soon driven back by the enemy. The corps under Lieut. General Werneck continued, however, in communication with H. R. H., occupying the posts upon his left, along the Rhine, as far as Pannerden. H. R. H.'s army was encamped and cantoned between the Waal and the Leck, occupying the line of the former river as far as the island of Bommel, in which Dutch troops were stationed. In this position the army continued unmolested, until H. R. H.'s return to England, which took place early in December, the general command devolving on General Walmoden, that of the British troops on General, now Earl, Harcourt.

When H. R. H. quitted the army he was justified in entertaining every hope that the attempt of the enemy, on the provinces of Holland and Utrecht, would be checked by the line of defence which it occupied; but this hope was subsequently disappointed, the uncommon severity of the season (which rendered all the rivers passable on the ice) having concurred with the indifference of the

inhabitants, or their disaffection, in facilitating the enemy's con'quest of the Dutch territory.

The limits of this work have precluded any other than a brief sketch of the campaigns of 1793-4, and of the share which the Duke of York had in the successes and reverses of the allied arms. It has, however, been shown from a statement of positive facts, that, in the course of the retreat from the French frontier to the Waal, the retrograde movements of H. R. H.'s corps were invariably the result of those made by the Austrian army upon his left, and that, while he abstained from committing the army entrusted to his charge in partial and desultory operations, which, from the superiority of the enemy, must have proved sanguinary, without producing any positive or sufficient effect; H. R. H. as studiously sought, or availed himself of every opportunity to urge the adoption of a more vigorous system of warfare, by a concentration of means, and a combination of efforts.

Amidst the difficulties under which he laboured, should be particularly noticed the small aid which he derived from the troops, or the government of Holland, in his endeavour to protect that country. There was no army in the field which could effectually co-operate; the fortresses, of which the resistance might have seriously interrupted the progress of the enemy, were either inadequately garrisoned and supplied, or entrusted to officers who shamefully surrendered them on the first appearance of the enemy. Graves alone made a gallant and protracted defence, and its brave governor owed the means of so doing to the exertions of the Duke of York in throwing in supplies; for when he retired across the Meuse it was destitute of every thing.

It is not meant by this to say that the Illustrious Princes of the House of Orange were wanting at this crisis in the zeal and activity for which its importance so urgently called, or that there were not among those who served them, some few individuals who were willing and ready to step forward, and to risk their lives and properties in support of the cause; but those were few, and the mass of the Dutch people either viewed with apathy and indifference the approach of the French armies, and the danger which threatened the existing government, or

indulged with satisfaction the prospect of a revolution, possibly on no other grounds than a love of change, and a disposition to licentious liberty, which had at this period infected so many parts of Europe. These feelings were shown, not only in the reluctance of the inhabitants to step forward in defence of the country, but also in individual acts, amounting often to open hostility, against detachments and individuals of the Duke of York's army, although its correct discipline and orderly conduct, during the retreat, afforded no just cause of complaint. They were imbibed in a more or less degree by the Dutch troops, and they naturally had the general effect of producing in those who would have directed the energies and resources of a well affected people, a dread of calling forth exertions of which the application might become so doubtful.

In February, 1795, his Majesty was graciously pleased to nominate the Duke of York to the situation of Commander in Chief, an office, at that time, not less important than it had become arduous from the deplorable effects of the inefficiency and abuse which prevailed in every branch and department of the military service. There existed no positive system of discipline, no rule of promotion, or if they did exist, they were not enforced. Advancement was attainable by a hundred different means, none productive of any solid or immediate advantage, yet all entailing serious and lasting mischief.

His Royal Highness undertook the duties of this situation with a firm determination to correct the errors and abuses which had crept into the administration of the army, and the zeal and indefatigable attention with which he persevered in this arduous task, were equalled only by the judgment which directed his labours, and which prompted him to proceed with moderation and caution towards the progressive attainment of his object, instead of resorting to hasty measures which would have unhinged the whole machine, before any other could be substituted, and have ruined a number of individuals, who under a better system, might eventually become useful to the state. A course so prudent and so mild could alone have enabled him to overcome the many difficulties he had to encounter, and the opposition with which he frequently had to