rily put together by the mind, to answer its own purposes; or, 3dly, of relations.

According to the Hartleian theory which this author propofes to illuftrate, all the phenomena of the human mind may be refolved into these two claffes, perception and the affociation of ideas. Perception they ftill further endeavour to account for by the theory of vibrations. In this, however, they do not appear to be fo confident that they are right. But they infift that the refolution of all the phenomena of mind into perception and affociation does not depend upon this, and is equally true whether any explanation be given of perception or not. It is evidently beyond the limits of our defign to enter into a full investigation of this doctrine, about which fo much has been faid by one clafs of writers in this country; but we fhall proceed to offer fome obfervations on its appearance in the hands of Mr. B.

The method which he has taken is proper. He first states the theory, and then endeavours to fhew that the phenomena are conformable to it. Our obfervations fhall be firft directed to his account of vibrations, and next to the theory of affociation with its application to the phenomena.

We think Dr. Reid has fhewn, in the most satisfactory manner, Ift, that there is no fufficient evidence that vibrations are excited either in the nerves or brain by external objects; and, 2dly, that they are perfectly inadequate to account for our perceptions, though they were proved to exift. Mr. Belfham allows, that they do not make the nature of perception more intelligible than before." The man`ner," fays he," in which fenfations, ideas, and muscular motions are excited by vibrations, and the nature of perception, are mysteries which still remain wholly unexplained."

But to account for perception is not all which vibrations have to do according to this theory. They ought to account for all our ideas or conceptions, numberlefs as they are, no lefs than our fenfations. A fenfation, fay they, is the feeling excited by an external object acting on an organ of fenfe. The idea is the thought or conception which the mind is able to form of that object when it is removed. The cause of both thefe is the fame. A vibration in the brain causes the perception of the object when it is prefent; a vibration in the brain caufes the conception or idea of the object when it is abfent. What fhould make us think it prefent in the one cafe, and abfent in the other? Oh! fays Mr. Belfham, the vibration in the first case is ftrong, in the fecond weak. Indeed! a difference in the degree of the cause might make a difference in the degree of the effect; but it is rather unusual that a difference in the degree of the caufe fhould make a total difference in the kind of the effect. I fee an object in ftrong funfhine. Here is a vigorous vibration. I fee it in a lefs degree of light. Here is a weaker vibration. I fee it in every degree of light, till it vanifh from my fight, and till there is no vibration at all. A ftrong vibration is a fenfation, a weak vibration is an idea. We defire to know at what ftage of this progrefs the fenfation ceases to be fenfation, and becomes idea. For here are all

degrees of vibration from the strongest to the weakeft; and yet in common apprehenfion it is perception, or, in Mr. B.'s language,' fenfation, all the while.

If we chufe to make fuppofitions to account for perception, why not suppose fifty other things as good as vibrations, for that purpose the galvanic influence, for example:-This has one great advantage above vibrations, that it is known to exift. Why not fuppofe that the nerves are conductors of this influence, which paffes along them to the brain, and there produces fenfation and ideas? Had we space and time it would be very easy to produce full as pretty a theory on this fuppofition as that of vibrations.

Let us enumerate a few of the gratuitous fuppofitions of this theory; ift. There are vibrations excited in the medullary fubftance of the brain and nerves by external objects. That this is perfectly without proof we refer to the fatisfactory evidence of Dr. Reid to demonstrate: 2d, fays Mr. B. c. 3. fec. 2. The medullary substance having once vibrated in a particular manner does not return entirely to its natural ftate, but continues difpofed to vibrate in that manner rather than another." There is no other vibration or vibrating substance of that kind with which we are acquainted. A mufical cord, which has twenty times vibrated any note, is not on that account more difposed to vibrate fuch note than any other of the scale. Aye, but, fays Mr. B. a stick once bent has a difpofition to remain in that form, and does not return to its former state. So has a stone, that is lifted out of one place into another, to remain where it is put down, and not to return of its own accord to the place from which it was taken. But Mr. B. fhould have told us that a stone which has been once thrown up into the air has a greater tendency to fly up into the air again, than one which has never been thrown up: 3d. Mr. B. fays in the fame fec. "Vibrations may be revived not only by the repetition of external impreffions, but by their affociation with each other." What is meant by the affociation of ideas we know. It is the fact that one idea follows another according to fome one of the relations of contiguity, caufation, or resemblance. But to talk of vibrations in the medullary fubftance of the brain following one another according to the relations of contiguity, caufation, or refemblance, is perfectly unintelligible. He adds Of vibrations which have been affociated together a fufficient number of times, if one be excited, it will excite all the reft." We ask him what evidence he has for this. Did he, or any body else, ever see these vibrations following one another in this manner? All the evidence he can poffibly have, is, that when one idea is excited it excites all these others. From this he takes it for granted that the vibrations do fo too, And then he fays, "that this hypothefis affords an excellent folution to the theory of the affociation of ideas." He makes the theory of affociation ftand as the ground of the theory of vibrations, and the theory of vibrations ftand as the ground or folution of the theory of affociation. After this manner it is a very eafy matter to prove or to folve any thing.

There

There are three claffes of mental operations, which are generally accounted different: ft, perception which has reference to time prefent: 2d, conception which has no reference to time at all: 3d, memory which has a reference to time paft. For example, ift, I fee a white horse; this is perception: 2d, I think of a white horfe, I have an image of a white horse; so to speak, in my mind, without any reference to time or place; this is conception : 3d, I remember that I faw the horfe yesterday. The Hartleian theory ac-counts for thefe operations, thus: 1ft, I fee the horfe, because a ftrong vibration is excited in my brain: 2d, the fame vibration, but weaker, happens to be excited afterwards. One would think that' on this account I fhould fee the horse again, but more faintly: no, I only think of him now: 3d, the fame vibration happens to be excited again, more weakly than the first time, but whether more weakly or more strongly than the fecond time, the theory fays not. Well, what is the confequence this time? Whether do I see the horfe, or only conceive him? Neither, I remember that I faw him. yesterday.

Let us next fee what has been the fuccefs of the attempt to resolve all the phenomena of the mind into perception and affociation"Neither Dr. Reid," fays Mr. B. "nor any other of the Scottish metaphyficians, nor even Profeffor D. Stuart perfectly comprehend Dr. Hartley's doctrine of affociation:" That is to fay, they have not thought it fo perfectly fatisfactory as Mr. B. has done; and till then nobody will perfectly comprehend it according to him. Mr. Belfhain, however, has very much misunderstood, or very much misreprefented, those philofophers. He charges them with referring every thing to inftinct; with multiplying inftincts beyond all bounds, and making foolish appeals to common fenfe whenever they have no other refource. The business of all true philofophy is to refer the phenomena of the universe to general laws, or ultimate facts, of which no account can be given. These gentlemen have attempted to do this with the phenomena of the mind. It is an eftablifhed rule with the chemical philofophers, approved by all just reafoners, to look upon every fubftance, which they have not been able to analyfe, as a fimple fubftance, till it be analyzed. So muft philofophers of all kinds look upon every fact which they are not able to refolve into fome more general fact, as an ultimate fact, till it be fo refolved. This -is what the philofophers, fo much blamed by Dr. Priestley and Mr. Belfham, have done. If any man can fhew that any of the facts, which they have left as ultimate, is a cafe of fome more general fact, 'tis well. It is a real addition made to their philofophy. But it no more overturns their phile fophy, than that of Sir Ifaac Newton overturned that of Kepler, when he fhewed that all Kepler's three laws of the planetary motions might be refolved into one. Mr. Belfham and Dr. Priestley have taken a different courfe. They first allume that there are only two ultimate facts in the huınan mind. Next they revile those philofophers who think that there are any more; and

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laftly,

laftly, they exert all their ingenuity to prove that all the phenomena of the human mind are refolvable into these two facts.

What are the proofs that the mind can perform no acts but those of perception or affociation? or more properly no act but that of perception? Affociation is not produced by the mind but by the ideas, and is an act of them not of the mind. Let us first see what is made of perception. Perception produces fenfation and ideas. What are fenfations and ideas?" Senfations," c. I, fec. 2, "are feelings excited by the impreffions of external objects upon the organs of fense. Ideas are revived impreffions or feelings when the object is withdrawn." Senfations and ideas are both feelings. All that we get then by perception are feelings. That is not the cafe. I touch the point of a needle with my finger, and I feel pain. But is this feeling all? No, I have befides this, the conviction of the immediate prefence of an instrument, of whofe fize, fhape, and colour, I have a distinct conception. This double operation of an internal feeling and the conception and belief of an external caufe takes place in every cafe of perception by the fenfes. For this important analysis we are indebted to Dr. Reid. And he diftinguishes the first by the name of fenfation, and the latter by that of perception, and to this confined ufe he carefully restricts these two names.

"Senfations are feelings excited by external objects; and ideas are thofe feelings revived without the prefence of the object." According to this account we can have no idea but of fenfible objects. All our fenfations are from fenfible objects, and all our ideas are only those fenfations revived. If there be any idea which is not the revived feeling of a fenfation, this theory gives no account of it. "But," fays Mr. B. c. 3, fec. 1, "all internal feelings, not being fenfations, are, according to Dr. Hartley's theory, called ideas. This to be fure, will include every thing. This takes off all at one full fwoop. This is difcuffing the fubject with a master's hand; but when Dr. Hartley was giving a name of such vaft importance, why not have done it a little more perfectly ftill? Why not have called affociations and fenfations ideas too, and then he could have infifted that all the phenomena of the human mind were of one clafs only, which would have been' moft fimple and philofophical. I feel the agony of remorse; this is an idea; I conceive a centaur, this is an idea; I remember a white mouse, this is an idea; I am in love, this is an idea; I judge that twice two are four, this is an idea. It would be an improvement on this species of philofophifing to call all objects in nature by one name, and then maintain that there is one general law which accounts for every thing."

Let us obferve how far perception extends by this doctrine. It is by perception we get all fenfations and ideas. It is perception therefore when we difcern an external object-it is perception when we conceive any object-it is perception when we are confcious of any mental operation. The three claffes of operations, those of sense,

con

conception, and confcioufnefs, are all in this theory called by one name, perception.

Obferve the progress of the mind according to this theory. First, external objects act upon the fenfes and produce fenfations. Then those sensations are revived after the object is removed, and produce ideas. Laftly, thofe fenfations and ideas are clustered together in groups by affociation in every poffible variety. The mind does nothing but perceive, or join two or more perceptions together. This accounts for memory, judgment, reafoning, love, admiration, and every poffible modification of thought. It is not very probable at first fight, and we cannot say that to us it appears so, even after all that Mr. Belfham has faid in its favour.

We can only examine one or two of his attempts to reduce the mental operations to affociation. His account of abstract complex ideas is pleasant. "The fimple ideas of which they are made up,' fays he," are united together by affociation, and fo intimately mixed, that they have an appearance altogether fimple and uniform, as the feven coloured rays produce a white one. I fee a dog for the first time to day; I fee another to-morrow, and fo on for many days. Whenever afterwards the fenfation of dog is impreffed, it excites not the idea of this dog or that dog, but ideas of all the dogs which I have feen, which are not a number of ideas, but so mixed by affociation as to form one idea." Let us here tell Mr. B. what affociation means:It refers to the fucceffion of our ideas, not to their mixture: It expreffes the law by which one idea fuggefts another. But, fays Mr. B. fome affociations are fynchronous-a fynchronous affociation is a term unintelligible. The laws of affociation exprefs the mode in which ideas follow one another, but are inapplicable entirely to those which appear at the fame inftant together in the mind. What, are not several fenfations, fays Mr. B. prefented to the mind at once? True, but by an external caufe, not by the affociation of one with another. For in that cafe one muft appear first, that fuggeft a fecond, that a third, and fo on, in fucceffion. This is the law of affociation; and if it mean not this, it means nothing.

Let us take one other inftance, a moft important one furely, the mental operation by which we distinguish truth from falfhood. This by common writers is called judgment. It is called intuition by Mr. Belfham. Knowledge," fays Mr. B. " is the clear perception of truth; I know, that is, I clearly perceive, that the whole is equal to its parts." Perception was formerly made to comprehend the operations of the fenfes, consciousness and conception. Here it is made to comprehend judgment too. It is not eafy to fee what use there is for affociation at this rate at all. Helvetius understood this, and refolves at once all the operations of mind into perception. This by Mr. Belfham's rule is far more fimple, and philofophical; and his own charge, fo bitterly made against Dr. Reid, may justly be retorted on himself. Why multiply inftincts? Why make an instinct of affociation? Perception anfwers all. He defines intuition thus:

"By