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was made by our competitors. In the case of a large number of commodities and services used at home but not absolutely necessary, where the demand expands or contracts with the price, reduced hours and raised prices would result generally in lower wages or lessened employment, though not equally so in all cases. In the case of necessaries for home consumption, reduced hours would raise prices, though not perhaps greatly in the cases of bread or clothes. In these cases, self-interest being assumed, unanimity amongst labourers is hardly to be expected. The unemployed would gain by an eight hours' day at the cost of the community, and chiefly of the employed; therefore legislation would be inexpedient. In the case of mining, the limitation of hours would, on the whole, be a decided gain. The only interest affected unfavourably would be that of the consumer, who should, however, be willing to forego something to benefit a large class of overworked labourers. It is not so certain that the State should effect the limitation, since a decided majority in combination could effect it for themselves, the employers' interest not being adverse in this case to that of the employed. In the case of the East-end tailors and others worked excessively long hours (or paid very low wages) the interference of the State would merely throw a number of them out of work, and would not be acceptable to them. The long hours or low wages here come from the fact that there are too many of them seeking employment. If the numbers were less, they could prevent the long hours or low wages. And even as it is, if they wanted less hours, they could

effect it for themselves by trades unions, and the refusal to work so long; but they could only do so at the cost of some of their numbers being thrown out of work. They cannot all, therefore, afford to go into trades unions to lower hours or raise wages, which would merely have for effect the exclusion of a number of them altogether. In this particular case it is the excessive competition from excessive numbers due to foreign immigration, which lies at the bottom of the long hours. Where the numbers are excessive, neither the State nor trades unions can prevent the evils, except by excluding some of the workers, that is, increasing the unemployed.

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IT remains to consider how far the State might itself advantageously undertake a certain portion of the field of industry. At present it works satisfactorily, as well as successfully from the economical point of view, the postal and telegraph services, and it has recently extended the postal service so as to include the transport of small parcels; that is to say, it has to a certain extent become, in conjunction with the railway companies, a carrier of goods. To be a complete carrier even of parcels, it should own the railways, their rolling stock and other adjuncts; and the question arises, whether the Government might not undertake wholly the carriage of goods and passengers by purchasing the railways, and working them in the public interest? It is a kind of work peculiarly suitable for Government management, being largely of a uniform and routine character, not demanding from the general managers the complicated calculations and resources required in manufacturing industry, and for which work, however responsible or difficult, the Government could secure as capable managers as the companies. Besides, the

railway interest is of the nature of a huge though qualified monopoly; or rather there are as many monopolies as there are companies without competition. Hence the chief check on the monopolists' charges in freights and rates is their own sense of self-interest, which is by no means always coincident with the public interest or convenience. It is true that our great railway companies have not abused their position to the gross extent that the companies in the United States have done, but there have been abuses, and they are liable to abuse to a degree which would not be possible if they were under the control of the Government, with no other interest but that of the general public.

If the State undertook their management, the working expenses would probably be reduced by diminished salaries to directors for one item, and the gross receipts would probably be increased by the greater regard paid to the public convenience and comfort. For this would increase the number of passengers, while the amount of traffic would not be decreased by fairer freight, which would facilitate trade. The result would most likely be a fair balance of net profits beyond their present amount, which would be for the public benefit, and which might be employed to reduce taxation, or in other ways. The purchase of the railways and their adjuncts would, however, necessitate the borrowing of some 700 to 800 millions sterling, the interest on which could be paid by the profits resulting, with something left to help to extinguish the principal, it deemed advisable. And the disengaged capital of

the paid-off shareholders, what is to be done with it? As to that, it would partly go to fill up vacancies made in other investments by the Government borrowing for the railways, partly it might swell the general loan fund so that some of it would overflow into foreign investments, if there were not enough promising new enterprises at home; the total effect being most likely beneficial by calling forth extra savings. Or, the financial change might be less, as many of the shareholders might prefer to leave their shares under the Government management, that is, to lend their money, supposing they got their old interest or something near it, so that to the extent that they did so there would be a mere transfer of their credit to the Government instead of to the railway companies.

One result would be a great increase in the civil service of the State, and an increase of Government influence. There would be a number of appointments with varying salaries thrown open to the general competition of the whole nation, with a certain equalizing and diffusing of opportunities, wherein would consist its chief good result. It would be so far a carrying out of the St. Simonian ideal of awarding places according to talent, without regard to the favour or patronage of individuals. There would be abler persons filling the higher appointments than at present, because the ability of a wider area would be drawn upon.

And having gone thus far, is the State to stop or go farther and absorb all industries, substituting its own management for that of the private capitalist

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