that their scheme is incompatible with existing governments and as the latter are not likely to change quickly enough of their own impulse in a Socialistic direction, a revolution in fact as well as in idea, and probably a violent struggle, will be necessary.

Now a revolution is a possible thing, and a successful revolutionary government might be installed. The thing has been before. The government might be animated with Socialistic principles, and it might decree the confiscation of land and capital. It might take both from the present possessors, without any compensation, or, more mercifully, it might give them partial compensation, not in money, but in labour cheques, to be presented against consumable goods,' most of which would be of no use. Interest might be forbidden, salaries cut down, production controlled, prisons might even be filled, and heads cut off, but a universal collectivism would not work; it would be found impracticable because contrary to human nature in certain directions, and in others where it would be practicable it would be discovered to be bad for the general weal. The ablest and most energetic would revolt against it; they would probably carry the many with them after a short experience of the new system. There would be general chaos, and out of that chaos, in all probability, a strong and successful soldier would arise (perhaps from the government itself) to compel order, with the strong hand. It would indeed be the best and the only way out of the difficulty; and the thing has happened so invariably in like 2 Schæffle's "Quintessence of Socialism," p. 33.

cases that we may now almost regard it as a scientific law. But history does indeed also suggest the possibility that out of civil commotions and revolutions a great man might arise, a man of genius and virtue, who in re-establishing order might found and establish something of permanent advantage to the general weal, might in particular effect changes for the better in the relation of classeseconomic and social changes—a thing more possible to one man of great capacity than to a body, whether Parliament, Congress, or Chamber of Deputies. The latter, indeed, in times of revolution could not do it; the former might. This would be the only chance for the Revolutionary Socialists; and a remote one, for the man would require almost superhuman power as well as wisdom and virtue, should be a sort of earthly Deity, in fact, to do the work. To establish universal Collectivism would indeed be beyond the power of even such a one, unless he could reverse the laws of nature, but something less, though something considerable, in the general Socialist direction, he might do and sooner and more fully than a Representative Assembly. And such a one of extraordinary will and genius, though only of ordinary virtue, did arise out of the Great Revolution in Napoleon, who did put into his Code much that was practicable and permanently desirable, and who had the large idea that the career should be open in every field to talent; the Napoleonic ideas being in fact largely akin to St. Simonism, as Roscher says, and really carrying out the best and most practicable parts of it.

But Revolution should not be invoked on the

remote chance that a Deity would be found in the whirlwind any more than in the hope that an impossible social system could be forcibly founded by an Assembly, because the Cæsar who might arise would far more likely not be of large capacity, or he might even prove a reactionary. He might find the forces of reaction too strong for him, even supposing him to have the best intentions to favour the socialist ideas, or he might be opposed to them; so that, all things considered, the leaders of the working classes would do better in pushing for reforms and practicable ameliorations in their condition through existing constitutional means rather than in putting all at hazard by attempting a violent revolution more likely to throw back their cause than to advance it.

Even by so doing it may not be possible to avoid revolution in the end; because in the assertion of the cause of the Fourth Estate revolution may come from class antagonisms, as it came in France after 1789 from the aspiring efforts of the Third Estate; but if it came in this way it would be in the natural order of things, and the responsibility for it would not lie solely with the working class, but would be shared by the uncompromising defenders of the present order. And it may be added that the only kind of revolution by which the cause of labour would be likely to make any permanent advance would be such a natural revolution, which need not necessarily be a bloody one.

IV.

WE may here sum up the chief conclusions reached respecting Collectivism, the latest scheme of an Ideal

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Commonwealth, and pronounce a final estimate upon it. As a scheme, while partly agreeing with the St. Simonian, it is distinctly inferior to the latter in not fully recognizing inequality of capacity and frankly accepting as the natural consequences of the fact, inequality of remuneration, especially in the sphere of material production. With really fuller economical knowledge than St. Simonism, it is yet essentially weak on the economical side where it should be specially strong, and where it specially boasts of its strength.

Its criticism of capital, though partly sound, is largely fallacious. Its constructive scheme, so far as any has been given, is unworkable in parts, in others of doubtful tendency, in others, again, of bad tendency. The detached propositions which form the essence of it cannot cohere into a system. Its parts cannot be put together so as to form a whole that would work. Productive labour could not all be collectively organized, still less unproductive. Agricultural labour could not be collectively organized, though land might be collectively owned. The numerous small detached industries where not much capital is needed could not with advantage be worked by the State. There is much labour that might be brigaded, though not suited for collective action in a given place or at the same time, and the only thing to be said in favour of State organization and payment is that it would prevent private exploitation, though it would probably also open the door for official corruption and misappropriation of funds.

As regards Distribution, we have seen that anything

approaching equalization of wages there could not be without resulting in diminished production and inferior services, especially those of the higher sort. The industrial chief in particular will have to be paid liberally, or the product will be worse in quality as well as less in quantity. On grounds of justice no less than of policy, the superior manager deserves extra wages whenever the increase in quantity or quality is due to his superior energy and ability. Mere policy would dictate sufficient payment to make him use all his energy and ability, at least until new and higher motives can act upon him. Extra merit in the generality of workers, for the like reasons, would have to be paid higher, or production would suffer. More than all, the great inventors of machines and discoverers of new processes of production, the Watts, Bessemers, Edisons, as well as the great engineers, the Stephensons and Lessepses, the men who almost at one stroke make a comprehensive addition to the sum of wealth or store of material utilities, will have to be specially encouraged, or if not their country and the world will be the poorer.

We have seen, too, that certain professions, as the medical and the legal, could not be adequately or conveniently paid by the State; that the most skilled members at least would have to be permitted private practice and to charge additional fees, in the interests of the general health or of justice; that the artist, the actor, the public singer, the popular novelist or poetall who possess an exceptional gift the exercise of which is greatly valued-could not conveniently or with advantage be paid by the State, without at least