GEN. ORD.

would follow, thus leaving Corinth an easy prey to his (Van Dorn's) forces. Grant did not fall into the trap, but without leaving Corinth uncovered, proceeded to defeat Price before he could get back to Van Dorn or be reinforced by him. He sent Ord, with about five thousand men, toward Iuka from the North, and ordered Rosecrans, who had succeeded Pope, with about nine thousand men, to attack the place from the direction of Jacinto. But Ord and Rosecrans failed to attack simultaneously as Grant had ordered and expected. The brunt of the battle fell on Rosecrans' troops, on the afternoon of September 19th, and they lost a battery, with seven hundred and thirtysix men killed and wounded. The engagement was a sharp one, and the loss to the Confederates greater than that to the Federals, being estimated by Rosecrans at fourteen hundred and thirty-eight killed and wounded, and by Pollard at eight hundred. Rosecrans sent word at nightfall that an early attack must be made in the morning. Ord was urged to push up his column and co-operate closely. Grant fully expected to capture all of Price's force on the 20th. But the enemy slipped out of its predicament during the night, and by morning was in full retreat, except about one thousand, who became prisoners of war. Pursuit was ordered and kept up for some time, but was discontinued when it was found that Price was making his way in a circle to rejoin Van Dorn. Grant had to get his forces back toward Corinth, or within supporting distance, as quickly as possible. Rosecrans was back at Corinth by the 26th; Ord was at Bolivar; Hurlbut was sent toward Pocahontas, midway between Corinth and Grand

Junction, where Price had rejoined Van Dorn, after his circuitous retreat, and from which point they were expected to move on Corinth.

My position is precarious, but I expect to get through all right" was the word Grant sent to Washington on October Ist. The Confederates moved as if to strike Corinth on the north and thus cut off reinforcements from Bolivar. But Grant ordered Ord and Hurlbut to come from Bolivar to Pocahontas and thence to Corinth, so as to fall in on the Confederate rear. Van Dorn pushed boldly on with a force of over thirty thousand men upon Rosecrans with about nineteen thousand. On October 2d skirmishing began. On the 3d battle became active, and Rosecrans was gradually forced back toward the fortifications of Corinth, which Grant had erected within the bounds of the old ones. It was now seen how wisely Grant had been working a month before. The enemy were flushed with seeming victory. They pressed hard on the Federals, and by nightfall had driven them within their fortifications. So confident were they of final victory that Van Dorn sent a hasty dispatch to Richmond announcing the capture of Corinth. They were ordered to renew the attack early in the morning.

Fire was opened on the Federal lines early on the 4th. At half-past nine Price made a furious assault on the Federal centre, which was met with a storm of canister and grape, but not checked till it broke Davies' division and forced it back on the town. Rosecrans concentrated his artillery, pushed up Sullivan's brigade and the Tenth Ohio and Fifth Minnesota regiments, and finally drove the Confederates from their position within his lines. Meanwhile Van Dorn was leading his right in an assault on the Federal left. This was anticipated, and met with havoc to the enemy by Stanley's division and the heavy guns of Battery Robinet. Still they held on till within fifty yards of the works where the rifle fire became too

deadly. They retreated, but were again led forward into the midst of that dreadful fire. On their second retreat, the soldiers within the works gave pursuit, and drove them, broken and routed, back to the woods. They were no longer able to make headway and lost no time in getting off the field, leaving their wounded and the artillery they had captured the day before. The Federal loss was 315 killed, 1812 wounded and 230 prisoners. Rosecrans reported the Confederate dead at 1423 with 2225 prisoners, representing sixty-nine regiments and light batteries. The coming of McPherson's and Hurlbut's columns in the rear and the splendid circle made by the former to get to Rosecrans' right, served to help the demoralization of the Confederates. Ord pushed after the enemy and intercepted the retreat at the Hatchie river, capturing a battery and several hundred men. Rosecrans had been ordered to pursue also and help Ord, but his army could not reach the scene in time, on account of fatigue and getting on the wrong road. A heavy rain set in, supplies were low, and the art of living off the enemy's country had not yet been learned. So the pursuit was called off. Grant issued orders congratulating his officers and men for their faithfulness and undaunted bravery.

Iuka and Corinth retrieved somewhat the disasters in the East and relieved West Tennessee from immediate danger. Rosecrans was made a major-general and ordered to the command of the army of the Cumberland to relieve Buell. Grant did not receive the credit due him for conceiving and directing these important operations. He was modest, made no show of superiority, took no advantage of victory to further his personal ends. He had few friends in Washington and was not a favorite with any correspondents. His genius was not yet fully understood, and his successes were yet counted as in the nature of accidents. He had been operating for weeks on the defensive, whereas he had before won his greatest victories on

the offensive. Yet he showed equal mastery of situations, the same wonderful attention to details, the clearest knowledge of topography and strategy, and a felicity in ordering and directing which was Napoleonic.

CHAPTER VII.

PREPARING FOR VICKSBURG.

take and hold the Mississippi Valley was vital to the Confederacy, and equally vital to the Union. There lay an empire six times as large as France, through which ran the finest navigable water course on the globe, and over fifty navigable tributaries. Without it the Confederacy would be rent in twain; and so, without it the Northwest would be hemmed in and crippled to ruin.

Accordingly the Confederates early seized and fortified important positions on the line of the Mississippi river-Columbus, Fort Pillow, Island No. 10, Memphis, Vicksburg, Port Hudson. By means of the fortifications below New Orleans they controlled the mouth of the stream. By means of those at Columbus they shut off navigation from the north, up to within twenty miles of Cairo. And that long strategic line of theirs running from Columbus on the left, through Ft. Donelson and Ft. Henry, to its right at Bowling Green, Ky., gave them control of both the Tennessee and Cumberland.

To break this, and all other strategic lines that the Confederates might form, to open, and keep open, the Mississippi, was the supreme object, on the part of the North, of all that concentration of troops, munitions and supplies at Cairo, all the operations conducted from that convenient base, and all the co-operative efforts of armies and navies below New Orleans. We have seen how the splendid victory of Grant at Donel