disliked; but ganjah-smokers, and dram-drinkers, are seldom seen to be reduced to that entirely degraded state, though the consumption of the former is very prevalent in Bengal; and we can easily imagine that in the absence of tea or coffee, or other soothing beverage, a labourer may find, after a long day's work in the sun or rain, a refreshment in smoking a chillum of ganjah. It is to be deplored that such is the case, and that they have not the means of taking a draught of that "which soothes, but not inebriates," but as ganjah-smoking is permitted, that is the sale of the drug is legally authorised, we think that the consumers may fairly expect that such laws should be enacted, as would place them above the mercy of the few who undertake to supply them, and from whose licensed imposition there is no escape.

We have said that opium is the only drug in which there may be a "free trade," and why that, the most deleterious of all excisable articles, was thrown open, we are not in a position to tell; and therefore our reasons for doubting the advisability of the measure may be of not much use or importance; but still we may be allowed a few words on the subject. An opium license is granted in the following manner :-Any man petitioning an Abkari Superintendent with the amount of a seer of opium in his hand, is entitled to a license for the sale of it, in any particular haut or market in which he may wish to set up a shop. The price of opium in eastern Bengal ranges between thirteen and sixteen rupees, and this sum covers the manufacturing price, as well as the tax or fees on the sale. This arrangement has been in force some six or seven years, and may be supposed to have been introduced to equalize the tax and prices of all districts; perhaps, also to put an end to the smuggling and illicit trade, emanating in the manufacturing zillahs. The old arrangement was very different in the eastern districts. The opium-vender had to pay Rs. 5-8 as price, and Rs. 29-8 as tax on sale; in some districts the tax was only Rs. 27 or even less, but the price of course was always Rs. 5-8 every where. The new system of Abkari management, introduced in 1840 (Act 25) under Commissioners expressly appointed for that purpose, has been superseded, because it did not pay. The increase of revenue obtained by it, was not equivalent to the increase of expense it involved. Can it be wondered at? As far as the opium is concerned, in a district where the tax was Rs. 29-8, to equal the revenue derived from it at that rate, it would be necessary, if the tax and price were reduced to Co.'s Rs. 14 (which would be Rs. 5-8 for price, and Rs. 8-8 for tax) to sell three and a half maunds, for each maund formerly sold, and a dis

trict which then sold twenty-five maunds would now have to sell eighty-seven maunds to make the jumma equal to what it was. "What! sell eighty-seven maunds of opium for self-consumption in one district! Heaven forbid," says our friend, the philanthropist, and "Amen"-respond we most heartily. It could hardly have been anticipated or hoped, that the decrease in the amount of opium revenue consequent on the decrease of tax on sale, could have been made up by an increased consumption, when we come to consider the amount of opium that would have to be used; what other reasons may have induced the reduction we do not know, and therefore cannot undertake to pronounce on the financial advantages of the measure. But we will say, unhesitatingly, that in a moral point of view, as passively encouraging the consumption of a very noxious drug, the most noxious we may say of all intoxicating drugs-it cannot be praised.

There are one or two other faults of the system, which press not only on the vender, but act antagonistically on the benefits for which it was introduced, and the principal of these lies in the manner of collecting the revenue.

It was all very well for the farmer of a whole district, who of course resided at the Sudder station, to pay his revenue direct into the Collectorate; but when the shops were let out to their under-venders, it was out of the question to expect that these latter should come in from all parts to pay in their three or four rupees every fifteen days; therefore Government appointed Darogahs on very good pay, and with a handsome establishment, to assist these under-venders, to collect and remit their revenue. This concession and assistance was kind and considerate, and if the officers appointed for this purpose had remained content with so far doing their duty, all would have been right; but they did not stop here unfortunately. These Darogahs had great power, and soon began to call for fees and nuzzars of all sorts. By the uncertain gambling produced by introducing poor men, and very often the lowest of the low, Darogahs of course began to obtain great influence also. The new class of pattadars had every thing to gain, and nothing to lose; they were entirely without resources, and if they did not sell each week enough to pay up their revenue for those seven days, they were liable to be seized as defaulters, and deprived of their shops. A timely nuzzur saved them from all this, and consequently it was given, and given until often it came to be looked on as part of the Darogah's perquisites. The establishment of Chupprassies was as bad; if they did not receive their monthly nuzzur (called by the craft mascabar) they had many ways of annoying the vender; they could put up a man to be seen coming out of a licensed

vender's shop, with more of the drug on his person than a retail seller is allowed to sell to any one person at one sale. They would know every consumer within the bounds of the obnoxious vender's shop, and getting gunjah from some more accommodating pattadar, would go and sell it privately to these consumers. In fact, a Chupprassy has many ways of annoying, and many too of assisting, a licensed vender; so that in general, the mascabar is not disputed. Hence the measures adopted by the Government for the benefit of these people, have been made the means of injuring them; for though we have been writing in the past tense, we cannot but believe that these practices still exist.

Another cause of complaint, and one which presses only on the vender, is the too strict reading of the terms of agreement entered into by him, on taking out his license. He stipulates to give a certain daily tax all through the year for the sale of any certain drug, say gunjah. A month's supply is allowed at a time, which he may take at once or by instalments. Now any one having any knowledge or experience in any retail trade, knows the utter impossibility of any tradesman being able to fix or determine what amount of sales he will effect in a future month; every thing depends on the demand,—and the demand in this case is for an article of consumption, not being an article of absolute necessity, as salt, corn or oil, but one which fluctuates with the means and inclination of the consumer, and is one. therefore which it is quite impossible to fix. The vender probably takes an average of the consumption of so many previous months, and he will generally be near the mark; but still, he may be short of it. An extra marriage or two, or some extra and unexpected féte may happen to take place, and he has not ganjah to supply this; of course, and very fairly, he must go to the Excise Office and take out an extra pass, and pay tax for any extra quantity he may desire to sell; but then it may happen, from certain causes just as unexpected, that he has not had an opportunity of selling in some month, all that he estimated that he would sell, and for which by the last day of that month he has paid tax. Not having had any necessity for it, he has allowed it to remain at the wholesale golah or store; but the month having elapsed, he has no claim on the quantity so left unsold, nor is he allowed to sell it the following month. Now we consider it would be but fair to allow him to sell this next month if he can. The reader must remember the settlement is made as follows: A man says, "I will give so much a day for the sale of ganjah in such a market," that is, if he gives eight annas a day, he is entitled to sell one seer per day in that place, if he requiring more than thirty seers for the month, pays extra

and gets it, he ought to be allowed the corresponding advantage of being permitted to sell what from unforeseen circumstances, he was unable to sell the previous month; it would be but a balancing of accidents and chances, benefits and disadvantages. A contrary proceeding gives the Government the appearance of wishing to take advantage of a man's ill-luck. Many people are inclined to argue so. 66 Look," they say, "Government state expressly that they tax spirituous and fermented liquors, and intoxicating drugs, primarily for the purpose of putting a check on the moral and physical injury caused by an abuse of them; and only secondarily, for the sake of the revenue derived by it; yet they take a tax for any quantity of a drug a vender may not ' have sold during the course of one month, and if he has an 'opportunity of selling it the next, he is not allowed to do so without paying for it over again; how can they reconcile this fact with that assertion?"* People will argue so, and they have reason too;-under such a view of the case, it is difficult to prove that the revenue is only the indirect, and not the direct cause of the Excise tax.

If the faults of the system are so glaring, the faults of the management are, we think, worse, and more numerous; and the most palpable is the desire to increase the revenue. This is a monomania almost with some Abkari superintendents. Their first thought is, how much they will be able to increase next year, and the next thought is, how that revenue can be collected within the year. We have often known it to be jokingly urged against Abkari superintendents that when two of them meet, the first subject of discourse between them is, how much they increased last year, and how much they anticipate increasing the next, and so on. How long is this increasing to go on? If they would only think, they would perceive the utter incompatibility of the two ideas of increasing, and collecting regularly. Where is this constant increase to come from? There are but two sources, viz: an increase in the number of drunken wretches, or that those who drank before, should drink the more;-neither of them very desirable objects to bring about. It may be said that there is an increase arising from the stoppage of illicit trade, which was effected by the strengthening of the preventive force. Allowing it, that increase could only have affected the jumma of the first year, or at most of the second year, after the introduction of the new system, and has, or ought to have been, long since exhausted. The smuggler and illicit dealer have certainly been put

This restriction no longer exists, and a vender may sell in the following month, what remained unsold the previous one.

down; and strangely enough, at the same time, the inducement to smuggle has increased in the generally higher price of excisable articles, and the prices have risen principally from the following cause: A superintendent wishing to make a settlement says:-"I want so much for such a shop." It may not be worth anything like what the superintendent requires, but some vender comes forward and says, " very well, I will give so much, provided I ' have all the neighbouring shops at the rates at present paid on them." Very probably he gets them all, for few superintendents have the moral courage to give up an increase; but this is not the end of it; if the proposer be a respectable fellow, well to do, he may manage to carry on pretty well, and make some profit. When down comes a speculator and offers a still further increase-Darogahjee, who may have become dissatisfied with the respectable man as touching his mascabar or something else, aids the interloper, perhaps puts him forward himself, states that he is perfectly capable of carrying on the shop. Having scraped up the requisite deposit, it may be given to the new applicant, and the difficulties begin. The respectable man having retired in disgust, the new man finds that there is not the profit he anticipated, that although his predecessor managed to carry on well enough, it was because he traded on his own capital, whereas he, the interloper, is obliged to go on a borrowed one. He must sell his drug as he can, on tick, or at reduced prices, to those living beyond his bounds; but the price amongst his own regular customers is kept up, and if they go to other shops, they are threatened with a case against them;-against one, perhaps, a case may be instituted, and he will be punished, or released as it may be, but in either case with much tusdeah, according to the discrimination of the superintendent. His friends and neighbours, knowing him to be innocent, of course raise the cry of oppression and injustice; the shop is shunned as much as possible, and at last the pattadar pays his fine, if permitted, and resigns, or, what is more probable, runs away and adds to the already hostile feeling entertained towards the Abkari; which may be left in a regular fix, owing to the most respectable men having retired and refusing to have anything further to do with it, or at any rate only on their own terms; so the settlement goes back to the old point, with only a large increase of ill-will and bad character. We find in fact that a screw is required to keep up the present jumma under the new system, to its pitch; the pattadars are aided and abetted in all means of acquiring profit, at the same time, they require strict supervision, or they will not pay up. We do not mean that torture or any