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to discharge the duty, and in all the Bengal army, not one has proved true. Away with them! we say-let their treachery and uselessness no longer cumber the ground, and the army. Let the native officers of the regular army be all dismissed, and only very special reasons exempt any one to the extent of giving him a pension. Expediency may forgive a traitor, and compassion may forgive a fool; but traitor and fool united is out of the category of forgiveness; and this, we say, is the predicament in which the native officers stand. Aye! even those belonging to the so-called staunch regiments. What applies to the native officer equally applies to the common man. As a matter of good faith, they have now, as a body, no claim on the Government. Their retention is a mere matter of expediency, and, as it is not expedient in the case of the native artillery, we would not retain them. Special cases might be made the subject of special consideration, but a lasting divorce should be instituted between the native and the gun. The re-organization of the artillery, involving, as it does, an increase of guns, officers, and men, in the aggregate, the substitution of a large number of Europeans for natives, and of horses for bullocks, would of course cost more than at present. We will save more than the amount in the other arms of the service.

CAVALRY.-This branch of the service before the war consisted of two regiments H. M.'s dragoons, ten native light cavalry, and eighteen regiments irregular cavalry. Both of the native branches of the cavalry have mutinied, and their rights are exactly what are above stated to be those of the artillery, and no more. We however, though condemning the bad faith of both alike, propose to treat them very differently, and that simply because it is expedient to do so. In a word, we propose to abolish the light cavalry entirely, and in their room form eight regiments of dragoons. We propose to increase the number of regiments of irregular cavalry to twenty, denominate them light horse, and raise a duffadar's pay to thirty, and a sowar's to twenty-five rupees a month. The eight regiments of dragoons might be officered as follows: one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, eight captains, eleven lieutenants, and five cornets. This would leave two colonels, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, six captains and two lieutenants supernumerary in the whole cavalry. We would propose that the supernumerary field officers be retained to keep up the promotion, but that the six captains and two lieutenants be absorbed; a measure which could not be very hard on the junior cavalry officers, considering the very great luck that they have had. We propose that each regiment of cavalry shall consist of three squadrons, and six troops, and number twenty-four

sergeants, twenty-four corporals, six trumpeters, six farriers, 480 troopers, one surgeon, two assistant-surgeons, and one veterinary surgeon, with a staff and establishment on the scale proportionally of one of Her Majesty's regiments of light dragoons. Eight such regiments would, we think, be a sufficient heavy cavalry for the Bengal army; they would cost rather less than the ten light cavalry regiments did before the mutinies, would be at least equal to thirty of the other sort, and would enable Government to dispense with the two regiments of Her Majesty's dragoons, and save the very great cost they entail. As a percontra, there would be a large expenditure for buildings and barracks; but that is a Public-Works charge, and inevitable; as more Europeans, many more, must be stationed here. Our endeavour is to develope a scheme which shall make this increase at once as efficient as possible, without trenching beyond the limits of necessity, drawn by the exigencies of Indian finance. As to the merits of the native light cavalry, we have no inclination to discuss them, they have been argued ad nauseam. Suffice it to say, that they have been condemned by public opinion, and stand confessedly the most inefficient branch of the native army, with reference to the reasonable expectations that were formed of them. Even their own officers admit that they are not worth the money they cost. Under such circumstances their abolition cannot but be attended with advantage; and we have every reason to believe, that this measure has been more than once in contemplation, but that always some difficulty or other was found in the way, which this mutiny will go far to remove. The value of a reliable body of European cavalry in this country can scarcely be overrated. The arm is sadly neglected in England. The officers of the British cavalry regiments are extravagant, and have given their service a bad name in consequence with reference to work. True, Balaklava made a reaction; but it is an undeniable fact, that cavalry is neglected and underrated among English soldiers. Yet except under very peculiar circumstances, no decisive battle was ever gained without the free use of cavalry. Broken troops can easily escape from infantry and artillery, for the latter dare not leave the former, unless it had cavalry with it. In the Peninsula, we only gained two decisive battles, Salamanca and Vittoria. In the former battle, cavalry played a leading part. It was the decisive charge of the heavy dragoons under General Le Marchant that won the day. Vittoria again was one of those peculiar cases to which we alluded as exceptional. The town lies in a basin surrounded by hills, and almost encircled by a small river. Two roads lead from it towards France, and two only. The high road to Bayonne was seized by our left,

under Sir Thomas Graham, and after their defeat, the French were driven to retreat, encumbered with the spoil of a nation, by the bad and mountainous road to Pampeluna. It was this sole line of retreat, choked, crowded, and insufficient, which made the battle so decisive without the aid of cavalry. But look at Napoleon's battles. How was Austerlitz, Jena, or Wagram won? It was his invariable practice to mass his heavy cavalry under Murat, and after shaking the enemy with his other arms, overwhelm them with this one. Any one who has read the history of the campaign in the Netherlands in 1815, will see and acknowledge its use. The charge of the union brigade at Waterloo destroyed, as a military body, 8,000 men, and rendered forty guns useless. Frederick the Great had a magnificent cavalry, and used it most freely. Cæsar won Pharsalia with his cavalry, and Alexander won all his battles with his "companions." Ancient and modern history alike points out the use and indispensable necessity of this arm in war; but it is a fact beyond dispute that no British army has ever a proper proportion of cavalry, and that in a nation which can produce more good riders than any country in Europe. No country in the world is more suitable to the action of cavalry than the plains of Hindoostan, and nowhere is it easier for a beaten army to escape in every direction; the country is level and open, and the only way to make success decisive is to be found in that arm, which can follow with rapidity, without fatigue or disorder. It is unnecessary for us to point out the advantages of decisive success in all our wars in Asia. Anything short of it with these people is no success at all. Promptness and vigour are every thing, and that is scarcely to be accomplished here in war, without the aid of an European cavalry force. The native light horse is as necessary as the other. We propose that they should be the same in every respect as the present irregular cavalry, but we reject the name, "irregular," as unsuited to a force which is part and parcel of a regular army. There is much duty for light horse in India, which is suited to natives only. Experience has proved this description of force both cheap and efficient. We therefore propose to retain it, extending the number of regiments to twenty, and increasing the pay of a duffadar from rupees twenty-eight to thirty, and that of a sowar, from rupees twenty to twenty-five. This measure is in our opinion advisable, as all officers now attached to this force agree in declaring twenty rupees a month to be too little for a sowar. Justice cannot be done to the regiment without trenching on the means of the men till debt ensues, and then, though appearances may be kept up for a time, in the end the regiment cannot be a good one.

This force would not be used, as a rule, in charging bodies of men, but purely as light horse, in keeping open communications, clearing roads, intercepting the enemy's orderlies and despatches, feeling the way of the army, and whirling down on a mass of fugitives broken and disorganized by the European cavalry. In dours against robbers, or on the frontier, they would be invaluable. In short, it is nonsense to write what every body knows : we forget we are addressing an Indian public. One word about the command of these corps. There is no branch of the service in which the personal character of an officer is of more importance, and only those adapted to it should be there. A man may be a clever man, nay, even a good soldier, yet unsuited to the light horse. All the officers ought to be good, or at least bold riders; if they are not, they should be turned out; and a man with dash about him should be always preferred. Should an officer be himself a man of prowess, who can beat his own men at their own exercises, and who is ready to head any scheme of whatever hazard, his influence will be so much the greater for this sort of command. Men of the school of Mayne, Holmes, and Chamberlain, are the men for this force, and an effort should be made to select them. In any case those wanting should be made to leave. Can anything be more lamentable than to see a dashing horseman who cannot ride, bestriding a horse that cannot go, and hugging himself with the prospect of a command some day? For such men the sowars can but have an utter contempt, and are in consequence not very likely to be of much use when the tussle comes.

INFANTRY.-This branch of the service before the mutinies consisted of fifteen regiments H. M.'s foot, three of Company's European infantry, and seventy-four native infantry regiments. The Ghoorka corps, the Kelat-i-Ghilzie regiments, and the regiments of Loodhianah and Ferozepore, are reckoned regiments of the line, but as they are not officered by their own officers, we do not mean to include them, premising that Government might absorb them into the new army, or keep them as they are, as may be most convenient, without in any way hurting this scheme. In place of this, we would propose to have seventeen regiments H. M.'s foot, fifteen regiments H. C.'s European infantry, and twenty-five regiments of native regular light infantry, officered as European corps. In this scheme, it is observed, first,-that an increase of two of H. M.'s regiments of foot, is required. This we think the Court of Directors could have no difficulty in arranging. Secondly, that an increase of twelve regiments of Company's European infantry is proposed. To officer these would be required the officers of twenty-four native regiments now existing.

The twenty-five regiments of native infantry, officered as Europeans, would require the officers of the fifty remaining regiments. Hence no difficulty would arise, as far as the European officers are concerned. Of the new European regiments, we have nothing to say. Their model exists in the service, and we are not aware at present of any means of materially improving it. There is one thing that we may mention, and that is the utter unsuitability of their head dress in this country. It is European and French, and quite unfit for India. In the course of this paper, we had no intention of touching upon dress; but when, as in the late operations, we see men struck down right and left by the sun, a fate from which we believe a proper head dress would have saved them, we feel bound to protest. A helmet of cork or felt, which would protect the head from the sun, down as far as the junction of the neck and shoulders, is, we think, the best thing for Europeans. For natives we think the more the dress is assimilated to their own the better. Here we might learn from France, and dress them à la Zouave, a costume that would suit them admirably, and give them for a head dress their own useful and elegant turbans. Officers and men should be dressed alike of course.

We now come to consider the proposed new native regiments, and as it is here we introduce as it were a new element into the service, we must enter into the subject a little at large. We propose that each regiment of native light infantry shall consist of two colonels, two lieut.-colonels, two majors, fourteen captains, twenty-two lieutenants, and ten ensigns, one surgeon or assistant-surgeon, two native doctors, one sergeant major, one quarter-master sergeant, twenty European sergeants, twenty drummers or buglers, fifty havildars, fifty naiks, and 800 sepoys; that these regiments should be drilled and disciplined precisely as an European corps; that the barrack system be introduced, and the daily orderly room. A small bungalow should be erected at the quarter guard for the European officer of the day, where he would remain during his tour. As the regiments would be light infantry, of course, greater attention would be paid to their particular drill. It will be observed there are no native officers. Our remarks on the subject of their claims upon Government are found under the head of artillery. Their claims are nothing. They have thrown aside pensions, pay, rank, consideration, and honesty-for treachery, robbery, and murder. They must abide by their bargain. It is not expedient to reinstate them, and therefore they should not be reinstated. Except on this principle, there is no reason resting on the slightest foundation why they should be taken back into the service, and as this SEPT., 1857.

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