(2.) Sentiments Proper to Man.

5. VENERATION.-Uses: Tendency to venerate or respect whatever is great and good; it gives origin to religious emotion.-Abuses: Senseless respect for unworthy objects consecrated by time or situation, love of antiquated customs, abject subserviency to persons in authority, superstitious awe; "undue deference to the opinions and reasonings of men who are fallible like ourselves; the worship of false gods, polytheism, paganism, idolatry." 6. FIRMNESS.-Uses: Determination, perseverance, steadiness of purpose.-Abuses: Stubbornness, infatuation, tenacity in evil. 7. CONSCIENTIOUSNESS.-Uses: It gives origin to the sentiment of justice, a respect for rights, openness to conviction, the love of truth.-Abuses: Scrupulous adherence to noxious principles when ignorantly embraced, excessive refinement in the views of duty and obligation, excess in remorse or selfcondemnation.

8. HOPE.-Uses: Tendency to expect future good; it cherishes faith.-Abuses: Credulity with respect to the attainment of what is desired, absurd expectations of felicity not founded

on reason.

9. WONDER.-Uses: The desire of novelty; admiration of the new, the unexpected, the grand, the wonderful, and extraordinary.-Abuses: Love of the marvellous and occult; senseless astonishment; belief in false miracles, in prodigies, magic, ghosts, and other supernatural absurdities. Note.Veneration, Hope, and Wonder, combined, give origin to religion; their abuses produce superstition.

10. IDEALITY.-Uses: Love of the beautiful, desire of excellence, poetic feeling.Abuses: Extravagant and absurd enthusiasm ; preference of the showy and glaring to the solid and useful; a tendency to dwell in the regions of fancy and to neglect the duties of life.

11. WIT-Gives the feeling of the ludicrous, and disposes to mirth. 12. IMITATION-Copies the manners, gestures, and actions of others, and appearances in nature generally.

(2.) Knowing Faculties which perceive the Existence and Qualities of External Objects.

1. INDIVIDUALITY-Takes cognisance of existence and simple

facts.

2. FORM-Renders Man observant of form.

3. SIZE-Gives the idea of space, and enables us to appreciate dimension and distance.

4. WEIGHT-Communicates the perception of momentum, weight, and resistance, and aids equilibrium.

5. COLOURING-Gives perception of colours, their harmonies and discords.

(3.) Knowing Faculties which perceive the Relations of External Objects.

1. LOCALITY-Gives the idea of relative position.

2. NUMBER-Gives the talent for calculation.

3. ORDER-Communicates the love of physical arrangement. 4. EVENTUALITY-Takes cognisance of occurrences or events. 5. TIME-Gives rise to the perception of duration.

6. TUNE-The sense of melody and harmony arises from it. 7. LANGUAGE--Gives facility in acquiring a knowledge of arbitrary signs to express thoughts, readiness in the use of them, and the power of inventing and recollecting them.

(4.) Reflecting Faculties which Compare, Judge, and Discriminate.

1. COMPARISON-Gives the power of discovering analogies, resemblances, and differences.

2. CAUSALITY-Traces the dependences of phenomena, and the relation of cause and effect.

* In his "System of Phrenology," fifth edition, pp. 149, 285, 436, the author admits that some of the details of this classification (which is borrowed from Dr. Spurzheim) are open to objection. The time does not seem to have yet arrived when a perfect arrangement and nomenclature of the mental faculties will be possible. Nevertheless, the classification here given will be found very convenient; and probably few intelligent persons who have had much experience of human character will dispute the existence of a great majority of the faculties enumerated, even if doubting the sufficiency of the evidence for their connection with those parts of the brain to which phrenologists assign them.-ED.

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CHAPTER III.

THE FACULTIES IN OPERATION.

SECT. I.-THE FACULTIES OF MAN IN RELATION TO ONE ANOTHER.

ACCORDING to the theory of human nature described in the last chapter, the faculties are divided into Propensities common to Man with the Lower Animals; Sentiments proper to Man; and Intellect. Almost every faculty stands in a definite relation to certain external objects: when it is internally active, it desires these objects; when they are presented to it, they excite it to action, and delight it with agreeable sensations. Human happiness is resolvable into the gratification, and misery into the uneasiness, of one or more of our mental faculties, those of bodily sensation included. Every faculty is good in itself, but all are liable to be abused.

The faculties may act in a variety of combinations. 1st, The lower propensities may act by themselves, each seeking its own gratification, without transgressing the limits prescribed by enlightened intellect and the moral sentiments : this gratification is legitimate, and the fountain of much enjoyment.

2dly, The propensities may act in opposition to the dictates of the moral sentiments and the intellect: a merchant, for instance, by misrepresentation of the real qualities of his commodities, may obtain a higher price for them than if he spoke the truth; or, by depreciating unjustly the goods of a rival, he may attract that rival's customers to himself. By such conduct he would apparently benefit himself, but he would infringe the dictates of the moral sentiments and the intellect; in other words, he would do an injury to his customers or to his rival, proportionate to the undue benefit which he attempted to secure to himself. All such manifestations of the propensities are abuses, and, when traced to their results, are found to ultimately injure the man who practises them even more than him against whom they are directed.

3dly, The moral sentiments may act by themselves, each seeking its own gratification: thus benevolence may

prompt a person to do acts of kindness, and veneration to perform exercises of devotion. When the gratification sought by any one or more of the sentiments does not infringe the duties prescribed by all the other faculties, the actions are proper. But any one moral sentiment, acting by itself, may run into excess--benevolence, for instance, may lead to profusion, or to the practice of generosity at the expense of justice; veneration may prompt a person to frequent churches to the neglect of his domestic duties; and so forth.

Thus there is, first, a wide sphere of action provided for the propensities, in which each may find its gratification without transgressing the limits of morality: and this is a good and proper action; secondly, there is ample scope for the exercise of each of the moral and intellectual faculties, without infringing the dictates of any of the other faculties: and this action also is good. But, on the other hand, the propensities, and also the moral and the intellectual faculties, may act, singly or in groups, in opposition to the dictates of all the other powers enlightened by knowledge and acting in combination: and all such actions are wrong.

Hence, right conduct is that which is approved of by the whole faculties, sufficiently enlightened, and acting in harmonious combination. When conflict, however, arises between the desires of the different faculties, the dictates of the moral and intellectual, as superior in kind to those of the animal faculties, must be obeyed, otherwise misery will ensue; and this I call the supremacy of the moral sentiments and the intellect.

When conflict arises, I do not consider any of the moral sentiments and intellectual faculties singly, or even the whole of them collectively, as sufficient to direct conduct by their mere impulsive suggestions. To fit them to discharge this important duty, they must act in harmonious combination with each other, and be illuminated by knowledge of physical and moral science, and of the nature and legitimate spheres of action of the propensities. The sources of knowledge are observation, experience, and reflection; also instruction by books, teachers, and all other means which the Creator has provided for the improvement of the human mind. Whenever the dictates of the moral and intellectual faculties, thus combined and enlightened, oppose the solicitations of the propensities, the latter must yield--otherwise, by the constitution of nature, evil will inevitably ensue.

This is what I mean by nature's being constituted in harmony with the whole faculties of Man; the moral sentiments and the intellect, in case of conflict, holding the supremacy.

Experience shows that different men possess the faculties in different degrees: I do not mean, therefore, to say that in each individual the dictates of his animal, moral, and intellectual powers, acting in harmonious combination, are rules of conduct not to be disputed. On the contrary, in most men one or several of the faculties are so deficient or so excessive, in proportion to the others, that their perceptions of duty will differ from the highest standards. The dictates, therefore, of the animal, mcral, and intellectual powers, acting in harmonious combination, which constitute rules of conduct, are the collective dictates of the best-endowed and best-balanced minds, illuminated by the greatest knowledge.

Let us now consider the faculties themselves. First, I shall view the PROPENSITIES acting alone, uninfluenced by the moral and the intellectual powers. There is ample scope for their proper activity in this way; but the great distinction between the animal faculties and the powers proper to Man is, that the former do not prompt us to seek the welfare of mankind at large: their object is chiefly the preservation of the individual himself, his family, or his tribe; while the latter have the general happiness of the human race, and our duties to God, as their ends.

THE LOVE OF LIFE and THE APPETITE FOR FOOD clearly have reference to the preservation of the individual alone. Even the domestic affections, amiable and respectable as they undoubtedly are, have self-gratification as their chief object. The first three propensities, AMATIVENESS, PHILOPROGENITIVENESS, and ADHESIVENESS, or the group of the domestic affections, desire a conjugal partner, offspring, and friends; the obtaining of these affords them delight-the removal of them occasions pain. But they do not take an interest in the welfare of their objects on account of those objects. He who loves from amativeness alone is sensual, faithless, and negligent of the happiness of his partner. He who combines with this propensity benevolence, veneration, justice, and intellect will disinterestedly promote the real happiness of the object of his affection,

To realise happiness, the whole faculties must be gratified harmoniously, or at least the gratification of one or more of