as they continue immoral, her religion will prove a rope of sand to bind her people to virtue; her wealth will be a snare, and her power will have a canker at its core that will eat out its strength, and add her empire to the list of those that have fallen by their defiance of God's moral providence, and their reliance on their own animal and intellectual superiority.*

Many persons believe that they discover evidence against the moral government of the world in the success of men not highly gifted with moral and intellectual qualities who attain to great wealth, rank, and social consideration, while men of far superior merit remain in obscurity and poverty. But the solution of this difficulty is to be found in the consideration that success in society depends on the possession, in an ample degree, of the qualities which society needs and appreciates, and that these bear reference to the state in which society finds itself at the time when the observation is made. In the savage and barbarous conditions, bodily strength, courage, fortitude, and skill in war lead a man to the highest honours; in a society like that of modern England, commercial or manufacturing industry may crown an individual with riches, and great talents for debate may carry him to the summit of political ambition. In proportion as society advances in moral and intellectual

* These remarks on India first appeared in the eighth edition, which was published in 1847. Ten years afterwards, when the great rebellion took place, the event was regarded by the author as a strong confirmation of his views. In February, 1858, he published in a little pamphlet, entitled Our Rule in India, a correspondence on this subject between himself and his friend, Mr. W. R. Young, author of A Few Words on the Indian Question, who bad for several years administered a district in India. Mr. Combe's final letter concludes as follows: "The natives of India never can love us or our yoke; because we are conquerors and foreigners. Let us not, therefore, force unacceptable peace and justice upon them, which they do not prize at our hands. What we call peace and justice must appear to them oppression, because conquest poisons its source. Let us, then, restore order, and devise means to slip out of our conquered territories as soon as this can be advantageously accomplished." A beginning has now been made in the political emancipation of the people of India in the Ilbert Bill, which allows natives to act as judges.-ED., 1893.

In his work on The Relation between Science and Religion, the author shows how heavy a retribution England has suffered as the fruit of the oppressive manner in which she has governed Ireland during several centuries.-ED.

acquirements, it will make larger demands for high qualities in its favourites.

The reality of the moral government of the world is discernible in the different degrees of happiness which individuals and nations enjoy in these different states. If unprincipled commercial and political adventurers were happy in proportion to their apparent success; or if nations were as prosperous under the dominion of reckless warriors as under that of benevolent and enlightened rulers; or if the individuals who compose a nation enjoyed as much serenity and joy of mind when they advanced bold, selfish, and unprincipled men to places of trust and power, as when they chose the upright, benevolent, and pious, of equal intellectual attainments-the dominion of a just Creator might well be doubted. But the facts are not so.

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CHAPTER XIV.

SUFFERING UNDER THE NATURAL LAWS.

THE next point connected with the Natural Laws which I shall consider is the principle on which suffering for infringement of them is inflicted in this world. To prevent misunderstanding of the sense in which I use the word suffering or punishment, I request the reader to bear in mind the observations made on this subject in the introductory chapter.*

Every law prescribed to intelligent beings pre-supposes a superior who establishes it, and subjects who are called on to obey it. The superior may be supposed to act under the dictates of the animal faculties or under those of the moral sentiments. The former being selfish, whatever they desire is for selfish gratification. Hence laws instituted by a superior inspired by the animal powers would have for their leading object the individual advantage of the lawgiver, with no systematic regard to the enjoyment or welfare of his subjects. The moral sentiments, on the other hand, are altogether generous, disinterested, and just; they delight in the happiness of others, and do not seek individual advantage as their supreme end. Laws instituted by a lawgiver inspired by them would have for their grand object the advantage and enjoyment of those who were required to yield obedience.

The story of William Tell will illustrate my meaning. Gessler, an Austrian governor of the canton of Uri, placed his hat upon a pole, and required the Swiss peasants to pay the same honours to it that were due to himself. The object of this requisition was obviously the gratification of the Austrian's self-esteem in witnessing the humiliation of the Swiss. It was framed without the least regard to their happiness, because such abject slavery could gratify no faculty in their minds, and could ameliorate no principle of their nature, but, on the contrary, was calculated to outrage every feeling of self-respect.

Before punishment for breaking a law can be justly

* See page 10,

inflicted, it seems reasonable that the people called on to obey it should not only possess the power of doing so, but should likewise be benefited by their obedience. It was certain that by the very constitution of their minds it was impossible for the Swiss to reverence the hat of the tyrant; and if they had pretended to do so, they would have manifested only baseness and hypocrisy. The law requiring that respect was therefore unjust, and punishment for disobedience was pure tyranny and oppression. In punishing the Swiss, the governor employed destructiveness as a means of procuring gratification to his own self-esteem.

Let us imagine, on the other hand, a law promulgated by a sovereign whose sole motive was the happiness of his subjects, and that the edict was, Thou shalt not steal. If the lawgiver were placed far above the reach of theft by his subjects, and if respect to one another's rights were indispensable to the welfare of his people themselves, then it is obvious that their stealing or not stealing would be of no importance whatever to him, while it would be of the highest moment to themselves.

Let us suppose, then, that in order to prevent the evils which the subjects would bring upon themselves by stealing, he were to add as a penalty that every man who stole should be locked up and instructed in his duty until he became capable of abstaining from theft: the justice and benevolence of this sentence would be unquestionable, because it would prove advantageous both to society and to the offender. Suppose that the latter was born with a tendency to acquisitiveness and secretiveness, and was deficient in conscientiousness, and that when he committed the offence he really could not help stealing-still, there would be no cruelty and no injustice in locking him up and instructing him in moral duty until he learned to abstain from theft; because, if this were not done, and if all men following his example were to steal, the human race, and he, as a member of it, would starve and become extinct.

The Creator's natural laws, so far as I have been able to perceive them, are instituted substantially on the latter principle that is to say, there is no indication of the object of any of the arrangements of creation being to gratify an inferior feeling in the Creator Himself. No well-constituted mind, indeed, could conceive Him commanding beings

whom He called into existence, and whom He could annihilate in a moment, to do any act of homage which had reference merely to the acknowledgment of His authority, solely for His personal gratification, and without regard to their own welfare and enjoyment. We cannot, without absolute outrage to the moral sentiments and the intellect, imagine His doing anything analogous to the act of the Swiss governor-placing an emblem of His authority on high, and requiring His creatures to obey it, merely to gratify Himself by their homage, to their own disparagement and distress.

Accordingly, every natural law, so far as I can discover, appears instituted for the purpose of adding to the sum of enjoyment of the creatures who occupy the world. In regard to Man, the Divine pre-ordainment of certain agreeable consequences from obedience to the natural laws, and of disagreeable consequences from their infringement, appears to be designed for his instruction and guidance, as the moral and intellectual administrator of this world. That there are cases of suffering, in the lots both of the inferior animals and of Man, which still present formidable difficulties in the way of reconciling the order of creation with our notions of benevolence and justice, I am far from denying; but I regard the human race as still only in the dawn of its existence, and I am disposed to refer the present apparent anomalies to our imperfect knowledge, and not to real inconsistencies in the Divine arrangements. One of the objects of the painful consequences attached to disobedience appears to be to arrest the offender in his departure from the laws, which departure, if permitted to proceed to its natural termination, would involve him in tenfold greater miseries. This arrangement greatly promotes the activity of the faculties; and active faculties being fountains of pleasure, the penalties themselves become benevolent and just. For example :

Under one of the physical laws, all organic bodies are liable to combustion. Timber, coal, oils, and animal substances, when heated to a certain extent, catch fire and burn; and the question occurs, Is this quality, in so far as it affects Man, consistent with a benevolent purpose, or is it not? Let us look at the advantages attending it. By means of fire we obtain warmth in cold latitudes and light after sunset; it enables us to cook food, thereby rendering it more wholesome and savoury; and by fire we soften and