perception of the sensation of matter-two terms to begin with the image, and the perception of that image. They then resolve the sensation of matter into three elements-matter per se, or sine perceptione, matter by and in itself; the organ of sensation, the nerve of the percipient; and the sensation, the resultant of the action and reaction of matter and nerve. One perceives a green tree, and there are four elements in that perception. There is the tree, not green, indeed, but capable of producing the sensation of greenness upon, or rather with, the retina of an eye, the retina having as much to do with the greenness as the tree has; there is the retina susceptible of the sensation of greenness from the image of a tree which is not green, but which has as much to do with the greenness as the retina has; there is the sensation of greenness, which is thus the tertium quid, resultant, or community of tree and retina; and, lastly, there is the mind, soul, or spirit, which perceives or attends to this new-born sensation.

Such is the analysis of those ascendental psychologists, who have tried to build up a philosophy of the human mind with the concrete facts discoverable in the educated consciousness of man, with certain real or supposed laws of our nature as the foundation underground. Reid did accordingly still more than make this analysis, inasmuch as he attempted to ground it on the principle of the common sense of mankind. It was put forward by him as a sort of chevaux-de-frise against universal scepticism on the one hand, and what was then called idealism on the other. He asserted that it is a law of our nature to refer our perceptions of sensations to such outward matter, and that the instinct is irresistible even by sophisticating philosophers and sceptics. Now this was not only an unfortunate mistake, it was a glaring error.

Scrutinise the first product of the second analysis a moment-matter by itself, a tree not green, a sky not blue, an earth not brown, but only capable of combining with an eye-nerve to produce these colours, as the centripetal and centrifugal forces of a planet conspire together to produce its revolution round a sun. Matter sine perceptione is matter with all its properties struck down into a state of absolute latency. It is matter naked, pure, and only ready to indue itself with the various beauty of nature as soon as an eye shall open on it. It is an abstract and unqualified matter. It is the very ultimatum of abstraction. I do not at present deny that such matter does exist, but it was never heard of in the world till these analysts found it out. It is fairly and entirely the discovery of these schoolmen; but the popular intellect cannot seize it, now that it is discovered. The man of education tries to grasp it; he thinks perhaps he has laid hold of it, but it always escapes him. Even the long and severely trained philosophical mind cannot form any permanent conception of it, but must rest satisfied with the formulation of it in his analytical table. So far is it from being instinctively accorded by the common sense of mankind! No; the matter which our general human nature beholds and believes in and loves, is no such lifeless residuum of the analytical alembic. We see the brown earth, the blue sky, the green tree, and so forth, and it is in the external existence of these beautiful creatures alone that we intuitively believe; hence the simple analysis which the metaphysicians have always made of the primitive phenomenon of the perception of the sensation of matter. They simply halve it. Perception is one term, sensation of matter the other, of their formula. I perceive, is the former; a green tree, the latter. With them, as with children, poets, and

common people, there is no such thing as matter sine sensatione; there is only matter cum sensatione. They perceive alone sensations of matter, green fields, blue hills, and the like. They assert that we know, and can know, nothing of matter-by-itself. They regard it as the sheer invention of an ingenious but short-sighted science. This is substantially the metaphysical creed in every age and in every school. It is as remarkable for simplicity and humility as the psychological one is for pretension and complexity. Other doctrines, indeed, have been united with this analysis, and there have been developed from it as from a germ the schemes of representative and subjective idealism; but this is not the place to trace the genesis of these diverse systems. Suffice it at present that I hold by the metaphysical analysis of the perception of matter as the only genuine and possible one, without being either Berkeleyan or Hegelian. Nor must the reader omit to notice very particularly at this point, that this view does not in any way affect the nature of physical investigations; for physical science just remains what it always has been in its essence, viz., the observation, classification, generalisation, and (by the application of the mathematics) the universalisation of all such sensations of matter as are anywhere to be perceived.

This analysis does not by any means deny the existence of matter. It only states, more clearly and philosophically than is done in the psychological one, that it is sensations of matter alone that we perceive; while it denies that there is any such thing as the intuitive referring of these sensations to such an abstract creature of the mind as matter-by-itself. It does not, however, deny that there is or may be such a thing as matter-by-itself; it simply and irrefragably denies that

nature.

such abstract matter is or can become the object of instinctive or intuitive or fundamental belief. It keeps the eye full upon the actual world, and insists upon the manifest fact that it is in the outwardness of sensationsof-matter (green seas, grey clouds, cold winds) that man believes by instinct, intuition, faith, or a law of his The fact is, that it holds by the common sense of the race, although the true metaphysician does not proceed to erect a philosophy on the principles of common sense, because he knows his province better. The psychologist, on the contrary, professes to be the disciple and interpreter of the common sense, and yet in declaring that the common sense of mankind at once refers sensation to the action on him of matter-by-itself,which we have seen to be a remote and scientific conception of the cultivated mind, he sets the universal current of humanity at nought. These opponents, in a word, are not unlike the two servants in the Christian parable: one said 'No' to his master's bidding, and yet he did it; the other, 'Yes,' and did it not.

II. It has been said that the metaphysical analysis of what is called the perception of matter does not by any means exclude the possible existence of matter-by-itself. In truth, it leaves the secret nature of matter-withsensations, or sensations-of-matter, untouched, and an open question. Only it does not find, and it denies that there is, any intuitive or common-sense solution of that question. It is a question for research.

Considered from this point of view, the inquiry is big with interest and importance. It has not hitherto been investigated, except in the hypothetical manner. The hypotheses which have been advanced may be divided into three classes :

1. There is that of the psychologists, of which I have

a

said so much already. They brought it forward indeed not as a hypothesis, but as a fact of common sensething which it has just been shown not to be. It is a hypothesis more or less fitted to explain or analyse the sensation-of-matter, the red rose, and so forth; and it falls now to be considered as such a hypothesis among others. The conception which it hypothetises in order to render matter-with-sensation (the green tree) more intelligible, is that of matter-by-itself. Nothing can be adduced in favour of this hypothesis, except its verisimilitude. But that quality is perceived in it only by a limited number of minds. It has not a tittle of verisimilitude to me, for instance, although the nature of my regular studies is calculated (apparently) to predispose me to its acceptation. It also appears to me to be demonstrably erroneous. It proceeds upon the monstrous supposition that any actual thing can correspond with or be represented by an abstract conception. Matter-per-se, mattersine-perceptione, is the reverse of a concrete—it is a high abstraction; and therefore neither it, nor anything truly representing it, can underlie the multitudinous particulars of sensation. The clearness of this refutation will be increased and made almost excessive by a familiar illustration. There are many species of the genus rose, and many varieties of each species. The botanist first ascends from the properties common to all those varieties to the general conception of the species of rose to which they belong. This process he repeats upon the varieties of all the species, species after species, until he has constructed general conceptions of all the species of rose. From these conceptions of the several species he gathers the abstract conception of the genus rose. There is no such thing as the genus rose; no particular rose is it; it is a purely abstract conception. Now if it is