are generally more neceffary and peculiar to a certain class or body of men, than to mankind at large; whether otherwise they be distinguished for diversity and extent, or for folidity and method, bę they of the historical or philofophical fpecies, and of more or lefs general utility, Every one that addicts himself to any one clafs or kind of fuch knowledge and science, devotes the greater part of his time and faculties to it, and thus diftinguishes himself above others, bears and deferves the name of a man of learning. And, for rightly appreciating the value of this learning, we must previously make feveral remarks.

The first and most important is this: the value that learning has is no otherwife, for the greatest part, due to it, than as being a means to higher aims, and not as an ultimate object itself; and this it has in common with the generality of the other privileges and advantages that relate to human happiness. Particular kinds of knowledge, certain branches of learning, have, indeed, in themselves, a value, an intrinsic and lasting value; but these are few in number. Under this head we may, perhaps, reckon most of our mathematical and aftronomical knowledge, feveral of the deeper philofophical ftudies, a part of our religious notions; whatever is eternal, unalterable, and everlastingly useful truth; all propofitions and ideas that are of account in heaven as well as upon earth, among fuperior beings as well as among mankind; and though we may

not poffefs a great many fuch propofitions and ideas, yet are we not totally deftitute of them, and they indifputably compose the most precious part of our knowledge. All that falls under this denomination befides has no value whatever, as an end, but only as means. It is only fo far defirable, and is only fo far deferving of our esteem, of our attention and our application, as it exercises the faculties of our mind, procures ourselves and others innocent and elevated pleafures, guides us in the track of truth and facili tates the knowledge of it, diffufes activity among mankind, improves their outward welfare, provides for their accommodation, promotes their fecurity, and helps them in the profecution of their business, or procures them any other adventitious benefit. Hereto belong the generality of historical, most of the mechanical and philological fciences, and the greatest part of the learning of the theologian, the physician, and the lawyer. They are only means, no more than implements, by which we may forward and attain certain good purposes in our present state; and which, when these ends are once ob. tained, lofe abfolutely all their value, and become ufelefs, like old fcaffoldings. That man, however, would think foolishly, who fhould suppose we might defpife and reject them, while they are neceffary to the profecution of the building we are carrying on, before the structure be completely finished.

Hence fpontaneously arifes a fecond rule, of fervice to us in forming a right judgment of learning,

and

and the feveral branches of it. It is this: the greater service and general utility it is of, the greater is likewife its value. Studies, abfolutely unprofitable, when confidered at least as means to farther views, are, indeed, no part at all of learning; many parts of it, however, are unworthy of the painful and indefatigable industry, the great application of time and abilities that are bestowed upon them. Many debase and weaken the mind of a man, instead of elevating and strengthening it; and benumb and contract his heart, instead of enlarging it, and quickening it to great and generous fentiments. Many lead off fuch as employ themselves in them from the defign of their creation, from their proper perfection, rather than facilitate them in the profecution of it. Such learned attainments and occupations are, indeed, of but trifling value; often of much lefs value than the attainments and occupa tions of the artificer or the labourer; and he that makes them his principal employment has no right to complain, if he be neither more respected, nor more happy, than fo many others of the unlearned, who trifle away their time like him, and diffipate their powers. No, he alone deferves to be fo, and that in a high degree, whofe learning is, in any obfervable way, beneficial and generally useful; who can give an account to himself, and to others, of what he has done and performed for the advantage of his fellow-creatures; who effectually has kindled more light, and called forth more activity, in him

felf and about him; who has learnt to think and to live better himself; and has likewife, mediately or immediately, been the occafion that others think more juftly, and live more prudently or happily.

A third circumftance, which falls under confideration in our refearches into the real value of learning, especially in regard to particular perfons, is this: the more modefty and true wifdom it has to accompany and guide it, fo much the greater is its value. If learning allow room to pride, it foon degenerates into arrogance and tyranny; not unfrequently prevents its poffeffor from making greater progrefs in knowledge and fcience; often renders it unferviceable to others, or of but little ufe; and how very much must this detract from its worth! Still lefs value has the learning which has no morally good influence on the mind and temper of the learned man; which allows him to think as meanly, and to act as perverfely and foolishly, and as flavishly to follow the calls of his lufts and paffions, as the ignorant and the unlearned; and in proportion as it procures but little real and durable advantage to himself, fo much muft this defect diminish its utility in regard of others, and weaken its influence on human happiness. No, then alone does learning difplay herself in her native dignity, in her full fplendor, and fuffer none to doubt of her high value, when fhe appears in the company of modesty and wisdom; when she is not blind to her own infirmities and failings, and is not afhamed of her

limitations;

fimitations; when the readily communicates herself to others; when she rather informs in the fpirit of meeknefs, than decides in a haughty imperious tone; when she exerts herself in generous fentiments, in a beneficent and active zeal in the cause of truth, of virtue, of liberty, of human happiness, and by an eminently wife, manly, virtuous behaviour, worthy of the enlightened man.

This once premised, let us more closely examine wherein the real value of learning confifts, and on what grounds it merits our refpe&t.

Erudition is, firft, mental perfection, and promotes mental perfection; and, if this be a real and covetable privilege of mankind, then must erudition be fo too. The man of learning, who deferves that name, knows more of truth, fees farther into the principles and connections of truths, goes more furely to work in the investigation of them, and is therefore lefs liable to be impofed upon by appearance. His acuter fight takes in more objects, his trained eye explores much farther; he thinks more perfpicuously, more profoundly, more juftly, than the generality of mankind can do; and who but muft confefs this to be a perfection, a prerogative? Allow that he fometimes miffes of his mark; allow that he is liable to falfe conclufions and errors; let the whole amount of the highly useful truths he has made out, clearly explained, or first, discovered, be, comparatively, never fo fmall;' yet he has been all that time exércifing his mental powers, learning

to