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NOV 9 1885

THE

UNITED SERVICE.

NOVEMBER 1885.

I.

RESACA.

SOMETIMES during the war it was difficult for certain journals to keep their correspondents with the army. If anything improper or calculated to give undue information crept into print and into circulation, the commanding general held the newspaper man nearest at hand accountable. Often he was banished from the front, or so treated that he could not successfully report. Latterly in the war, correspondents obtained positions as additional aides, or some enterprising junior staffofficer undertook to write regularly to a public journal, thus doing double duty. For example, Captain D. P. Conyngham, an Irish officer who published a book after the war, was in the Twenty-third Corps on General Judah's staff. He also corresponded regularly with the New York Herald. I mention him particularly because he was present at the battle of Resaca, and gives some characteristic pen sketches of some of the prominent actors in that battle. That General Sherman, who had often been misrepresented by the correspondents, was not at this time very friendly to them appears in Conyngham's sketch of him. The evening of the 13th of May, with one staff-officer, General Sherman joined McPherson in Sugar Valley. Conyngham says, "He was anxious and nervous, as was evident from the fierce manner he pulled at his unlit cigar, and twitched that strange rough face of his." In another place he says, "He has little reserve in concealing his opinions of other officers."

He had worked hard all night after his arrival near Resaca. Sherman was then greatly disappointed. With his intense confidence in McPherson and his Army of the Tennessee, he had believed that Confederate Johnston's force would now be driven into a broken and VOL. XIII.-No. 5.

33

disastrous retreat; but by McPherson's pulling back to Sugar Valley the whole programme was changed. Now a big battle must be fought against an intrenched position. I will give the scene just west of Resaca as the correspondent presents it. "Next day (the 14th of May, 1864), wearied and sleepy, he sat on a log, beside a shady tree, to rest himself, and soon fell asleep. He had but a single orderly with him; some man in passing made an insinuating comment, for example, ‘A pretty way we are commanded.' Sherman awakened by the noise of passing men overheard the remark: 'Stop, my man, . . . while you were sleeping last night I was planning for you, sir: and now I was taking a nap.'

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A little later, when several generals had gathered around him, he was told that Johnston had evacuated the Rocky Face Ridge and Dalton, and that Kilpatrick had been wounded. I had the night before brought the first item of this news, so that Sherman already knew it. Now reflecting upon the situation at Resaca, he said, "Well, we must get them out of this too. McPherson, had you held this position when you first occupied it, they (the Confederates) would find themselves in a nice trap." "General," replied McPherson, “I found my flank exposed and open to them by good roads, whilst I had not a single road by which reinforcements could come up, if attacked; so I fell back to a stronger position." "Oh, pshaw!" said Sherman. "It can't be helped now, though."

ance.

General Thomas was with Sherman that morning. The lively captain looked upon his sturdy face and wrote, his sturdy face and wrote, "Major-General Thomas is quite the reverse of Sherman, both in manner and appearHe is tall, stout, with brawny frame and shoulders. His head is slightly bent forward, as if drooping with care and thought." (This was temporary, for habitually Thomas's head was erect.) "His hair and beard, which he wears cut pretty short, are rather dark, and slightly sprinkled with gray. He is about fifty years of age and looks his age fully. . . As a general, Thomas is calm and cautious; does everything by rule; leaves nothing to chance. He makes his arrangements for a battle with caution and foresight, and is sure to have every column and division move with clock-work regularity, and strike at the proper time and place. Nothing disturbs or unnerves him."

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I regard this as a fair picture of General Thomas as I saw him that morning when we were bringing our corps into position before Resaca, except the idea conveyed that he was a mere machine-man. His intellect was active enough while devising or planning, but firm and steady when a decision had been arrived at. He was thoroughly subordinate. He earnestly seconded General Sherman in all his undertakings, whether just in accordance with his judgment or not.

While these sketches were being offered and taken on the most

prominent point of observation between Resaca and Taylor's Ridge, the troops were struggling through the ravines and thickets into a position encircling Johnston's lines, which were already firmly established.

Joseph E. Johnston speaking of Resaca says, "The two armies (Sherman's and his own) were formed in front of Resaca nearly at the same time; so that the Federal army could give battle on equal terms, except as to numbers, by attacking promptly, the difference being about ten to four."

There is evidently a mistake in this statement. In all Confederate writings this claim of disparity of numbers is noticeable. As General Polk had arrived, and the Confederate army at this place is admitted by Hood to have been then about seventy-five thousand, and as General Sherman's force was at first ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, then being diminished by a thousand casualties at Rocky Face and vicinity, and increased by Stoneman's cavalry, which did not exceed four thousand, giving a new aggregate of about one hundred and one thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, it is difficult to understand how Johnston can make it anywhere near two to one against himself. It is well, however, to remember, what we have before frequently noticed, that our opponents used the word "effectives," probably counting the actual number of men carrying rifles and carbines, plus the enlisted artillerymen actually with their guns; whereas our officers counted in all present for duty, officers and men, no matter how multitudinous and varied the duties might be. It is, therefore, plain that the disparity between the armies was not very great at the battle of Resaca. We probably could not possibly put into line of battle, counting actual fighting elements, more than four men to Johnston's three.

With regard to "attacking promptly," that is easily said; but to attack at once on arrival at a new place is seldom practicable. To do so it should require an immediate and thorough knowledge of the strength and position of your opposing forces. On the 14th of May, 1864, Polk with the new corps had already come up from below and formed to the right of the two Confederate brigades which had been at Resaca and completely intrenched. For the defensive, in two hours' time that new line could have been extended to the Connasauga, making a beautiful front from the Oostanaula along behind Camp Creek. For defense, the position between these three streams-from the rugged nature of the ground, the materials at hand for obstructions, and the grand places for locating all his artillery-was to the Confederate commander as good as the Fredericksburg Heights to Lee.

Next to Polk's corps came Hardee's, and on Hardee's right the corps of Hood, which was faced west and north, near Huey's house, in a strong double line. Hood covered the railway and effectually closed every other approach from that quarter.

Johnston's line was now three miles in extent, and curved-something like ours at Gettysburg-in the shape of a horseshoe, so that it was easily reinforced from one part to another and from its reserves. As always in this campaign, this Confederate army was promptly marched into position and thoroughly intrenched.

On the other hand, our forces approaching Resaca through the Gap on the one side, and from Dalton on the other, had to feel for the enemy's picket lines and for each other in that blind, rough, broken, wild, tangled, unknown region. It was near twelve o'clock of the 14th of May before we had formed solid junction, and then the lines had to be changed as we worried forward through troublesome ravines, wooded valleys, hills obstructed by crags, steep rocks, old logs, and underbrush. Sometimes long gaps between brigades troubled the division commanders, and sometimes an astonishing overlapping of forces displaced regiments as they were advanced.

The 14th, then, was mainly spent in placing McPherson on our right near the Oostanaula, Schofield next, and Thomas on the left. My corps, the Fourth, reached the railroad and formed the flank, Sherman's extreme left, and was faced against the strong position of Hood. As the Connasauga bended off far to the east, it was quite impossible for my left regiments to reach that river, so that I was again forced to have the left of my line "in the air." But Stanley's excellent division stationed there, by refusing (drawing back) its left brigade and nicely posting its artillery, formed as good an artificial obstacle against Hood as was possible.

cessor,

Let us now go to Sherman's southernmost troops, and for a time confine our attention to the operations of the Army of the Tennessee. It will be remembered that General McPherson, its commander, fell near Atlanta, before the end of this campaign, so that, being his suchis dispatches and records fell to me. In making up my report, I said for the 9th of May, "The command on the lead (General Dodge's Sixteenth Corps) pushed on, the cavalry in advance, till within about eight and a half miles of the town (Resaca), when Kilpatrick encountered considerable infantry force, in charging which he was wounded and obliged to leave the field." The date was an This wounding occurred in the manner and at the place described, but near noon of the 12th, instead of the 9th of May. Kilpatrick sustained his usual reputation for boldness and activity in scouting, and for success in promptly clearing away the enemy's outposts. This wound, though severe, did not long detain him from the field.

error.

The forward movement from the Snake Creek Gap was taken up and completed on the 13th of May. One corps, Logan's Fifteenth, was deployed, and General Veatch's division, of the Sixteenth, brought up in support. The resistance of the enemy's skirmishers became

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