NATIONAL ENCAMPMENTS.

THE late so-called national encampment at Philadelphia has drawn much attention to the propriety of concentrating troops of several States and the federal government into a common camp, to be established yearly in various parts of the country. The example alluded to can in no proper sense be called a national encampment. It is true the forces there assembled, probably fifteen hundred in number, comprised organizations of infantry and artillery gathered from eight or nine States, and two mounted batteries of artillery of the regular army. However, if the extent of territory represented be a test, it might reasonably come within a liberal definition. The general government recognized it so far, only, as to detail the judges and an officer from the army, to lay out the camp, and to send two batteries; but further than this the authorities of the War Department did not feel inclined to go. It is understood that more than one general officer of the army declined to take command; and a distinguished gentleman of high rank in the war, who, before the close of it, was the able head of an army, on visiting the grounds, refused the invitation of the manager, a civilian, to assume the responsibility, whether because he is now out of the service, federal and State, or from whatsoever reason, is not known. Thus the military control of it rested upon the officers of the camp themselves, and if rumor tells the truth, as she has sometimes been known to do, at least three officers of the grade of colonel, under the direction of the civilian manager, may in a sense be said, during the one week of its existence, to have been in command. In the main, outside of two regiments from Ohio, the force was made up of independent companies, the captains of which were subject to the orders of no one except those of that curiosity in military usages, the civilian manager. The result of the encampment was simply a drill for prizes for superiority in company exercises. The Ohio regiments and the Kentucky battalion, as such, took no part in the performances, beyond the usual reviews and dress-parade. Outside the regular batteries, the band of the First Ohio, and a drummer of that fine company, the Montgomery Grays, it is believed there was not a single musician in camp; a fact probably due to the great expense of bringing field-music with them. Had the programme been fully carried out

as it was prepared, there would have been competitive manœuvres by brigades, regiments, and battalions, for excellence or superiority, in which handsome prizes in money, banners, badges, flags, etc., were liberally offered to the successful participants. The fees taken in from spectators, for admission to the inclosed grounds where the drilling took place, were expected to pay the expenses; thus charging the public to see the exhibition of troops maintained at the public cost.

It is understood that many such encampments have been held in the South and West, where they evidently are regarded with high popular favor, since the Houston Light Guard, of Texas, the most successful company at Philadelphia, already within this year has carried off many thousands of dollars in the way of premiums for superiority in drill. Thus, before generally discussing the propriety of national encampments justly so designated, the question may be considered whether or not an encampment should be held solely for the purposes of illustrating excellence in drill, either of companies or larger bodies. The singleness of this question becomes the more apparent, since at the Fairmount camp, and presumably at all the others held under like auspices, no general guard or police duty was attempted, or at least carried out; no uniform plan of carrying on the subsistence or quartermaster's department was tried or adopted; and no officer was put in authority, whose orders were duly recognized, or at all events enforced. The competing captains cannot be censured for a lack of disposition to put on guards, as they had no men to spare for that or any other purpose, beyond those who were to drill; and consistent with the object of their presence, they could not be fatigued by guard duty and a resulting loss of sleep. resulting loss of sleep. If good order was observed, it was voluntarily observed; a creditable fact entirely due to the excellent character of the officers and enlisted men of the several organizations therein assembled.

There can be no dispute over the advantages to be derived from proficiency or superiority in drill. However, the bodies which entered for the contest were very small; of the militia batteries (those of the regular army of course did not compete) there were only dismounted sections; of the infantry, none of the companies appeared with more than three officers, two guides, and twenty-four men, the limit in fact, for obvious reasons, prescribed by the management. It cannot be seriously contended that the exhibitions by these small detachments, beautiful as they were, are in any fair sense a display of military superiority. Evidently the men were picked, as it is not to be supposed that any State maintains companies of that size. Even if they were not, the companies being of an aggregate, twenty-seven, allowed under the laws of their States respectively, it is plain that almost everything else was sacrificed to the Moloch of success. In many respects the men were not equipped as provided for by army regulations. Some

wore creepers to prevent slipping on the grass; others had filed off or smoothed down the muzzles of their rifles, in order with more ease and rapidity to fix their bayonets, a circumstance which would undoubtedly result in bursting those pieces in case of actual use; while others used a funnel-shaped attachment to their bayonets to slip on the latter with greater swiftness and certainty, without deranging the position of the men's shoulders. There is no disposition here to criticise such changes, perhaps improvements, in the ordinary regulations, inasmuch as they were there to win, and in view of the accepted maxim, with some limitations, that everything is fair in war. But it shows that the sole purpose of the camp was to exhibit fine drilling, and it must be conceded that it was successful to that extent.

While admitting that to drill well is a good and useful exercise, no one will contend that it is all of a soldier's training; in point of fact, it may be acquired in the armory, absolutely without other knowledge. On the contrary, beyond that which may be termed a reasonable knowledge of the drill, excellence or superiority is not necessary; even if it were, it is but one of many things requisite to constitute a fine command. Discipline, of course, is the foundation of military coherency, and it may be obtained or developed to a high degree without marked proficiency in drill. The knowledge of guard and camp duties; the capacity of the man to take care of himself, without which he soon ceases to be of value in the field; the skirmish drill, or the power to operate in open order in front of an enemy; picket duty, or the ability to guard well the front of hostile forces opposing each other; the exercise of staff functions in the subsistence, transportation, medical departments, etc.; these and many others, essential to the perfection of troops, are of much more moment than the mere keeping of a fine line on a wheel, or a lightning rapidity and a mathematical accuracy in the manual of arms. It may be asserted that drilling for prizes does not prevent the acquiring of a knowledge of these essentials to a wellinstructed command.

A company, the men of which devote their entire time to gaining a complete familiarity with drill, as a matter of course, learns nothing else. Only a moderate limit of time can be devoted, at the best, to military pursuits by volunteer soldiers; everything else, of necessity, is subordinate to becoming perfect in drill, which is valuable only in a military sense when combined with other things, some of which have been named. To the victors, the prizes won are no doubt sufficient compensation for the time and labor spent; but the State which consents to this direction of training will undoubtedly find its militia wanting in the day of trial. To those troops, in such encampments, who are instructed that other knowledge is preferable to mere excellence in drill, the spectacle of competing for prizes to be gained in that way must be demoralizing to the last degree. To say nothing of being discouraged

in the attempt to acquire a fair knowledge of tactics, they are taught by the applause which follows, and the prize which rewards the victor, that their efforts in other ways have been useless, and that their officers have not followed the course proper to qualify them as soldiers. Besides, when the prize-drilling is going on, all other exercises are necessarily suspended. An officer who should try to enforce other duty, and thus keep them away from the fascinating tournament, must be looked on as a martinet. Should he succeed without more or less of a mutiny, he would have occasion to see his usefulness depart in the volunteer or militia service, where so much depends upon moral control over the men. Besides, troops can go into camp no more than a week in each year, and that at great expense. They ought, therefore, to devote time so valuable to more serious ends. It may be contended that these public exhibitions of great proficiency in drill stimulate the military spirit in a community, and thereby promote enlistments. To this the answer is plain such proficiency can be attained only by long application and a sacrifice of much leisure. Few men have the inclination for this; and if it be generally understood to be necessary on entering the service, more men, otherwise inclined to enlist, will stay out, than would enter at so great a price. These and many other reasons undoubtedly justify the Northeastern States in declining to allow their soldiers to enter an encampment carried on upon such theories and for such purposes. From the States which give great attention to the benefits to be derived from a camp properly conducted on true military principles, which sustain their troops with ample, or at least sufficient, allowances, there was scarcely a representative,-if the State of Ohio be an exception. It must be evident, therefore, that the so-called system of national encampments, with the large expense involved, from the military point of view, from which only they are to be regarded, does not warrant the care, cost, and loss of time required.

But it does not follow from that which has already been said that a national encampment, carried out upon right theories, may not be commended. Such a camp may well be distinguished from a mere assemblage of companies and regiments brought together only to display a fine capacity to drill, from a gathering of military men without a military head, and under the control of a civil management. Indeed, it is difficult to explain the object of such management, save to collect entrance fees and to disburse them, less such charges as it may deduct, in the shape of rewards to successful and, doubtless, worthy competitors. The subordination of a military camp to civilian control, except to the official authority of the President, the governor, or, in certain respects, the police, is neither to be explained nor tolerated. A submission to the discretion of a mere citizen in the conduct of a camp is voluntary and absurd. A submission to it is at the risk of violation of all military usages and customs, and, in short, unlawful. For a soldier to observe

the directions of a citizen as such, aside from the President or the governor, or the sheriff and the mayor, and the latter two only under conditions prescribed by law,-is as much against sound precedent, if not against law, as to disobey the order of his commanding officer. It may be here permitted to say, by the way, that in the absence of positive regulations of law to the contrary, an officer will not take orders from the sheriff or the mayor, beyond general instructions as to the objects to be attained. The manner in which military force is to be employed is entirely in the discretion of the military officer, when he is lawfully called to act: the means and methods of using it are not supposed by the law to be within the knowledge of the civil authorities.

Aside from the mere lack of right to command them outside a legal muster into the Federal service, many, or most officers of the militia, would be glad to serve in a national encampment under officers of the regular army of sufficient rank. At the Centennial celebration at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1881, officers of the militia from the various States there assembled cheerfully, and with pleasure, assented to conferring the supreme command on Major-General Hancock. Brief as the period of that encampment was, it proved to be of benefit in many ways to the organizations which took part. The care and transportation of troops for a distance so far from home as many of them went, was a useful lesson. It will be remembered that the elegant prize awarded on that occasion went to the provisional regiment of New Jersey, under General Grubb, "for the best appearance in the encampment," which included as well camp and police duties, etc., as the fine appearance of officers and men. Rewards offered on such a basis are well worth having and striving for, as they call for an exhibition not merely of one, but of many of the most useful elements of superiority.

A national encampment would necessarily be under the control of the Federal authorities. While rightly beyond his power in times of peace to order it to be held, doubtless the President would consent, under fitting circumstances, to detail officers to command and otherwise to assume a moral, if not strictly a legal, responsibility of a general camp. As many of the States have annual encampments of as large bodies as a brigade, Pennsylvania in alternate years assembling an entire division of three brigades, some seven thousand five hundred to eight thousand strong, an encampment under the auspices of the general government to offer anything particularly new or of wide and substantial advantage in that way, would require the concentration of two or more divisions; in short, a corps of fifteen or twenty thousand men. Doubtless General Sheridan or General Hancock would willingly take command of such a force, conditioned on the camp's being conducted on proper rules and regulations, as it must be under an officer of that character. For the sake of example, take the Pennsyl