That so myopic or distorted a view of the military situation and of what was proper to be done with his army in such an exigency should be taken by Lieutenant-General Pemberton is hardly surprising in view of his whole course in that campaign; but that all his "subordinate generals" should have been equally afflicted with a like diseased vision, is well-nigh incredible. So far from being at that moment "the most important point in the Confederacy," practically Vicksburg had lost all importance and military advantage to the Confederate States, and by its further occupation the navigation of the river was not to be materially obstructed. As for not being able to withdraw from the position without so thorough a demoralization of the garrison and so large a loss of the material of war, absolutely there was no rational ground for such a conclusion to stand upon. The Federal army at the time, and for several weeks thereafter, was not large enough to enable it to invest the whole Confederate position from Haine's Bluff, on the north, around to the river's bank south of Vicksburg. Therefore, for some days there was left open in the latter quarter an ample gateway through which an energetic soldier might have marched the greater part of an army, that had shown itself so doughty and so worth saving, whensoever suffered to do so by its commander. It is true that the route of exit suggested by General Johnston, that is, towards the northeast, was closed, as might have been anticipated, but not so towards the southeast; and if by that way at least twenty-five thousand of the Confederate army were not successfully rescued from General Grant's clutches, it was not only because of General Pemberton's amazing incapacity for military command, but chiefly for the reason that General Johnston, in view of that already clearly demonstrated incapacity and disregard of all sound military suggestions, failed in so pressing an exigency to take command in person of so vital a part of the Confederate resources in that quarter, and saw fit to leave them in hands shown to be fatally clumsy at every critical moment of the campaign.3

Sherman's corps, of which only Blair's division had shared in the action of Baker's Creek, had overtaken the main force and was thrown to the front as the Federal army approached its long-sought prey. And to a cavalry detachment of that corps was deputed the task of entering the deserted Confederate works at Haine's Bluff by the rear; works found abandoned, the guns partially disabled, with magazines full of ammunition and a hospital full of wounded and sick men.* At the same time, the main body of Sherman's corps was pushed forward upon Vicksburg, General Grant riding, as we are told, with Sherman at the head of the column. As the two generals surmounted the "Walnut

* In so critical a posture, Marlborough, for example, never would have trusted the fortunes of the campaign to any subaltern, much less to one seen to be so maladroit as Pemberton.

Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman, vol. i. p. 324.

Hills" in the near vicinity of their final objective, his lieutenant turning to Grant is reported to have frankly said, "Until this moment I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end clearly until now; but this is a campaign. This is a success if we never take the town." This speech, be it noted, is adduced as a conclusive illustration of the Union commander-in-chief's rare military prescience and of Sherman's voluntary, just acknowledgment of the fact, as also of his own distrust and error of judgment. It is doubtful, however, whether this will be the ultimate view of military men at least, who will hardly accept mere success, so palpably the outcome of a feeble, unskillful defensive, as a right measure of the operation as originally conceived and entered upon. On the contrary, Sherman's views in the outset and course of the campaign up to Baker's Creek will be apt to be considered as having been properly based upon the supposition that the Confederates would do what it was so plain they ought to do, and that which they were fully able to do with their known resources in that quarter.

In sight of the many transparent opportunities and advantages given the enemy in every movement of the campaign, even so sanguine a soldier as Sherman could not anticipate success, for he could not forecast, as yet, that Pemberton would throughout the whole campaign be as blind as a mole to all the chances thrown broadcast before him; nor, moreover, that he would put aside Johnston's orders in all things calculated to endanger or foil the operations of their adversary. Hence, involuntarily, from sheer surprise, he might indeed say that he had been utterly skeptical of success until then; for until that moment he could but apprehend some blow from the Confederate generals commensurate with their ample means and the fearful advantages given them at every step. But seeing Pemberton's unaccountable course finally culminate in the suicidal act of shutting up his army in such a cul-desac as Vicksburg, he "could now see the end," and doubtless said as much. Yet, if he made the further observation attributed to him it was a loose, heedless utterance. It would be a "campaign" in any event, of course, whether successful or not, and therefore the phrase may be termed loose; but if meaning a legitimate campaign, even though it should fail of its object, then his words were devoid of meaning. Failure would be simply the ripe fruit for which Sherman had looked, which he had dreaded and deprecated as inevitable. Success, on the other hand, could not change the intrinsic character of the campaign, the success of which had been due, as was plain enough, to the sheer inability of Pemberton to comprehend what he ought to do; to his chronic supineness coupled with his persistent disregard of the orders of his superior. "The rebel movements in this campaign could hardly have been better contrived to facilitate the movements and objects of the National commander," is the explicit testimony on

this point of Grant's aide-de-camp and special biographer, General Badeau, who justly might have added, what in time will be the verdict of military men, that the Federal general was only successful because he had Pemberton as his opponent, while General Johnston was so thoroughly imbued with the sombre conviction that all was lost before his advent upon the field, that he really made little or no exertion to bring together and effectively handle on the active-defensive system, all the resources which were really available for a supreme effort, such as the greatness of the stake in issue demanded of him. It was late in the afternoon of the 19th of May before the Union army began to gather in close proximity to Vicksburg, where Pemberton had, as we have seen, resolved upon being beleaguered. Built upon hills successively rising from the river, the position was indeed a strong one, though the lines were greatly extended and of somewhat inferior construction. A series of open-gorge, detached works were established upon all the salient commanding points. These were connected by lines of riflepits, while the ridge-slopes landward were obstructed by fallen timber. A numerous artillery garnished the lines, and the garrison numbered about thirty thousand infantry and artillery.

Success seems to have confirmed the Federal general in his disposition throughout the campaign to tempt fortune without hesitation, for, without waiting for his whole force to reach the scene, Grant, at 2 P.M. on the 19th of May, gave orders for an immediate assault of the Confederate position. What happened may be best stated in the words of Badeau: "Without any fault or hesitation on the part of either troops or commanders, night had overtaken the National forces before they were really in condition to obey the orders of Grant, except at the point where Sherman had reached the works but failed to make any serious impression. . . . The Fifteenth Corps was the only one able to act vigorously; the other two having succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions covered from the fire of the enemy." Yet the order had been that at 2 P.M., at a signal of three volleys of artillery from all the pieces in position, a general charge should be made along the whole line. General Sherman, in his very brief account of this affair, says it was undertaken on "the supposition that the garrison was demoralized by the defeats at Champion's Hill (Baker's Creek), and at the railroad-crossing of the Big Black." He also says that his "troops reached the top of the parapets but could not cross over. The rebel parapets were strongly manned, and the enemy fought hard and well; my loss was pretty heavy. . . . We, however, held the ground up to the ditch until night, and then drew back only a short distance and began to counter-trench."6

...

Not satisfied with the results of this bloody fiasco, General Grant

Military History of U. S. Grant, by Badeau, vol. i. pp. 301–303.

Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 325.

determined upon another swing of the human hammer at his disposition, against the intrenched Confederates, now that his whole force was up and well in hand. This plan, as well as the manner of it, was settled at a convocation of his corps commanders on the 20th of May, and ordered to take place on the 22d, with the intermediate time for preparation; but their opponent also had had seventy hours to set his house in order. The orders were to scale the Confederate lines at a concerted moment, and without firing a gun until the works were stormed. No one, I dare say, acquainted with the dread trade of war, who will carefully read either Badeau's or Sherman's account of this bloody operation, will say that the dispositions of the Union army for the fearful and unprecedented work set for it, were such as made success likely. In such enterprises there must be concentration; a heavy mass must be hurled with the greatest possible impetus and weight at the weakest tangible spot, generally some salient in the adversary's line. But instead, the three Union corps were spread out in a long, thin, brittle line, which was simultaneously pushed forward against the Confederate works in the feeblest possible order of attack. That is to say, small as were the chances originally for success, they were thrown away by the manner in which the attack was made. The Federals, gallantly led by subordinates, as might be expected, were speedily involved and terribly slaughtered in the numerous shambles made by the converging fires from many parts of the Confederate lines. The result we prefer to give in the language of the official biographer: "Thus, all along the line, the assault, though made by heroes, had completely failed. Each corps had advanced, had met the shock, and then recoiled. The rebel position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken by storm. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover, while the difficulties of the ground rendered an attack in column, or, indeed, almost any tactical movement by the National troops, utterly impossible. . . . Grant's loss had been great both in killed and wounded, the hill-sides were covered with the slain, and with unfortunates who lay panting in the hot sun, crying for water which none could bring them, and writhing in pain which none could relieve; while the rebels, ensconced behind their lofty parapets, had suffered but little in comparison. . . . The brunt of the battle incident to the first assault was over in less than an hour, and no substantial result had been obtained. It was plain that Grant could not hope to succeed by assault."

This was the situation at meridian, and, as Aide-de-camp Badeau admits, "thus it was plain at that early hour, Grant could not hope to succeed by assault." Sherman writing of the affair relates that, after thoroughly reconnoitring in person the ground and the hostile position in his front and establishing his field batteries under cover of "good

epaulments," he sent his troops to the assault of the part of the Confederate lines he had selected at ten o'clock. The Federal lines of infantry "advanced rapidly in line of battle. The Confederate line, concealed by their parapets," showed no sign of unusual activity, but as the Federal "troops came in fair view," their "enemy rose behind their parapets and poured a furious fire" upon the advancing Union infantry. "For about two hours," Sherman adds, "we had a severe and bloody battle, but at every point we were repulsed. . . . After our men had been fairly beaten back from off the parapet, and had got cover behind the spurs of ground close up to the rebel works, General Grant came to where I was, on foot. . . . I admitted that my assault had failed, and he said the result with McPherson and McClernand was about the same."

However, upon the suggestion of McClernand that certain advantages which he reported he had gained in his quarter of the assault might be ripened into victory,-advantages, however, which, we are told, Grant really discredited at the moment, another assault was ordered and adventured with all three corps at 3 P.M. "It was a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessful and bloody," is the brief chronicle given by Sherman, who omits, however, to state that the "butcher's bill" of the day's work footed up more than three thousand killed and wounded, or ten per cent. of the Federal forces engaged. Both Sherman and Badeau endeavor to shift the whole responsibility of the wasteful carnage of this second misadventure entirely upon McClernand. They assert that that officer sent "incorrect accounts" of the operations of his corps after the repulse of Sherman and McPherson, which led his superior to act contrary to his own judgment. Sherman specifically recites the tenor and in fact quotes the language of a "loose piece ♦f paper” handed to Grant by an aide-de-camp which was "in McClernand's handwriting," to the effect that his troops had captured the rebel parapets in his front and that "the flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg;" a statement to which was added the request that McPherson and Sherman should press their attacks on their respective fronts, lest the enemy should concentrate on him, McClernand. "I don't believe a word of it," are the words of comment ascribed to General Grant by Sherman. "The note is official and must be credited," was the latter's answer. What McClernand really wrote and suggested was in effect that he was "hotly engaged with the enemy. He (enemy) is massed upon me from the right and left. A vigorous blow by McPherson would make a diversion in my favor." In another dispatch the sanguine subordinate repeats: "We are hotly engaged with the enemy. We have part possession of two forts, and the stars and stripes are floating over them; a vigorous push ought to be made all along the line." In yet another dispatch the material language is, 7 Sherman's Memoirs, vol. i. p. 226-27. 8 Ibid., p. 327. • Ibid., p. 327.