no bravado exhibited, and the Union soldiers indulged in no taunts over those whom the fortune of war had placed in their hands.

The brigade of negro soldiers under Colonel Charles R. Thompson had been brought to a high state of efficiency at Chattanooga, where they were drilled and prepared for action during the summer. They had been collected in different portions of the South and placed under capable officers, who took great pains with them. I saw them at that place, and was struck with their martial appearance and the great pride they evinced in military matters. When Nashville was threatened, they were brought in and told that they were expected to do their whole duty in the defense of the city. On the 16th, the brigade lost twenty-five per cent. of its strength in thirty minutes on the slope of Overton's Hill, and proved itself worthy of every confidence. They took part in the last grand charge, and cleared everything before them, thus winning the approbation of their commander. From this time forward it was well understood that the colored men were able and anxious to fight for the Union cause and could render valuable service. They gained much commendation for their deeds of valor on this occasion, and the Southerners themselves were taught a lesson in regard to them which they never forgot. It was useless afterwards to say that they would not fight. The battle was carried out exactly as it had been planned by General Thomas. He made the Confederate commander believe he intended to make the main attack on the left of his line, and while Hood was vigorously defending it, General Thomas threw a tremendous force against the right, which gave way on the 17th and was soon fleeing in confusion towards the South.

The firing along the lines was heavy and continuous during both days of the struggle, but the number of casualties in the Union army was remarkably small, a fact not easily accounted for. The Confederate commander seemed bent on forcing our lines, but was unable to accomplish this object. The commanders of corps on the Union side were skillful officers, and directed by a mind of great grasp in military matters. If General Thomas was slow he was exceedingly sure, and risked nothing without having first counted the cost. The cavalry, mounted and dismounted, bore their full share of the dangers of the field, and rendered most important services in driving the rebels from their position. In his efforts to do all in his power, the cavalry commander separated his men too far from their horses, and was unable to follow up an advantage as promptly as could have been desired. horsemen contested with the infantry and artillery as to which should do most towards ridding Tennessee of secession troops, and there was a noble emulation worthy of all praise. The infantry cheered on their comrades of another arm with hearty good will, and were proud of their achievements, and the same was true with regard to the artillery. When the troops first occupied the ground they both commenced throw

The

ing up intrenchments, which afforded considerable protection, though the rock was near the surface.

The Confederate soldiers on the right of Hood's line, as we learn from one of them, could scarcely believe their senses when they saw their men on the left giving way, closely followed by the Federal troops. No member of their army who witnessed the terrible rout can ever forget the surprise and chagrin with which they saw men and riderless horses rushing in wild confusion from the woods towards the Franklin pike in their rear, closely followed by the "boys in blue," amid the smoke and carnage of battle. Then regiment after regiment fell back in succession from their works to avoid being flanked, until it became necessary to withdraw the whole right wing in haste to prevent their retreat from being cut off by the Federals moving in on their left and rear. Soon, on the plains, in full view, there was a scene of confusion such as is seldom witnessed. The horses of battery after batterywhere the horses had not been killed,-were rushed to the front at full speed, and hitched to their guns to hurry them off and avoid capture. Towards the left many were too late to save their batteries, and in a short time the rout and disorganization was complete. The Confederates supposed it was a panic among their men, but when the long blue lines of the Nationals came sweeping on like the waves of the ocean, they were convinced it was not a panic, but the destruction of their army by an overpowering and irresistible force.

While the organized soldiers were pushing the enemy on the outer lines, the quartermaster's men, under command of Brigadier-General Donaldson, were holding the inner lines of defense, where they rendered much valuable service. Colonel Philip Sidney Post, of the Fiftyninth Illinois Volunteers, commanded a brigade, and was wounded while leading the charge upon the enemy's works on Overton's Hill. His conduct gained him great applause, and he would doubtless have swept all before him had he not been stricken down when near the works. There were plenty of instances of individual heroism on both sides, and men vied with each other as to who should be in advance. Very many of the soldiers had never been under fire before, but this seemed to make no difference, and their conduct was excellent. They felt that if the enemy could be well punished in this battle it would go far towards bringing the war to a close, which was a result desired by every patriot and lover of his country. The volunteers were willing to sacrifice a great deal to bring this about, and suffered the cold and bitter weather without complaining or fault-finding. The night on the battle-field was extremely chilly and there was a good deal of actual suffering, many of the men having lost their blankets and shelter-tents on the march, and were unable to replace them before the battle commenced.

Some good and correct judges have thought the Confederate soldiers

did not fight so well on this field as usual, believing, as they did, that their cause was hopeless, and preferring to surrender to the Unionists to keeping up the contest any longer. The Confederates were tired of watching and fighting, and had not that confidence in their leaders which soldiers ought to have. General Hood became intensely un-. popular in the South shortly after this, and asked to be relieved from the command, which was accordingly done. He was a very daring man, but had not that knowledge of military matters that is absolutely requisite in a great soldier. Over four thousand of the Confederates were taken prisoners and brought into our lines, together with fiftythree pieces of cannon and a vast quantity of military supplies, much of which was in a good state and capable of being used against them. They seemed reckless of consequences, and felt that they had done all they could, and that it was not worth while to continue the war any longer. They were earnest and sincere men, who had worked themselves out, and struggled as long as they were able to for the cause of disunion. It was a startling reality to these men to see that the Unionists would conquer them in spite of all of their efforts, and that they would be forced back into the Union whether it was agreeable to them or not.

What was left of the Union cavalry was commanded by General James H. Wilson, who seems to have been peculiarly fitted for the place. He had been selected to lead the mounted men of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and entered upon his duties with much energy. He was young and intelligent, and brought his men up to a high state of efficiency. After the rebel lines were broken he sent his men in pursuit, and they continued it for several days. During the fighting in front of Nashville they had been dismounted on the extreme right of our line, and assisted greatly in the discomfiture of the Confederates. General Wilson knew the only way was to keep the enemy moving, and he did this in good style, and much to the detriment of the Southern cause. Our cavalry at this time was in excellent condition, all things considered, the officers having succeeded in getting good mounts for their men, and the troopers themselves were well trained. They now had a chance to show what that training would do. The division commanders, Generals Croxton, Edward Hatch, Richard W. Johnson, and Knipe, were men of experience and good judgment. I had been on duty as Special Inspector of Cavalry for the Cavalry Bureau, and as such had contributed my mite towards getting the men in shape, and of course felt gratified at their conduct in the great battle, and subsequently in following and dispersing the enemy farther south.

The results of this battle were of the utmost importance to the Union cause. The Confederate soldiers were driven out of a large extent of country, in which they never again obtained a footing. Con

fidence was once more restored, and the damage inflicted during the war measurably repaired. There were scores of Union men in and around Nashville who took hold at once to smooth over and adjust matters to the satisfaction of all, and many heart-burnings were done away with. It is not too much to say that great numbers of the secessionists themselves were pleased with the result of this conflict, and hailed with pleasure the dawn of approaching peace. The Southern States were worn out with the struggle, which had been carried on so long, and wished it would end at any price. Many houses in the outskirts of Nashville were burned, though the destruction was far less than might have been expected on the scene of such extensive military movements and warm contests. Fences of course were ruined, and a great many trees sacrificed to the wants of the soldiers. On the whole, however, there was not an extraordinary degree of waste, nor was there any uncalled-for severity. Our men were not given to wanton destruction, except in a few cases where our enemies had manifested too much offensive partisanship, and had made themselves particularly obnoxious to the soldiers themselves.

At one time I knew John B. Hood intimately. He was then a jovial and kind-hearted man, full of life, and abounding in courage. Nobody doubted his bravery, but as to his judgment-that was another question. I doubt whether there were many among his acquaintances who would have pointed him out as the man to command a large army, though as a brigade or division commander no one could do better. He was not a great soldier, though an exceedingly courageous one. Cool, calm, quiet judgment is what is needed in the head of a large mass of men, combined with knowledge acquired from books and personal observation. Hood, when a lieutenant, had been engaged with a party of Indians in Texas, on Devil's River, in July, 1857, where he received a painful wound, and succeeded in saving his little party of men from a band of savages which greatly outnumbered his. He failed as a general, and found to his cost that the leader of an army must know other things besides how to deal hard knocks upon his enemy. His character was gentle, and his disposition kind. He loved children and animals, and was simple in all his tastes. The people of the South felt bitterly towards him for his failures, but when the grave closed over him they revered and loved his memory.

ALBERT G. BRACKETT,

Colonel Third U. S. Cavalry.

RECOLLECTIONS OF 1861.

It is not very wise or prudent to undertake the task of writing up from memory recollections of events that occurred nearly a quarter of a century ago. Without some aid, in the shape of memoranda, personal or official documents, diaries, or the suggestions and assistance of comrades, one is certain to commit blunders, or, to say the least, be guilty of errors and omissions that will leave him exposed on both flanks, front and rear, to the sharp fire of criticism from scores of pens; and, while this may be considered fun for the ever-vigilant enemy, the critic, it is terribly demoralizing on the man without notes, and drives him from the field of literature a sad, broken, and defeated man, who, while possessing much valuable information on the history of the war of the Rebellion, has, under the pressure of severe criticism, determined that his knowledge will die with him, for lack of opportunity or the advantage of having access to official records and documents, and he retires to the seclusion of his own fireside and lets the smart critics whistle for the information they would give anything to obtain.

Very few officers or enlisted men of the army of 1861 took the trouble or had the forethought to keep diaries. Some methodical men, we know, did; but they were exceptional. The change from the office, the counter, and the farm, to the tented field, hard fare, exposure, and the picket-guard was so novel in its features, so essentially warlike and serious in its meaning to the thoughtful and reflecting, that few men even thought of such a thing as a diary. Future history and its importance was crowded out, as it were, by the more serious events of the moment,— events so vital to the welfare of the nation. The great aim and object of the army was the safety and welfare of the country, the crushing out of the rebellion, and sustaining the Union in its entirety. Thousands of volunteer officers never dreamt of even making out property and other important returns, until their monthly stipend was discontinued,— much less of devoting their spare time to the pages of a diary. In later years of the war, as the novelty of camp-life and the skirmish-line wore off, men began to note down daily events passing around them, which to-day are invaluable. Many a soldier can now look back twenty-four years ago and express his sorrow and regret that he did not keep even brief data of passing events, and put away for safe-keeping and future