course, for in it he had the double advantage of pressing his strategic offensive and tactical defensive. He was on the enemy's territory, and yet might compel the enemy by active diversions to attack him on his own chosen battle-field. Second, he could attempt to manoeuvre Meade out of his chosen position. This was Longstreet's idea. It was hazardous, because during the operation he was exposing his flank; but it was feasible. Third, he could await attack on Seminary Ridge. This was a doubtful scheme, for Meade was in position to tire him out at his own game. Fourth, he could boldly attack. This last course he selected, probably impelled thereto by the temper of his army, which he could not endanger by a retreat, the reason for which they would be unable to understand.

The difficulties we always labored under in Virginia are well illustrated by Lee's slowness of attack in Pennsylvania. On the 1st he delayed in attacking Cemetery Hill when it could have been taken. On the 2d, instead of attacking at daylight, as was his wont, his orders to Longstreet were not imperative enough to bring on the actual clash till late in the afternoon. His ancient habit of barely suggesting to Jackson, who needed no more to start his troops into instant vigorous action, was lost upon his present lieutenants, however excellent as soldiers. Moreover, when Lee determined to strike our left flank, it was wisdom to subordinate everything else to the execution of this one manœuvre. To leave Ewell in force on our right with a similar purpose was scarcely defensible in a military sense. It is especially necessary, when the weaker army attacks the stronger, that its blow should be concentrated to the last degree. A notable instance of this is Frederick's assault with but thirty thousand men on eighty thousand Austrians at Leuthen. Frederick's front covered barely the Austrian's left wing; but the vigor of his onset in a short winter's afternoon rolled up his enemy's entire force as it had been a scroll.

Lee would perhaps have been wiser to concentrate all his forces along the line of Seminary Ridge. But Ewell was so strong in his belief that he could capture Culp's Hill if Longstreet would make a strong demonstration upon the left, that Lee was loath to withdraw him.

The Union army thus lay in convex line of battle about four miles in length, with a chord of less than a mile and a half over which to move troops from one to another point in the line. The Confederates on the other hand were in concave order, on a line all but six miles long, and in no place of such strength as to be able to mass for a single overwhelming blow. However admirable Lee's tactics generally were, however easily he stands chief among the soldiers of our Civil War, he was here open to criticism. He was doing just what Hooker and Sedgwick had done two months before at Chancellorsville, and, despite superior forces, had himself paid a heavy penalty for doing. And this

was an open country, where his movements could not be concealed as they might be in the woods of his native State.

In possession of charts, the materials for which the investigations of a thousand minds for twenty years have combined to give us; having the benefit of the research and acumen of the best military judges; viewing the field as we do a problem on a chess-board; with absolute knowledge of the numbers engaged and the terrain upon which they are to move, it is easy to pass criticism upon even Lee, whom history will enroll upon the short first page of Captains of the World. But to stand where Lee stood, with threescore and ten thousand human lives in his keeping; with the fate of the cause he loved and led hanging upon his word; with unknown ground, unknown forces, unknown obstacles in his front, was indeed another task. Unless our criticism is made as earnest students in peace of the great deeds these giants did in war, it is pitiable indeed. That which has been here indulged in is meant to be temperate as well as honest. It is made with a full appreciation of the unusual difficulties which beset our generals, North and South, with a sincere admiration of their qualities and services, and in that spirit of diffidence which should become a soldier who bore but a modest part in the great struggle which they conducted to what is now accepted by all as its happy outcome.

Ewell, then, was waiting for the signal of Longstreet's attack. But hours passed and Longstreet was not ready. Some of his brigades were not yet up. He was still perfecting his dispositions. His activity was not unperceived by our Signal Corps on Little Round Top. Meade imagined that he might be intending a manœuvre to turn our left, and like a wise commander he prepared his plans to meet this phase of the conflict if it should happen to be suddenly thrust upon him. For such a movement by the Army of Northern Virginia in force might necessitate an immediate withdrawal towards Pipe Creek. Out of this simple precaution seems to have arisen the allegation that Meade deliberately planned a retreat from Gettysburg. The weight of evidence is certainly in favor of his readiness to fight there; and the fact remains that he did fight—and win there.

The Sixth Corps had arrived on the field about 2 P.M., after a march of thirty-five miles in twenty hours, and had been posted in reserve a little back of Round Top.

About 4 P.M. Longstreet opened his attack on Sickles. The Confederate line had not advanced far, before Hood, who was on the right, caught sight of Little Round Top, guessed that it was the key of the battle-field, and instantly made a bold move to capture it. At the moment, it was only occupied by our Signal Corps. Its loss would have taken our left in reverse. Warren, then on the general staff of the Army of the Potomac, had just arrived on the spot to watch the enemy's movements. At once foreseeing the danger, he hurried down

the hill for troops to occupy the threatened cliff. The van of the Fifth Corps was just coming up, ordered by Meade from the right to the now seriously threatened left. Seizing on Vincent's brigade, Warren hurried it pas de course up the rugged southern slopes, and after a desperate struggle rescued our menaced flank from this crucial peril.

Hood's general attack on Birney was, however, vigorous enough to require Sickles's line to be reinforced by part of the now arriving Fifth Corps and a brigade of Humphreys's; despite which the salient at Peach Orchard was speedily broken through, and Birney and Humphreys both taken in reverse by McLaws, while Anderson pushed in on his other flank at Zeigler's Grove. In fact, the onset at the latter point had actually pierced our line, and, if followed up, could have been made a turning-point in favor of the Confederates.

Sickles's difficulty lay in conducting an orderly retreat so as to reoccupy the proper line from Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top, and to hold it. The enfilading fire made the retiring lines very unsteady. Gradually, however, under the protection of reinforcements from Hancock and the Fifth Corps, and of Ayres's regular division, which left one-half of its number on the field in killed and wounded, the withdrawal was accomplished, and the line patched up. A small force now took position on Round Top.

Repeated attempts by our reinforced line were made to recover the lost ground, but uselessly. We occupied the wheat-field, but left the enemy the Devil's Den.

The Twelfth Corps had likewise been ordered over to the point of danger. But it lost its way and did not get into action. This seriously depleted the right of the line, without adding to the left.

Ewell's attack on our right had been as greatly delayed as Longstreet's. He had not heard the latter's fire. It was sunset before he assaulted. Early moved on Cemetery Hill, Johnson on Culp's. The former met with no success though he struggled hard till late at night, and once drove our troops out of their intrenchments. His columns had not been simultaneously moved to the attack. But at Culp's,

owing to the absence of the Fifth and bulk of the Twelfth Corps, marching over to the left, Johnson managed to make a lodgment with small effort in the lines abandoned by the Twelfth Corps, and held it during the night. Only a small force of cavalry was between him and both the headquarters of the army and the reserve artillery.

The night was spent in preparation for the eventful morrow. The troops were reformed; weak portions of the line were reinforced; ammunition was distributed; the field-works were strengthened; the situation was inspected in its every detail; and plans for every probable contingency discussed. The men lay on their arms in line of battle.

Meade, who had been but a few days in command, felt that he must rely greatly for his action upon the opinion of his late companions

in-arms, now his subordinates. manders during the night and put to them two questions. First. Shall we fight the battle out here? Second. If so, shall we attack or await attack? The situation was grave, but not unpromising. Longstreet had lost heavily, and had gained only an apparent, not a real advantage. The left was safe, and in the position originally designed for it. On the right, however, the enemy had a foothold very near the Baltimore pike on Culp's Hill. This was a serious matter, but it might be mended. The troops were in fine spirits, and despite their extensive losses-some twenty thousand men-were ready for yet another day. It was decided to fight a defensive battle on the morrow, without change of position.

He called together his corps com

Lee must of course have scanned the situation most critically, too. He was inclined to believe that Longstreet had made an actual lodgment in our left centre; while Ewell reported that he could certainly hold his position at Culp's. The Army of Northern Virginia felt confident of victory. There was no question of what Lee must do.

At one time Lee contemplated a renewed attempt to turn the Union left, so nearly broken through already; but on second thought he abandoned this idea, and determined to assault where Anderson seemed to have made a feasible breach at Zeigler's Grove. Lee had always been much in the habit of relying upon his subordinates. Jackson's splendid individuality of action had to a certain extent weakened his own. And his desire not to interfere with what Ewell felt sure that he could do, led him to leave his line in its then long and weak condition. Lee's powers in Pennsylvania seemed to be less active than on his native soil.

Meade, to prepare for the morrow, ordered the Twelfth Corps, reinforced by some troops from the Sixth Corps, back to Culp's. Here, on its arrival, it found the height which itself had occupied, in the possession of the enemy. It went into position, however, determined to drive him out at daylight.

The Fifth Corps had been placed on the left, leaning on Little Round Top, with the Third, whose losses had been the most severe of any in the army, in reserve. The First Corps had been placed in the most necessary gaps on the right and left of Cemetery Hill.

During the night batteries were established on all the heights which could be made to command the ground held by Johnson, and at early dawn on July 3 the Twelfth Corps engaged the veterans of Jackson along the rugged slopes of Culp's Hill. The Federals fought with the knowledge that this flank must be preserved intact at any sacrifice, while the vicinity of the Baltimore road invigorated the enemy, who well understood how grievous a blow could be inflicted upon the Army of the Potomac by gaining possession of its trains, reserve ammunition, and main line of retreat. And Jackson's men were rarely to be denied

the victory they fought for. But Johnson was unsupported by artillery, which could not be utilized on the steep and rocky hill-side, and their efforts proved vain. Until an hour from noon they persevered in their attempts to dislodge Slocum. Finally exhausted, Johnson was fain to beat a recall. Ewell's anticipations had come to naught.

Longstreet was still in favor of a strong manoeuvre upon our left, and looked with no kindly eye on the proposed assault at Zeigler's. This, meanwhile, was being unaccountably delayed. In fact, Longstreet had planned a diversion against the Round Top with a small column, but Kilpatrick's cavalry turned up opportunely on his right, and not only checked the attempt but required some effort to drive him back.

A lull of several hours of precious time had occurred in the preparations for the assault on our centre. Finally, about 1 P.M., the Confederate batteries which had been massed along Seminary Ridge-one hundred and thirty-eight pieces in all-opened fire upon that part of our line which Lee had selected for the assault. The Union batteries, of some eighty guns,-more could not be crowded into the available space,-began to reply so soon as they could determine the location of the enemy's guns.

The Confederate fire was too much spread. There was an appearance of that lack of unity among the Southern chieftains which did in fact exist. But the column destined for the supreme effort was slowly forming, and would move whenever a sufficient impression had been made on the Union lines by the artillery fire.

Pickett's division, consisting almost exclusively of Virginia regiments, which had just reached the field, was assigned as the forlorn hope. The duty could not be in better hands. The Ney of the Rebel army, backed by his gallant Virginians, could pierce the Union centre if any troops could do so.

Under the cover of the guns, Pickett formed his five thousand men in double line of battle. On his right Wilcox was to march in support, and on his left Pettigrew, each in column by battalions. The whole body was fourteen thousand strong. To save up ammunition for closer range, our guns had temporarily ceased their work. The enemy believed that he had silenced them by his own heavier fire. Now was the moment for the blow. In superb alignment, as on parade, Pickett's heavy column moved out from the cloud of smoke. A clump of trees within Hancock's line was the goal marked out by Lee. Our guns again opened fire, using canister as soon as the range allowed. The men lay behind their breastworks and in the shelter of the stone walls somewhat below, which they had strengthened as defenses, calmly watching the advance. In the breast of every man who fought on December 13, must have lurked the feeling that this was the day which should avenge us for the bloody work at Marye's Heights.