"LITTLE WARS."

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made between the seventeen states of which Europe is composed, in regard to the settlement of international differences between them, as would on questions of peace or war constitute them practically the "United States of Europe." It is evident that only a fractional proportion of the armies and navies now maintained by the aggregate of those states would then be required. It is true that for several reasons European armaments could not be for the present reduced to the level of those which suffice for our American brethren. Of these reasons the chief is that many European states indulge in the expensive luxury of "foreign possessions." Now these," possessions," however much they may conduce to the glory of their proud owners, constitute a heavy and perennial drain upon their resources, and necessitate among other expenses the maintenance of a far much larger army and navy than would otherwise be required. England is the foremost of these owners of foreign possessions. So abundantly are we blessed with them, and so vast is the surface which they present in every part of the globe for contact and collision with adverse or conflicting interests, that the friction is enormous, and the consequence is a constant succession of "little wars" with semibarbarous nations. And "little" these wars may well be called as to their motives, objects, and results, though they are by no means little as respects their cost to the country.

Having regard therefore to foreign possessions held (as long as they may think them worth holding) by European states, to the varied forms of

government under which the latter exist, to the present want of mutual sympathy between the populations which constitute the European family, and to other special conditions, the military establishments of the "United States of Europe" might still have to remain on a somewhat larger scale than those of the United States of America. But, nevertheless, the abrogation of European international warfare would nearly abolish the need for standing armies, and probably one-tenth of the present expenditure of men and money would meet all national requirements. To err, however, on the right side, let us take the estimate at oneseventh. This would still leave 500,000 armed men to be permanently maintained by the aggregate states of Europe, at an annual expenditure of £24,000,000-an allowance which is superfluously large under the assumed circumstances.

These data supply us with an answer to the inquiry, which we broached at p. 100, as to "what proportion of the 3,500,000 men now under arms in Europe on the peace the peace footing, and of the £156,000,000 which they cost, would suffice if European international wars could be superseded by some peaceful mode of settling international disputes." The saving thereby effected would represent three millions of men and £132,000,000 annually of wealth. Let us look at the significance of these figures.

1. As to the money. The extra £142,000,000 now expended is levied by extra taxation from the populations of Europe, and, therefore, if saved, there would be so much the less to be paid by them annu

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ally. Now, the population of Europe is 318,000,000, distributed into about 70,000,000 families. On an average, therefore, each family in Europe would be a gainer of £2 per annum. Or to place the matter in another light, the aggregate wealth of the people of Europe would be annually increased by £132,000,000. But this is by no means the limit of the money-saving, as we shall see from the remarks that follow.

2. As to the men. Under our hypothesis, three million of men, whose labour is under the existing system utterly unproductive, would be restored to their several fields of productive industry, and each would furnish his quota to the total mass of wealth-creation of the world. In estimating the probable amount of their contributions, we must bear in mind:

(a) That these three million men are in the very prime of manhood (between the ages of eighteen and fifty), and in the full maturity of their physical and intellectual powers.

(b) That from the universal liability of all classes to serve, which is the basis of military organisation throughout continental Europe, the three million of men who would be restored to a career of active productiveness would mostly represent the average productive ability of all classes of society, which is a far higher average than that of soldiers who enlist for a stipend under voluntary enrolment.

(c) In civilised countries, an average male adult produces by his labour (in conjunction with capital and land, whether supplied by himself or by others) a large excess over his own consumption. For

even under the present system that excess of production has sufficed, not only to maintain the women, children, sick, old, and infirm of the community, besides a host of unproductive consumers, but has also sufficed to form out of savings the enormous masses of capital (buildings, ships, railroads, &c., &c., &c.) that now exist. Indeed, every man with sound limbs and a sound brain, should be able to produce the equivalent of what would maintain several human beings-more, under a good; less, under a bad system.

Taking these facts into account, it will be, we think, a low estimate to value the average excess of production over consumption of these three million of men, whose idleness is changed to industry, at £50 per man annually, making a total of £150,000,000. Of course it is not their total annual production that we assume as gain, because under the present system their annual maintenance is included in the £156,000,000 devoted to military and naval expenditure. The profit to the world would be what these 3,000,000 of men would earn in excess of their own maintenance.

We have seen that the average cost of each European soldier is £45; but it must be observed that this sum comprises many other objects besides the maintenance of the soldier in food, clothes, and lodging. It comprises his relative share in all the war material, equipment, and appliances, by means of which his services are utilised-such as artillery, ammunition, horses, ships, fortifications, &c., &c. In a rough way we may assume that about one-half of the

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average cost to the state of a soldier goes to his personal maintenance, and the rest to equipment, &c. In the case of a sailor the proportion is somewhat different, as his ship, armament, &c., form a heavier percentage of the total cost. We now proceed to the third head under which we have proposed to discuss "the variety of modes in which war is injurious."

CHAPTER IX.

Annual Cost of the War-system in time of Peace-Annual Cost of the War-system in time of War-Economic Results of the Conversion of Soldiers, &c., into Producers.

3. DIVERSION of capital to unproductive or destructive purposes. In addition to the £156,000,000 annually spent in Europe on war preparations, a very heavy loss is sustained by the dead capital permanently locked up in fortifications, arsenals, ships, horses, barracks, military schools, &c. This capital, the amount of which it is difficult to estimate, but which must be enormous, is sunk unproductively, and yields no return whatever. The world, therefore, loses all the wealth which would have been created through the instrumentality of that capital, had it been in active employment. We shall not attempt to assess this loss, which is obviously a very large one, but must content ourselves with pointing out its existence.

There is, however, one item which is susceptible of easy computation; it is the intercepted earnings