to be passed upon him in an assembly of Macedonians.

All these incidents happened at the time that Hannibal was encamped on the banks of the river Po in Italy; and Antiochus, after having subdued the greatest part of Coelosyria, had sent his troops into winter-quarters. It was also then that Lycurgus, king of Lacedæmonia, fled from Etolia, in order to secure himself from the anger of the Ephori, who, on a false report that this king designed to embroil the state, had assembled in the night, and in vested his house, in order to seize his person. But Lycurgus, having some notion of this, fled with his whole family. However, he was recalled a little after, as soon as it was known that the suspicions raised against him were all groundless. It being now winter, Philip returned to Macedonia.

Eperatus was by this time universally despised by the Achæans; no body obeyed his orders; and the country being open and defenceless, dreadful havoc was made in it. The cities being abandoned, and receiving no succours, were reduced to the last extremity, and consequently could scarce furnish their quota. The auxiliary troops, the payment of whose arrears was put off from day to day, served as they were paid, and great numbers of them deserted. All this was owing to the incapacity of the general ; and the reader has seen in what manner he was elected. Happily for the Achæans, the time of his command was almost expired. He quitted it in the eginning of the spring, and the elder Aratus was appointed to succeed him.

Philip, in his journey to Macedonia, had taken Bylazora, the greatest city in Peonia, and the most advantageously situated for making incursions from Dardania into Macedonia; so that having possessed himself of it, he had very little to fear from the Dardanians.

# Polyb. 1. v. p. 435.

A. M.

After taking that city, he again marched towards 3787 Greece. He judged it would be proper to lay siege Ant. J. C. to Thebes of Phthiotis, from whence the Etolians

217.

used to make continual inroads, and at the same time commit great waste in the territories of Demetrias, Pharsalia, and even Larissa. The attack was carried on with great bravery, and the defence was equally vigorous; but at last, the besieged, fearing they should be taken by storm, surrendered the city. By this conquest, Philip secured Magnesia and Thessaly, and carried off a great booty from the tolians.

Here ambassadors came again to him from Chio, Rhodes, and Byzantium, and also from Ptolemy, to propose the concluding of a peace. Philip made the same answer as before, that it was what he very much desired; and that they had only to inquire of the Etolians, whether they also were inclined to it. Philip, in reality, was not very desirous of peace, but he did not care to declare himself.

He afterwards set out, with his favourites, for the Nemæan games at Argos. Whilst he was viewing one of the combats, a courier arrived from Macedonia, with advice that the Romans had lost a great battle in Tuscany, near the lake Thrasymene, and that Hannibal was master of the open country. The king showed this letter to none but Demetrius of Pharos, giving him a strict charge not to speak of it. The latter took this opportunity to represent to him, that he ought to disengage himself as soon as possible from the Etolian war, in order to invade Illyria, and afterwards cross into Italy. He added, that Greece, already subjected in all respects, would obey him no less afterwards; that the Achæans had joined voluntarily, and with the utmost chearfulness, in his cause; that the Etolians, quite depressed and discouraged by their ill success in the present war, would not fail to follow their example; that if he was desirous of the sovereignty of the world, a noble ambition, which suited no prince better than him

a moment.

self, he must begin by conquering Italy; that after the defeat of the Romans, the news of which he had then received, the time was come for executing so noble a project, and that he ought not to delay Such counsel could not but charm a king in the flower of his youth, successful in his exploits, bold, enterprising, and who besides was sprung from a family which had always flattered itself with the hopes of universal empire.

Nevertheless as he was master of his temper, and governed his thoughts in such a manner, as to discover only such of them as promoted his interest (a very rare and valuable quality in so young a prince) he did not express too great an inclination for peace, though he now earnestly desired it. He therefore only caused the allied states to be told to send their plenipotentiaries to Naupactum, in order to negociate a peace: and, at the earnest instances of the Ætolians, soon arrived in the neighbourhood of that city, at the head of his troops. All parties were so weary of the war, that there was no occasion for long conferences. The first article which the king caused to be proposed to the Etolians, by the ambassadors of the confederate powers, was, that every one should continue in possession of his conquests. The rest of the articles were soon agreed upon; so that the treaty was ratified, and all retired to their respective countries. This peace concluded by Philip and the Achæans with the Etolians; the battle lost by the Romans near the lake Thrasymene; and the defeat of Antiochus near Raphia; all these events happened in the third year of the 140th Olympiad.

297

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3787.

217.

In the first separate conference held in presence of the king and the ambassadors of the confederate Ant. J.C. powers, Agelas of Naupactum,, who was one of them, enforced his opinion by arguments that deserve a place here, and which Polybius thought worthy of relating at length in his history. He says it were to be wished, that the Greeks would never make war

upon one another; that it would be a great bleffing from the gods, if, breathing only the same senti ments, they should all in a manner join hand, and unite their whole force, to secure themselves from the insults of the Barbarians. But if this was not possible, that at least, in the present juncture, they ought to unite together, and consult for the preser vation of all Greece. That, to be sensible of the necessity of such an union, they need but turn their eyes to the formidable armies of the two powerful ftates actually engaged in war. That it was evident to every one who was ever so little versed in maxims of policy, that the conquerors, whether Carthaginians or Romans, would not confine themselves to the empire of Italy and Sicily; but would doubtless extend their projects much further. That all the Greeks in general, and especially Philip, ought to keep a strict eye on the dangers with which they were threatened. That this prince would have nothing to fear, if, instead of his attempting to ruin the Greeks, and to give the enemy an easier opportunity of defeating them, as he had hitherto done, he should labour as much for. their welfare as his own, and exert himself as vigorously in the defence of all Greece, as if it was his own kingdom. That by this means he would acquire the love and affec tion of the Greeks, who would be inviolably attached to him in all his enterprises; and, by their fidelity to him, disconcert all the projects which foreigners might form against his kingdom. That if, instead of barely acting defensively, he were desirous of taking the field, and executing some great enter prise; he need but turn his arms towards the west, and keep an eye on the events of the war in Italy. That, provided he would only put himself into a condition for seizing successfully the first opportu nity that should present itself, all things would smooth the way for universal empire. That, in case he had any difference with the Greeks, he should leave the decision of it to another season. That he

ought especially to be careful to preserve to himself the liberty of making war or peace with them, whenever he might think proper. That, in case he should suffer the storm which was gathering in the west to burst upon Greece, it was very much to be feared, that it would then be no longer in their power to take up arms, to treat of peace, nor to determine in their affairs according to their own sense, or the manner they might judge most expedient.

After

Nothing can be more judicious than this speech, which is a clear prediction of what was to happen afterwards to Greece, of which the Romans will soon render themselves absolute masters. This is the first time that the affairs of Italy and Africa influence those of Greece, and direct their motions. this, neither Philip, nor the other powers of Greece, regulated their conduct, when they were to make peace or war, from the state of their respective countries, but directed all their views and attention towards Italy. The Asiaticks and the inhabitants of the islands, did the same soon after. All those who, from that time had reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Philip or Attalus, no longer addressed Antiochus or Ptolemy for protection: they no longer turned their eyes to the south or east, but fixed them upon the west. Sometimes ambassadors were sent to the Carthaginians, and at other times to the Romans. Some also came to Philip, at different intervals, from the Romans, who, knowing the enterprising genius of that prince, were afraid he should come and add to the confusion and perplexity of their affairs: which is what the sequel of this history is upon the point of showing us.