force, in imitation of several great examples related in history, and when he ought to have been solely solicitous to save the state at the expence of his Own life. If he had even despaired of retrieving the affairs of the Achæans, he ought rather to have submitted to Cleomenes, who was a Grecian by birth, and king of Sparta, than to call in the assistance of foreigners, and make them masters of Peloponnesus, as will soon appear to have been the event: jealousy, however, extinguishes all prudent reflections, and is a malady not to be cured by reason alone.

The Achæans being reduced to the last extremities, and especially after the loss of the first battle, sent ambassadors to Cleomenes to negociate a peace. The King seemed at first determined to impose very rigid terms upon them; but afterwards dispatched an embassy on his part, and only demanded to be appointed general of the Achæan league, promising on that condition to accommodate all differences between them, and restore the prisoners and places he had taken from them. The Achæans, who were very inclinable to accept of peace on those terms, desired Cleomenes to be present at Lerna, where they were to hold a general assembly, in order to conclude the treaty. The King set out accordingly for that place, but an unexpected accident, which happened to him, prevented the interview; and Aratus endeavoured to improve it in such a manner as to hinder the negociation from being renewed. He imagined, that as he had possessed the chief authority in the Achæan league for the space of thirtythree years, it would be very dishonourable in him to suffer a young man to graft himself upon him, and divest him of all his glory and power, by supplanting him in a command he had acquired, augmented, and retained for so many years. These Considerations induced him to use all his efforts to dissuade the Achæans from the conditions proposed

to them by Cleomenes: but as he had the mortifi. cation to find himself incapable of conciliating them with this view, because they dreaded the bravery and uncommon success of Cleomenes, and likewise thought that the Lacedæmonians were very reasonable in their intentions to restore Peloponnesus to its ancient state, he had recourse to an expedient which no Grecian ought to have approved, and was extremely dishonourable in a man of his rank and character. His design was to call in the assistance of Antigonus King of Macedonia, and by inevitable consequence make him master of Greece.

"He had not forgotten that Antigonus had great cause to be dissatisfied with his former proceedings: but he was sensible that princes may be properly said to have neither friends nor enemies, and that they form their sentiments of things by the standard of their own interest. He, however, would not openly enter into a negociation of this nature, nor propose it as from himself; because he knew that if it should happen to prove unsuccessful, he must inevitably incur all the odium; and besides, it would be making a plain declaration to the Achæans, that if he had not absolutely despaired of retrieving their affairs, he would not advise them to have recourse to their professed enemy. He, therefore, concealed his real views, like an artful and experienced politi cian, and proceeded by indirect and secret methods. As the city of Megalopolis was nearest in situation to Sparta, it lay most exposed to the incursions of the enemy, and the inhabitants began to think themselves sufficient sufferers by the war, as the Achæans were so far from being in a condition to support them, that they were unable to defend themselves. Nicophanes and Cercides, two citizens of Megalopolis, whom Aratus had brought over to his scheme, made a proposal in the council of that city, for demanding permission of the Achæans, to

Polyb. 1. ii. p. 133-140.

implore the assistance of Antigonus. This motion was immediately assented to, and the Achæans granted them the permission they desired. These two citizens were then deputed to be the messengers of that proposal, and Aratus had been careful to furnish them with sufficient instructions beforehand. When they received audience of Antigonus, they lightly touched upon the particulars which related to their city, and then strongly insisted, in conformity to their instructions, on the imminent danger to which the King himself would be exposed, should the alliance which was then talked of between the Etolians and Cleomenes, take effect. They then represented to him, that if the united forces of those two states should have those advantages over the Achæans, which they expected to obtain, the towering ambition of Cleomenes would never be satisfied with the mere conquest of Peloponnesus, as it was evident that he aspired at the empire of all Greece, which it would be impossible for him to seize, without entirely destroying the authority of the Macedonians. To these remonstrances they added, that if the Etolians should not happen to join Cleomenes, the Achæans would be capable of supporting themselves with their own forces, and should have no cause to trouble the king with their importunities for his assistance; but if, on the other hand, fortune should prove averse to them, and permit the confederacy between those two states to take effect, they must then intreat him not to be an unconcerned spectator of the ruin of Peloponnesus, which might even be attended with fatal consequences to himself. They also took care to insi nuate to the king, that Aratus would enter into all his measures, and give him, in due time, sufficient security for his own fidelity and good intentions.

Antigonus highly approved all these representa. tions, and seized with pleasure the opportunity that was now offered him, for engaging in the affairs of Greece. This had always been the policy of the

successors of Alexander, who, by declaring themselves kings, had converted the frame of their respective governments into monarchy. They were sensible that it nearly concerned them to oppose all such states as had any inclination to retain their liberty, and the form of popular government; and wherever they found themselves in no condition to extinguish these, they attempted to weaken them at least, and to render the people incapable of forming any considerable enterprises, by sowing the seeds of division between republics and free states, and engaging them in wars against each other, in order to render themselves necessary to them, and prevent their shaking off the Macedonian yoke, by uniting their forces. Polybius, speaking of one of these princes, declares, in express terms, that he paid large pensions to several tyrants in Greece, who were professed enemies to liberty*.

It cannot, therefore, be thought surprising, that Antigonus should prove so tractable to the solicitations and demands of the Megalopolitans. He wrote them an obliging letter, wherein he promised to assist them, provided the Achæans would consent to that proceeding. The inhabitants of Megalopolis were transported at the happy result of their negociation, and immediately dispatched the same deputies to the general assembly of the Achæans, in order to inform that people of the good intentions of Antigonus, and to press them to put their interests immediately into his hands.

Aratus did not fail to congratulate himself in private for the masterly stroke by which he had succeeded in his intrigue, and to find Antigonus not possessed with any impressions to his prejudice, as he had reason to apprehend. He wished, indeed, to have had no occasion for his assistance; and though necessity obliged him to have recourse to

c Lib. ii. p. 131.

Δημήτριος ην αυτοίς (μονάρχοις) οι ενει χορηγός και μισθοδοτης.

that prince, he was willing to guard against the imputation of those measures, and for having them seem to have been concerted by the Achæans without any privity of his.

When the deputies from Megalopolis were introduced into the assembly, they read the letter of Antigonus, and related all the particulars of the obliging reception he had given them; with the affection and esteem he had expressed for the Achæans, and the advantageous offers he made them. They concluded with desiring, in the name of their city, that the Achæans would invite Antigonus to be present as soon as possible in their assembly; and every one seemed to approve of that motion. Aratus then rose up, and after he had represented the voluntary goodness of the king in the strongest light, and commended the sentiments that prevailed in the assembly, he intimated to them, that there was no necessity for precipitating any thing; that it would be very honourable for the republic to endeavour to terminate her wars by her own forces; and that if any calamitous accident should render her incapable of doing so, it would then be time enough to have recourse to her friends. This advice was generally approved; and it was concluded that the Achæans should employ only their own forces in supporting the present war.

The events of it were, however, very unfavour able to them; for Cleomenes made himself master of several cities* of Peloponnesus, of which Argos was the most considerable, and at last seized Corinth, but not the citadel. The Achæans had then no longer time for deliberation; Antigonus was called in to their assistance, and they came to a resolution to deliver up the citadel to him, without which he would never have engaged in that expedition; for

Plut. in Cleom. p. 814, 815. Plut. in Arat. p. 1047. Caphyes, Pellene, Pheneus, Phlionte, Cleonæ, Epidaurus, Hermione, Træzene.

209

A. M.

3778. Ant. J. C.

226.

A. M.

3779.

Ant. J. C.

225.