All the difficulty, which this masterly writer has, in his usual way, so strikingly pourtrayed, lies merely in the representations of those Trinitarians, who have expressed themselves on this subject so incautiously, as to be understood to affirm, that there are three separate beings, (persons in the common sense of the word,) in the Godhead, with distinct powers, volitions, &c. If there be any now, who defend such a statement of this subject, I must leave them to compose the difficulty with Toellner as they can. The view of the doctrine of the Trinity given by Toellner, in his statement of the objection, is not that which I have presented, or which I should ever undertake to defend. Of course it cannot be adduced as an objection, against the statement which I have given, and have undertaken to defend.

The second objection, appears, at first sight, more formidable and perplexing. It comes from Taylor, and was inserted in the English Theological Magazine, Vol. I. No. 4. p. 111. 1770. I have not opportunity of access to the original, and take the ideas from a Latin translation of the piece, which was published in Germany.

"There can," says Taylor, "be no real distinction between the Father and the Son, unless they so differ from each other, that what is peculiar to the Father, is wanting in the Son; and what is peculiar to the Son, is wanting in the Father. Now that property which belongs exclusively to the Father, or the Son, must be numbered among the perfections of God; for in the divine nature no imperfections can exist. It follows then, that scme perfection is lacking both in the Father and in the Son, so that neither is endowed with infinite perfection, which is essential to the divine nature. It must be conceded then, that the essence of the Father and the Son is not one and the same.”

Ingenious and specious as this is, still I am unable to see that it settles the point in debate. The essence and attributes of God, so far as they are known to us, are numerically one, as we have already admitted. If by " perfection," Taylor means all which belongs to the Godhead; then I answer merely by saying, It is essential to the perfection of the Godhead, that the distinction between the Father and Son should exist; for that otherwise there would be imperfection. My right to make such a statement, is just the same as his to make the assertion, that the distinction be

tween Father and Son, involved an imperfection in each. The very distinction between Father and Son is essential to complete Divinity; and did not these exist, something would be wanting to complete the perfection of the Godhead. I acknowledge this is assumption; but so is Taylor's statement: and an argument which is built on an assump tion, may surely be opposed by another argument, which has the same foundation.

My object in the present letter has been, thus far, to compare our views of the Trinity, with those which you have ascribed to us; to show that we are not exposed on account of our belief, to be justly charged with gross and palpable absurdity, or with "subverting the Unity of the Godhead;" and to prove that the question, after all, whether there is a distinction in the Godhead, must be referred solely to the decision of the Scriptures.

To them I shall appeal, as soon as I have made a few remarks on the twofold nature, which we ascribe to Christ. You say (p. 11.)

"We (Unitarians,) believe in the unity of Jesus Christ. We believe that Jesus is one mind, one soul, one being, as truly one as we are, and equally distinct from the one God. We complain of the doctrine of the Trinity, that not satisfied with making God three beings, it makes Jesus Christ two beings, and thus introduces infinite confusion into our conceptions of his character. This corruption of Christianity, alike repugnant to common sense, and to the general strain of Scripture, is a remarkable proof of the power of a false philosophy in disfiguring the

simple truth of Jesus."

You will admit that this is expressed in terms of severity. Whether we are really deserving of it, who hold the doctrine in question, every lover of truth will permit to be brought to the test of fair examination.

I am not certain, that I have rightly apprehended your meaning, when you say that the twofold nature of Christ, is " repugnant to common sense." Do you mean, that common sense may determine first, independently of Revelation, that the doctrine cannot be true; and then maintain the impossibility that Revelation should exhibit it? If so, then we are able to decide, a priori, what can be revealed, and what cannot; consequently what we may believe, and what we must disbelieve. It follows, then, that a Revelation, is unnecessary; or rather that it is im

possible, at least, one which shall be obligatory upon our belief; for we have only to say, that our common sense decides against the propriety or the possibility of the things said to be revealed, and then we are at liberty to reject them.

But is this the proper sphere, in which common sense should act? Is it not true, that common sense is limited to judging of the evidences, that the Bible is of divine origin and authority; to establishing the rules of exegesis common to all languages and books ; and finally, to directing a fair and impartial application of those rules, to determine what the original writer of any portion of the Scriptures designed to inculcate? Having once admitted, as you have, the divine authority of the Scripture in deciding all questions; and your obligation to submit to its decision when you can understand the meaning of it, by using the common rules of interpretation; how is it to be determined by common sense, whether Christ has two natures or one? Common sense may investigate the language of the inspired writers, and inquire what they have said; and if, by the sound rules of interpretation, it should appear that they have ascribed two natures to Christ; or asserted that which unavoidably leads to the conclusion that he has two natures; then, either it is to be believed, or the authority of the writers is to be cast off. In rejecting any doctrine, which the language of Scripture plainly teaches, common sense must cast off the divine authority of the Bible. To receive the Bible as a revelation from God, and yet to decide, a priori, what the Scriptures can, and what they cannot contain, and to make their language bend, until it conform with this decision, cannot surely be a proper part, for a sincere lover of truth and sober investigation.

In saying then, that the doctrine which teaches that Christ has two natures, is "repugnant to common sense," I presume you must mean, that the rules of exegesis, applied by common sense, lead unavoidably to the conclu sion that Christ has but one nature. If this be your meaning, what I have to say in reply, will be contained in my next letter.

In regard to the impossibility that Christ should possess two natures, and the absurdity of such a supposition, I have not much to say. If the Scriptures are the word of

God, and do contain the doctrine in question, it is neither impossible, nor absurd. Most certainly, if it be a fact that Christ possesses two natures, it is a fact with which natu ral religion has no concern; at least of which it has no knowledge. It can therefore decide neither for, nor against it: It is purely a doctrine of Revelation; and to Scripture only can we look for evidences of it. If the doctrine be palpably absurd, and contradictory to reason, and yet it is found in the Bible; then reject the claims of the Bible to inspiration and truth. But if the laws of interpretation do not permit us to avoid the conclusion, that it is found there; we cannot, with any consistency, admit that the Scriptures are of divine authority, and yet reject the doctrine.

How shall any man decide, a priori, that the doctrine cannot be true? Can we limit the omniscient and omnipotent God, by saying that the Son cannot be so united with human nature, so "become flesh and dwell among us," that we recognize and distinguish, in this complex being, but one person, and therefore speak of but one? If you ask me how such a union can be effected, between natures so infinitely diverse as the divine and human ; I answer, (as in the case of the distinction in the Godhead,) I do not know how this is done; I do not undertake to define wherein that union consists, nor how it is effected. God cannot divest himself of his essential perfections, i. e. he is immutably perfect; nor could the human nature of Christ have continued to be human nature, if it had ceased to be subject to the infirmities, and sorrows, and affections of this nature, while he dwelt among men. In whatever way, then, the union of the two natures was effected, it neither destroyed, nor essentially changed either the divine or human nature.

Hence, at one time, Christ is represented as the Creator of the Universe; and at another, as a man of sorrows, and of imperfect knowledge. (John i. 1-18. Heb. i. 10—12. Luke xxii. 44. 45. ii. 52.) If both of these accounts are true, he must, as it seems to me, be God omniscient and omnipotent; and still a feeble man and of imperfect knowledge. It is indeed impossible to reconcile these two things, without the supposition of two natures. The simple question then is; Can they be joined or united, so that in speaking of them, we may say the person is God or man; or we may call him by one single name, and by this understand, as

designated, either or both of these natures? On this subject, the religion of nature says nothing. Reason has nothing to say; for surely no finite being is competent to decide, that the junction of the two natures is impossible or absurd. One person, in the sense in which each of us is one, Christ could not be. If you make God the soul, and Jesus of Nazareth the body of Christ; then you take away his human nature, and deny the imperfection of his knowledge. But may not God have been, in a manner altogether peculiar and mysterious, united to Jesus, without displaying at once his whole power in him, or necessarily rendering him supremely perfect? In the act of creation, God does not put forth all his power; nor in preservation; nor in sanctification; nor does he bring all his knowledge into action, when he inspires prophets and apostles. Was it necessary that he should exert it all, when in conjunction with the human nature of Christ? In governing the world from day to day, God does not surely exhaust his omnipotence, or his wisdom. He employs only so much, as is necessary to accomplish the design which he has in view. In his union with Jesus of Nazareth, the divine Logos could not, of course, be necessitated at once to put forth all his energy, or exhibit all his knowledge and wisdom. Just so much of it, and no more was manifested, as was requisite to constitute the character of an all-sufficient, incarnate Mediator and Redeemer. When necessary, power and authority infinitely above human were displayed; when otherwise, the human nature sympathized and suffered, like that of other men.

Is this impossible for God? Is there any thing in such a doctrine, which, if found in the Bible, would afford an adequate reason for rejecting its claims to inspiration? For my own part, I cannot see the impossibility, or the absurdity of such a thing. How shall we limit the Deity, as to the ways in which he is to reveal himself to his creatures?

Can we not find mystery within ourselves, which is as inexplicable, as any thing in the doctrine before us? We do not appropriate the affections of our minds, to our bodies; nor those of our bodies, to our minds. Each class of affections is separate and distinct. Yet we refer either, to the whole man. Abraham was mortal; Abraham was immortal; are both equally true. He had a mortal and an immotal part; yet both made but one person. How is it a greater