truth with admitted particular facts. In this manner Socrates exercised the vocation which he believed had been indicated for him by the Delphic god, when, in reply to Chaerephon, the oracle declared that Socrates was the wisest of men-the vocation, namely, of examining men (¿žéraois, Plat., Apol., p. 20 seq.). He devoted his life especially to the education of youth. For the accomplishment of this end he relied on the aid of έpws, love, which, without excluding its sensuous element, he refined and utilized as an instrument in the conduct of souls and the common development of his thoughts and those of his listeners.

The fundamental thought in the political doctrine of Socrates is that authority properly belongs to the intelligent (¿ñɩoráμɛvoc), to him who possesses knowledge (Xenoph., Memorab., III. 9. 10; cf. III. 6. 14). The good ruler must be, as it were, a shepherd to those whom he rules (the Tou hav, of Homer). His business, his "virtue," is to make them happy (rò evdaíμovaç ñoiïv iv åv ýyÿraι, Mem., III. 2. 4; cf. I. 2. 32). Socrates found fault with the appointment of officers by popular suffrage and by lot (Mem., I. 2. 9; III. 9. 10).

The peculiar philosophical significance of Socrates lies in his logically rigorous reflection upon moral questions, his combination of the spirit of research with that of doubt, and his dialectical method of demolishing seeming and conducting to true knowledge. But since reflection, from its very nature, is occupied with the universal, while action in every specific case relates only to the particular, it is necessary for the existence of practical ability that the habit of reflection should be accompanied by a certain practical insight or tact, which also involves moral tact, although not exclusively, nor even mainly, confined to the latter. This tact respects chiefly the favorable or unfavorable result to be expected from a given action or course of action. Socrates recognized reflection as man's peculiar work; but that immediate conviction of the suitableness or unsuitableness of certain actions, of whose origin he was not conscious, but which he recognized as a sign pointing him to the right way, he piously ascribed, without subjecting it to psychological analysis, to divine agency. This divine leading is that which he designates as his dauóviov. In the Apology of Plato (p. 31 d), Socrates says: "The reason of my remaining apart from public life is ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καί δαιμόνιον γίγνεται,” and he goes on to explain that from his youth up he had been ever cognizant of a voice, which only warned, but never encouraged him. This voice he terms, in the Phaedrus, "his demonic and familiar sign" (rò dauóvióv Te Kai tò eiwlòs onμeiov). According to Xen., Memor., IV. 8. 5, this dauóvov interposed its warning when he was about to reflect on the defense he should make before his judges, i. e., his practical tact showed him that it was worthier of him and better for his cause, that he should give himself exclusively over to the solemn inspiration of the moment, than by rhetorical preparation to prejudice his hopes of such inspiration. Less exact is the occasional statement of Xenophon, that Socrates was shown by the dauóviov "what things he ought to do and what not” (å тe xpǹ πoliv kaì â μý, Mem., I. 4. 15; IV. 3. 12). The power from which this voice emanated is designated as "the God” (¿ Oɛóç, Mem., IV. 8. 6), or "the Gods" (oi Oxoí, Mem., I. 4. 15; IV. 3. 12), the same Gods who also speak to men by the oracles.

Socrates defends the belief in the existence of gods on teleological grounds, arguing from the structure of organized beings, whose parts are subservient to the wants of the whole, and founding his reasoning on the general principle, that whatever exists for a use must be the work of intelligence (πρέπει μὲν τὰ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ γιγνόμενα γνώμης έργα είναι. Memor., I. 4. 4 seq.; IV. 3. 3 seq.). The Wisdom (ppóvnouc), says Socrates, which is present and rules in all that exists, determines all things according to its good pleasure. It is distinguished from the other gods as the ruler and disposer of the universe (ó ròv dhov

KÓσμον σVVTáTTWV TE Kal ovvέxwv). The gods, like the human soul, are invisible, but make known their existence unmistakably by their operations (Memor., IV. 3. 13).

Aristophanes, in the "Clouds" (which were first represented in 423 B. C.), attributes to Socrates not only traits of character and doctrines which really belonged to him, but also Anaxagorean doctrines and Sophistic tendencies. The ground of the possibility of this misapprehension (or, if the expression is preferred, of this poetical license) is to be found, on the part of Socrates, not only in the fact that he stood, as a philosopher, in a certain antagonism to the general popular consciousness, and that the Anaxagorean theology had not remained without a considerable influence upon him, but more especially in the fact that, as a philosopher whose reflection was directed to the subjective processes and phenomena, and who made action dependent on such reflection, he moved in the same general sphere with the Sophists, being specifically differentiated from them only by the peculiar direction or kind of his philosophizing. On the part of Aristophanes, it is to be found in the fact that he, as a poet and not a philosopher, and (so far as he is in earnest in his representations) as an anti-Sophistical moralist and patriotic citizen of the old school, with his conviction of the immorality and dangerousness of all philosophy, scarcely considered the significance of specific differences among philosophers as worthy of his attention, not to say, was unable to appreciate their essential importance.

The same opinion respecting Socrates which we find in Aristophanes, seems also to have been entertained by his accusers. Meletus is described in Plato's Euthyphron (p. 2 b) as a young man, little known, and personally almost a stranger to Socrates. In the Platonic Apologia it is said of him that he joined in the accusation because he felt himself injured by Socrates' demonstration of the ignorance of poets respecting the nature of their art (vèp Tüv πointāv åx¤óμevos, Apol., p. 23 e). Perhaps he was a son of the poet Meletus, whom Aristophanes mentions in the "Frogs" (v. 1302). Anytus, a rich leather-dealer, was an influential demagogue, who had fled from Athens during the rule of the Thirty, and had returned fighting on the side of Thrasybulus; Socrates says in the Apologia (p. 23 e) that he joined in the accusation as a representative of the tradesmen and politicians (vπèp TWV Snμovpyāv kaì tāv toĥitikāv åxÕóμɛvos), and in the Meno (p. 94 e) it is intimated that he was displeased with the depreciatory judgment of Socrates respecting the Athenian statesmen. According to the Apology of Pseudo-Xenophon (29 seq.), he was angry with Socrates because the latter thought his son fitted for something better than the leather business, and had counseled him to educate this son for something higher. Lycon felt injured by what Socrates had said of the orators (inèp tùv pytópwv, Apol., 23 e). The accusation ran as follows (Apol., p. 24; Xen., Mem., I. 1; Favorinus, ap. Diog. L., II. 40): Táde ἐγράψατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεὺς Σωκράτει Σωφρονίσκου ̓Αλωπεκῆθεν· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὓς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἕτερα δὲ καινὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος, ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα· θάνατος. The ordinary objections against all philosophers were directed against Socrates, without any special investigation of the peculiar tendency or aim of his teachings (Apol., 23 d). The particular charges which Xenophon (I. ch. 2.) cites and labors to refute, appear (as Cobet, Novae Lectiones, Leyden, 1858, p. 662 seq., seeks to demonstrate-yet cf. Büchsenschütz, in the Philologus, XXII., p. 691 seq.) to have been taken, not from the speeches of the accusers, but from a work by Polycrates, the rhetorician, written after the death of Socrates, in justification of the sentence. The conduct of Socrates is described by Plato with historic fidelity in the essential outlines, in the Apol., in Crito, and in the first and last parts of the Phaedo. The Parrhesia of Socrates appeared to his judges as presumptuousness. His philosophical reflection seemed to them a violation of those ethical and religious foundations of the Athenian state, which the restored democracy were endeavoring to re-establish. The former intimacy of Socrate

with Alcibiades, and especially with the hated aristocrat, Critias (cf. Eschines, Adv. Timarch., § 71), led to a mistrust of his doctrines and purposes. Nevertheless, the condemnation was voted by only a small majority of voices; according to Apol., p. 36 a, he would have been acquitted if only three, or, according to another reading, thirty of the judges had been of a different mind; so that of the probably 500 or 501 judges, either 253 or 280 must have voted for his condemnation, and 247-248 or 220-221 for his acquittal. But since, after the condemnation, he would not acknowledge himself guilty by expressing an opinion as to the punishment he should receive, but declared himself worthy, on the contrary, of being fed at the Prytaneum as a benefactor of the state, and at last only on the persuasion of his friends agreed to a fine of thirty minæ, he was (according to Diog. L., II. 42) condemned to death by a majority increased by eighty votes. The execution of the sentence had to be delayed thirty days, until the return of the sacred ship, which had been sent only the day before the condemnation with an embassy to Delos. Socrates scorned as unlawful the means of escape which Crito had prepared for him. He drank the cup of poison in his prison, surrounded by his disciples and friends, with perfect steadfastness and tranquillity of soul, full of assurance that the death which was to attest his fidelity to his convictions would be most advantageous for him and for his work.

The Athenians are reported soon afterward to have regretted their sentence. Yet a more general revulsion of opinion in favor of Socrates seems first to have taken place in consequence of the labors of his scholars. That the accusers were, some exiled, some put to death, as later writers relate (Diodorus, XIV. 37; Plut., De Invid., c. 6; Diog. L., II. 43, VI. 9 seq., and others) is probably only a fable, which was apparently founded on the fact that Anytus (banished, perhaps, for political reasons) died, not in Athens, but in Heraclea on the Pontus, where in later centuries his tomb was still pointed out.

§ 34. In the Socratic principle of knowledge and virtue, the problem for the successors of Socrates was indicated beforehand. That problem was the development of the philosophical disciplines termed dialectic and ethics. Of his immediate disciples (so far as they were of philosophical significance) the larger number, as "partial disciples of Socrates," turned their attention predominantly to the one or the other part of this double problem; the Megaric or Eristic school of Euclid and the Elian school of Phædo occupying themselves almost exclusively with dialectical investigations, and the Cynic school of Antisthenes and the Hedonic or Cyrenaic school of Aristippus treating, in different senses, principally of ethical questions. In each of these schools, at the same time, some one of the various types of preSocratic philosophy was continued and expanded. It was Plato, however, who first combined and developed into the unity of a comprehensive system the different sides of the Socratic spirit, as well as all the legitimate elements of earlier systems.

K. F. Hermann, Die philosophische Stellung der älteren Sokratiker und ihrer Schulen, in his Ges. Abhandlungen, Göttingen, 1849, pp. 227-255.

On Eschines, cf. K. F. Hermann, De Aeschinis Socratici reliquiis disp. acad., Gött. 1850.

On Xenophon, cf. A. Boeckh, De simultate, quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercuisse fertur, Berlin, 1811; Niebuhr, Kl. Schriften, I., p. 467 seq.; F. Delbrück, Xenophon, Bonn, 1829; Hirschig, De disciplinas

Socraticae in vitam et mores antiquorum vi et efficacitate, in Xenophontis decem mille Graecos ex Asia salvos in patriam reducentis exemplo manifesta, în: Symbolae litt., III, Amsterdam, 1889; J. D. van Hoëvell, De Xenophontis philosophia, Groning. 1840; J. H. Lindemann, Die Lebensansicht des Xen., Conitz, 1843; Die rel-sittl. Weltansschauung des Herodot, Thucydides und Xenophon, Berlin, 1852; P. Werner, Xenoph. de rebus publ. sentent., Breslau, 1851; Engel, X. polit. Stellung und Wirksamkeit, Stargard, 1853; A. Garnier, Histoire de la Morale: Xenophon, Paris, 1857.

Cf. also the articles by A. Hug, Philol., VIL, 1852, pp. 638-695; and K. F. Hermann, Philol., VIII, 337 seq.; and the opuscule of Georg Ferd. Rettig, Univ.-Pr., Berne, 1864, on the mutual relation of the Xenophontic and Platonic Symposia, and Arn. Hug's Die Unechtheit der dem Xenophon zugeschriebenen Apologie des Socrates, in Herm. Kōchly's Akad. Vortr. u. Reden, Zurich, 1859, pp. 430-439. See also H. Henkel, Xenophon und Isocrates (Progr.), Salzwedel, 1866 (cf. P. Sanneg, De Schola Isocratea, diss., Halle, 1867); and A. Nicolai, Xenophon's Cyropädie und seine Ansicht vom Staat (Progr.), Bernburg, 1867.

Xenophon, who was born about 444 B. C. (according to Cobet, 430), died about 354 B. C., and belongs to the older disciples of Socrates. His Cyropaedia is a philosophical and political novel, illustrating the fundamental Socratic principle that authority is the prerogative of the intelligent, who alone are qualified to wield it; but it is to be confessed that the "intelligent" man, as depicted by Xenophon, is, as Erasmus justly says (cf. Hildebrand, Gesch. u. Syst. d. Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, I. p. 249), "rather a prudent and skillfully calculating politician than a truly wise and just ruler." Xenophon and Eschines are scarcely to be reckoned among the representatives of any special philosophical type or school. They belong rather to the class of men who, following Socrates with sincere veneration, strove, through intercourse with him, to attain to whatever was beautiful and good (kahoκαγαθία). Others, as, notably, Critias and Alcibiades, sought by association with Socrates to enlarge the range of their intelligence, yet without bringing themselves permanently under his moral influence. Few out of the great number of the companions of Socrates proposed to themselves as a life-work the development of his philosophical ideas.

The expression "partial disciples of Socrates," is not to be understood as implying that the men so named had only reproduced certain sides of the Socratic philosophy. On the contrary, they expanded the doctrines of their master, each in a definite province of philosophy and in a specific direction, and even their renewal of earlier philosophemes may be described rather as a self-appropriating elaboration of the same than as a mere combination of them with Socratic doctrines. In like relation stands Plato to the entire body of Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy. While Cicero's affirmation is true of the other companions of Socrates (De Orat., III. 16, 61): "ex illius (Socratis) variis et diversis et in · omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehendit," Plato combined the various elements, the, so to speak, prismatically broken rays of the Socratic spirit in a new, higher, and richer unity.

§ 35. Euclid of Megara united the ethical principle of Socrates with the Eleatic theory of the One, to which alone true being could be ascribed. He teaches: The good is one, although called by many names, as intelligence, God, reason. The opposite of the good is without being. The good remains ever immutable and like itself. The supposition that Euclid, without detracting from the unity of the good or the truly existent, nor from the unity of virtue, also assumed a multiplicity of unchangeable essences, is very improbable. The method of demonstration employed by Euclid was, like that of Zeno, the indirect. The most noted of the followers of Euclid were Eubu

lides the Milesian, and Alexinus-celebrated for the invention of the sophistical arguments known as the Liar, the Concealed, the Measure of Grain, the Horned Man, the Bald-head; Diodorus Cronus-known as the author of new arguments against motion, and of the assertion that only the necessary is real and only the real is possible; and the disciple of Diodorus, Philo, the dialectician (a friend of Zeno of Cittium). Stilpo of Megara combined the Megaric philosophy with the Cynic. He argued against the doctrine of ideas. The dialectical doctrine, that nothing can be predicated except of itself, and the ethical doctrine, that the wise man is superior to pain, are ascribed to him.

On the Megarians, cf. Georg Ludw. Spalding, Vindiciae philos. Megaricorum, Berlin, 1798; Ferd. Deycks, De Megaricorum doctrina, Bonn, 1827; Heinr. Ritter, Bemerkungen über die Philos. der Megarischen Schule, in the Rhein. Mus. f. Philol., II. 1828, p. 295 seq.; Henne, Ecole de Mégare, París, 1843; Mallet, Histoire de l'école de Mégare et des écoles d'Elis et d'Eretrie, Paris, 1845; Hartenstein, Ueber die Bedeutung der Megarischen Schule für die Geschichte der metaphysischen Probleme, in the Verhandl. der sächs. Gesellsch. der Wiss., 1848, p. 190 seq.; Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, I. p. 33 seq.

Of Euclid the Megarian (who must not be confounded with the Alexandrian mathematician, who lived a century later) it is related (Gell., Noct. Att., VI. 10) that, at the time when the Athenians had forbidden the Megarians, under penalty of death, to enter their city, he often ventured, for the sake of intercourse with Socrates, under cover of evening to come to Athens. Since this interdict was issued in Olymp. 87.1, Euclid must have been one of the earliest disciples of Socrates, if this story is historical. He was present at the death of Socrates (Phaedo, p. 59 c), and the greater part of the companions of Socrates are reported to have gone to him at Megara soon afterward, perhaps in order that they too might not fall victims to the hatred of the democratic rulers in Athens against philosophy (Diog. L., II. 106; III. 6). Euclid appears to have lived and to have remained at the head of the school founded by him, during several decades after the death of Socrates. Early made familiar with the Eleatic philosophy, he modified the same, under the influence of the Socratic ethics, making the One identical with the good. The school of Euclid is treated of by Diog. Laërt., in his Vitae Philos., II. 108 seq.

The author of the dialogue Sophistes mentions (p. 246 b, seq.) a doctrine, according to which the sphere of true being was made up of a multiplicity of immaterial, absolutely unchangeable forms (ɛidŋ), accessible only to thought. Many modern investigators (in particular Schleiermacher, Ast, Deycks, Brandis, K. F. Hermann, Zeller, Prantl, and others) refer this doctrine to the Megarians; others (especially Ritten as above cited, Petersen, in the Zeitschrift für Alterthumswiss, 1856, p. 892, and Mallet, ibid. XXXIV.) dispute this. In defense of the latter position may be urged the inconsequence which the doctrine would imply on the part of Euclid, if ascribed to him, and also the testimony of Aristotle (Metaph., I. 6 seq.; XIII. 4), according to which Plato must be regarded as the proper author of the theory of ideas, whence it results that this theory can not have been professed by Euclid under any form. The passage in the Sophistes must, in case Plato was the author of that dialogue, be interpreted as representing the opinion of partial Platonists (cf. my Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge Platonischer Schriften, Vienna, 1861, p. 277 seq.). But since the dialogue (as Schaarschmidt has shown, cf. Ueberweg in Bergmann's Philos. Mon., III. p. 479) was probably composed by some Platonist, who modified the doctrine of

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