JOHN LOCKE

(1632-1704)

T IS impossible to overestimate the extent of the influence which ideas defined by John Locke have exerted on the civilization of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. No American of our colonial period had more to do than he did with forcing the revolution which separated the North American colonies from England and created the United States. During the Middle Ages the Schoolmen and others who were left unnoticed by their sovereigns as learned triflers discussed, with all the niceties of scholastic method, the question of whether or not one man has ever really derived from heaven the right to render its decrees for the control of others, without their consent and against their will. All the arguments which slowly accumulated on the negative side of this question Locke mastered and co-ordinated, advancing beyond his predecessors with the confidence which belonged only to the highest genius. His treatise "Of Civil Government" and his "Letters concerning Toleration" bore their ripe fruit in the American Declaration of Independence, the constitution of the United States, and the gradual cessation of "religious" persecutions, through the use of the political machinery of the State. The worst and the almost only reproach against Locke is that when he attempted to draw a Constitution which would make his ideas practical, he was absurdly inconsistent with his own high ideals. But nothing less was to have been expected. The men who drafted and adopted the Constitution of the United States were consciously or unconsciously moved by the same ideals, but their collective wisdom in what is rightly pronounced the greatest success of its kind in history did not free it from inconsistencies so gross that radical differences of interpretation due to them resulted in the bloodiest civil war of modern times. It is not desirable to attempt to vindicate Locke against any charge of inconsistency, crudity, or absurdity which may be reasonably based on isolated facts of his life and writings. There is scarcely a page in the greatest work of Bacon which does not present similar contrasts. Every genius of the highest order becomes so by virtue of triumphing once or twice only over the iron laws of tradition and environment which govern his generation. In most things he must belong to his generation, or he could not exist in it. In a few things which con

stitute his governing idea and are the result of the Titanic triumph of individuality in its struggle with the governing mind and impulses of the mass, he belongs to the whole past and future of the human race. This itself is an inconsistency; but only in the measure in which it exists and appears does genius exist as the governing influence in the life and work of any man. Locke's great genius showed itself most effectively and usefully in his assertion of fundamental political principles, but it is in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding" that he develops his greatest power of connected thought. It occasioned one of the most protracted controversies in the history of modern philosophy, a controversy concerning which it needs only to be said here that in declaring "sensation" to be the "great source of most of the ideas we have," Locke stops with the "understanding" as a mode of interpreting facts. With the faith "which is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen," he does not deal as a part of the understanding. Whatever may be the shortcomings of his philosophy, he has written, without doubt, in a single sentence, more than the majority of philosophers succeed in putting in a volume. That sentence, "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished ?" is one of the most celebrated and the most pregnant in the history of thought. Locke was born in Somerset, England, August 29th, 1632. His father was a lawyer who had been a captain in the Parliamentary army during the civil wars; so that Locke came in his youth directly under the control of the same influences which had educated Pym and Hampden. He completed his scholastic education at Christ's Church, Oxford, in 1656, and for some time afterwards continued to reside at the University as a lecturer on Greek and Rhetoric. He studied medicine, but did not take a degree, though when he entered the family of the Earl of Shaftesbury he served as family physician, as well as the Earl's confidential agent. It was through this connection that Locke made his celebrated failure as a constitution maker. His patron, being at that time one of the "proprietors" of the Carolinas, induced him to attempt to have a model government for the colony. After the fall of Shaftesbury, Locke was compelled to go into exile, and he lived abroad, chiefly in Holland, until 1688, when he returned to England as the favorite of William of Orange, who wished to promote him to high rank in the diplomatic service. Locke declined, however, and became Commissioner of Appeals,- a modest office with light duties, which enabled him to pursue his studies. The Essay concerning Human Understanding" appeared in 1690, Locke receiving £30 for the copyright. Professor Fraser recalls the fact that this is almost exactly the sum that Kant received for his "Critique of Pure Reason," the only

philosophical work written since Locke's "Essay," which is generally admitted to belong to the same class with it. Locke's health began to fail in 1690, but, in spite of asthma and other infirmities, he continued to write vigorously until 1700, when his accumulating weaknesses checked, but did not suppress, his activity. His last years were spent in the study of the Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul. He began his fourth letter on "Toleration» in 1704 and on the twentyeighth of October in that year, leaving his work in the middle of a sentence, he declared himself "in perfect charity with all men" and died. He is buried in the parish church of High Laver in a tomb which attracts few visitors, but his mind is omnipresent as a part of the "perfect charity with all men," which, as it imperfectly governs the lives of individuals and enables them to tolerate each other, constitutes the world's civilization.

W. V. B.

I'

"OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT»- ITS PURPOSES

F MAN in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom? Why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasions of others. For all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name, Property.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.

Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all contro

versies between them.

For though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Secondly, in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state, being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.

Thirdly, in the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offend will seldom fail, where they are able by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniences that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others makes them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing, to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature, by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are of one community make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and

viciousness of degenerate men there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

The first power, viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature.

Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences, from the labor, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength, he has to part also with as much as his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty, and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend further than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people,