CHAPTER II.

FACTS.

SINCE Inductive Logic is the science of the Discovery of Facts, it is necessary to consider at the outset what is meant by a fact. The human mind finds itself in a universe of phenomena. Through the senses it has perceptions of an external world, and through consciousness it knows its own modifications. Through these channels alone can the mind advance in knowledge of realities. Whatever has real existence is a fact. It may be a substance, an energy, a quality, an action, a state, or only some relation of substances, energies, qualities, actions, or states, but if it be perceived by the mind it is a fact. A dragon is not a fact, because it is not perceived; but the notion of a dragon is a fact, for that is an action of the mind of which I am conscious. The sun is a fact, the continent of America is a fact; the yellow color of gold, the attraction of a magnet, the likeness of two peas, are facts.

For the purposes of induction, facts may be classified as substantive facts and facts of relation. A substantive fact is a phenomenon considered apart, as independently existing. The yellowness of gold, the weight of gold, the malleability of gold, are substantive facts. A fact of relation connects in some way two substantive facts. That malleability and yellowness coexist in gold is a fact of relation.

Facts of relation are of three kinds: Facts of Resemblance, Facts of Coexistence, and Facts of Causation. Facts of Succession are often named among the ultimate kinds, but, as we shall see later, they are dependent upon simpler facts of causation.

One of the first lessons received by a child when it begins, as we say, to notice, is that there are many things in the world which resemble one another. Often the resemblance is so complete that the several phenomena seem but repetitions of the same thing. Thus from the observation of individual facts we pass through the perception of resemblances to the formation of a general concept. Common nouns are but the names of indefinite numbers of facts that resemble one another. The possibility of language arises from the constant repetition of similar things for which the same words will do.

It is also observed that there are certain more or less constant groups of substantive facts. We repeatedly find yellowness, sweetness, roundness, etc., coexisting; and to this assemblage of phenomena we give the name orange. We find yellowness, malleability, specific gravity 19.32, etc., coexisting, and we call this group of coexistences gold.

It is observed that when certain substantive facts or groups of substantive facts are in a certain collocation, a reaction occurs between them and that this is often attended by a change in one or more of the facts or groups. The relation between facts or groups of facts and their reactions, as well as the relation between any fact or group of facts and itself in a new form, is called Causation.

Further it is observed that certain substantive facts appear in succession; thus, after a ball is struck, we see it move; after a bell is swung, we hear a sound; after we touch fire, a smart follows. The relation by which an antecedent fact is linked to a consequent one we call Succession. Careful attention to the facts of succession is a large part of the work of science, since it is in most cases impossible to bring immediately into existence the phenomena which we desire; we produce them indirectly by producing their antecedents.

We do not know why certain simple facts coexist or why certain phenomena resemble each other or why certain things react as they do. These are ultimate facts of the Universe. There is no law of thought necessitating them; consequently they belong wholly to the domain of Induction. That the most refrangible rays of light have a violet color, and that the least refrangible rays have a red color, are facts for which no one expects ever to know a reason. Science makes no progress in this direction.

CHAPTER III.

OBSERVATION.

THE first step in the discovery of facts is always Observation. In order to know what is passing in our own minds or in the external world, we must give attention. Each act of attention is called an Observation. To quote the words of Bacon: "Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything." 1 The five senses report to the mind the world of matter and force; consciousness interprets to the thinking subject his own activities. Perception and consciousness supply the materials out of which the structure of Inductive Science is built up. But thought can build nothing without the use of those primary facts and necessary truths which are known by intuition without the process of discovery. There is nothing peculiar in any process of inference in inductive investigation; for by the nature of the mind there can be but one mode of inference, namely that of deduction. The element of observation is the essential characteristic of Induction. Any syllogism is inductive in which one of the premises formulates the observation of some fact. The great work of Bacon was just this, that he with singular

1 Works, vol. viii, p. 67.

clearness, persuasiveness, and charm of language called mankind to patient observation of Nature.

A distinction is sometimes made between Observation and Experiment. Dr. Fowler says:

"To observe is to watch with attention phenomena as they occur; to experiment (or, to adopt more ordinary language, to perform an experiment) is not only to observe, but also to place the phenomena under peculiar circumstances, as a preliminary to observation. Thus every experiment implies an observation, but it also implies something more. In an experiment, I arrange or create the circumstances under which I wish to make my observation. Thus, if two bodies are falling to the ground, and I attend to the phenomenon, I am said to observe it, but if I place the bodies under the exhausted receiver of an air-pump, or cause them to be dropped under any special circumstances whatever, I may be said not only to make an observation, but also to perform an experiment. Bacon has not inaptly compared experiment with the torture of witnesses. Mr. Mill distinguishes between the two processes, by saying that in observation we find our instance in nature, in experiment we make it, by an artificial arrangement of circumstances."1

All this is very clear: indeed, it is so clear that one is surprised that the discussion of experiments did not come up in connection with a classification of instances, as natural and artificial. The fact that we can make instances artificially is of great importance in the progress of science; but it is not properly the basis of any distinction regarding the act of observation, which is always the same whatever the origin of the instance. There is no more contrast between an observation and an artificial instance than there is between an observation and a natural instance. Nor is the difference

1 Inductive Logic, p. 40.