could be desired; he told Goeroe Bangkol of the letter written by Djilantik and warned him of the danger he ran if Datoe Pangeran risked conniving at assistance from Bali. Goeroe Bangkol solemnly declared that he would never have anything to do with the Balinese and all the other chiefs gave repeated assurances of their friendliness and gratitude to our government; Liefrinck was able to return on the 16th November with satisfactory information.

Owing to the successful issue of the war we shall never know in how far the disquieting rumours were really true or not; but we are safe in saying: "there is never smoke without fire!" And it is a noteworthy fact that no more disturbing news was received after Liefrinck's mission and we have no hesitation in stating that the timely measure of the Commander-in-chief, combined with the tact of his envoy, saved us from very imminent peril.

In another and more literal sense the atmosphere was clearer, for the rains and storms of the latter part of October and the beginning of November were only temporary and fortunately the actual rainy season did not set in until some weeks later; everyone's courage revived and with renewed strength the operations were continued and carried through to a triumphant termination.

To achieve this happy result more troops were needed. For within the strong walls of Tjakra Nagara the Balinese had concentrated all their remaining forces and no sacrifice would be spared in the defence of their last stronghold, abundantly supplied with ammunition and weapons. The peculiar structure of the place with its numerous houses encircled by high walls and forming as it were so many fortified posts was well adapted to call forth all our energies; every attacking division would need to be covered in flank and rear by strong detachments, thus lessening the number of combatants as they advanced towards the point to be attacked, and for this purpose there were but 3 battalions available, so an additional reinforcement of 2 battalions of infantry was considered necessary and fortunately the Government shared the opinion of the Commander-in-chief, and telegraphed that when the time came when he actually required further help, it would be sent him without delay. On the 7th November General Vetter sent the telegram and on the 10th the order was issued...

Before it could be deemed safe to direct operations exclusively against Tjakra it was imperative to drive away the Balinese in occupation of the North-East of Mataram still in communication with Tjakra and forming an observation corps as it were in our midst and ready to take the offensive at the proper time.

The day on which the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed for his reinforcements General Segov started at 4.30 a. m. with two battalions, the 6th and the 7th, two sections of mountain artillery, two sections of engineers, the necessary train and some cavalry in order to clear the kampong of Mondjok of the enemy, lay it waste and, if considered expedient, construct a fort there.

About 7 a. m. two companies of the 6th and two of the 7th battalion were in the front line in the North East of Mataram; each company had a section thrown out as skirmishers, and was supported by the second. The first line was followed at a short distance by a second composed of one company of each battalion. The whole movement was covered by one reserve company behind each battalion and the artillery was temporarily divided amongst them.

The advance proceeded slowly, all obstacles were cleared away with spades, hatchets and pick-axes; half an hour later the company of the left wing (7th battalion) saw some armed Balinese, probably advanced outposts, taking flight. This retreat was immediately followed by a vigorous beating of the tom-toms at Moudjok, whereupon firing began, proceeding chiefly from the trees and was replied to by a few rounds from the artillery; the Balinese who fortunately for us shot very badly on this occasion-not one of our troops was hit-fled at the end of a quarter of an hour. Moudjok was soon occupied and the adjoining kampong of Bangkal Tjoelik offered no resistance whatever; on the contrary several Sassaks advanced with white flags and the Netherlands colours.

The right wing (6th battalion) was not long in pushing the enemy out of the kampong of Taman-Radja, they having fled to the front of Tjakra, which was immediately placed under fire.

Meanwhile the work of devastation was being proceeded with, walls were laid low and trees were chopped down; many weapons were found here and a quantity of things were recovered that had belonged to the 7th battalion, formerly stationed near here. As the work was pushed forward it became evident there was no suitable place for a fortified post, besides which there appeared no need for one.

The troops return; Mataram was entirely vacated by the enemy and with the exception of Moudjok, completely laid waste. But what a terrible task it was and how many thousands of hands worked at it for weeks together!

Was this complete destruction-and the same applies to Pagasangan and Pasinggahan-necessary or of any use? Was it necessary from a military point of view? We read in the official report that already on the 10th October, Mataram was in so far destroyed as to render re-occupation by the enemy impossible; how is it then that a whole month later it was considered unsafe to besiege Tjakra? Surely we cannot put down this wholesale destruction to a spirit of revenge. It is natural that at the beginning there was a strong desire to atone for the first disaster, but weeks afterwards more dispassionate reasoning ought to have prevailed; but we are convinced that mere anger and vengeance cannot have been the guiding motives of the Commander-in-chief.

In our opinion it would have been desirable to confine the work of dismantlement within the narrowest limits compatible with safety:

10. in our own immediate interests to save the strength and health of the troops; and in order to pursue and terminate the operations as soon as possible before the approaching west monsoon;

20. in our future interests, which demanded the overthrow of our enemy in the least possible space of time, and having forced them to accept our rule, to restore them to their ordinary mode of life and contribute to their welfare. A prosperous people loves peace, is more inclined to order and quiet and is the easiest to govern.

Self-interest and humanity ought to have prevailed.

How many treasures of Balinese art have thus been lost to us!

On the 11th November the iron bridge across the river Djangkok was ready; and to facilitate the transport a beginning was made on the same day with the Decauville railway from Ampenan to Mataram through Kapitan. Our line of communication from the basis of operations (Ampenan) to Pagasangan East being perfectly safe, work of dismantling our post at Pagasangan West was begun also on this day.

On the 14th November General Segov, to whom Captain Willemstijn was attached as Chief of the staff, with a column consisting of the 7th battalion, 100 men of the naval brigade, one section of mountain artillery and 20 cavalry, marched through Kaleh to Pagasangan East, hence in a Southerly direction past the outlying post No. III across the wet sawah to the North frontier of Pagoetan, where they took up position with the object of lending moral support to the Sassaks, continually harassed from Abean Toeboek and by wandering Balinese, and also with the hope of inciting them to more energetic resistance against the latter. After a short time and without having perceived anything of the enemy they set out on the return march at a quarter past ten. These days were busy ones, spent in general improvements; the Decauville line was pushed rapidly forward and the accommodation for both officers and men at Kapitan was being worked at; stables were also put up for the artillery horses, a large quantities of sand was brought up from the beach to repair the roads and a large supply of provisions. was laid in. Stores and ammunition were transported daily to the posts and batteries, which needed to be well equipped for the coming action.

On the 16th and 17th November, the two days previous to the actual assault, a heavy bombardment, of 60 to 80 rounds per gun, was to be directed against Tjakra by all the batteries.

The main object of attack was of course the poeri; but each battery was given a special objective. The three 12 cm. howitzers and the one 12 cm. and a gun at Pagasangan East were to direct their fire against the South of Tjakra, viz., Panaraga and Abean Toeboek. The 7 cm. gun at Karang-Bedil against Socita and the East of Tjakra, about 4000 yards distant; the three 12 cm. guns of this post were to fire at Toh-pati (North Tjakra) and also to put the west front of Tjakra under fire, south of the high road, to breach the walls for the advance of the troops and to force the enemy to abandon that face. With this object one of the 12 cm. guns of Padjang was also put into requisition, as well as the three mortars which were stationed there and with which it would be impossible to reach the Poeri. The

second 12 c. gun at Padjang was to direct its fire against Toh-pati and the village of Sajang, North of Tjakra.

On the 16th November all the ships of the expeditionary Naval force were collected in the harbour of Ampenan; the Tromp had come from her cruising station in Kombal-bay, on the 12th; on the 15th the Bali and the Prins Hendrik had arrived from the North coast. On the 17th the Borneo added her fire to the land batteries and threw 100 shells into Tjakra Nagara.

The Prins Hendrik, the Borneo, the Tromp and the Bali, disembarked their Naval Brigade (184 men) on the 17th and they were to occupy the garrison of Kapitan during the operations against Tjakra.

Out of the Naval Brigade already on shore 60 men are to assist in the capture of Tjakra, 60 others are to occupy Kaleh and 20 others the outpost of the river Anjar.

XI.

FRESH REINFORCEMENTS. FALL OF TJAKRA NAGARA.

Amidst great demonstrations of sympathy the two battalions appointed to reinforce the expedition left their respective stations:

The 5th, composed of 18 officers, 575 soldiers, 2 officers' horses with 23 women, left Semarang on the Gouverneur Generaal's Jacob and the 11th of the same strength started the "Reael" from Meester Cornelis.

Early in the morning of the 16th November the G. G.'s Jacob entered the harbour of Ampenan and by nine o'clock the 5th battalion was quartered in the old barracks on the shore. The "Reael" arrived in the afternoon, but owing to the heavy surf and the lateness of the hour the disembarkation was postponed until the following morning, when by 10 a.m. the 11th battalion also reached the bivouac of Ampenan.

Much to the disappointment of the 5th battalion they were not to take any active part in the prospective attack, but were to take turns in relieving the different posts with the Naval Brigade, thus leaving five complete battalions for actual fighting: the 2nd, 6th, 7th, 9th and 11th. On the 16th November detachments of the 5th were despatched to relieve the occupation of posts I, II and III.

In the afternoon all the commanders of regiments were summoned to a conference with the Commander-in-chief to receive their orders for the action intended for next day. We give the orders in full to show how much foresight is needed and how even the smallest detail is thought of preparatory to such a serious undertaking:

EXPEDITION TO LOMBOCK.

Order of the day.

Headquarters, Ampenan.

17 November 1895.

To-morrow, 18th November, an attack will be made on Tjakra Nagara with the view of capturing the town and ore especially the