in the work of demolition, and as there were too few hands available for the gigantic undertaking, the Commander-in-chief had requisitioned the services of 500 free coolies, who reached Lombock on the 2nd October. They were sent from Madura and were placed under the orders of a distinguished Madurese.

The transport was now 2900 men strong and was also increased by 220 horses and the necessary transport material. The various tactical units absorbed some 1200 convicts for regimental transport: the remaining 1700 men with the horses and staff were at the disposal of the engineers.

On the whole the conduct of the free coolies left a good deal to be wished for; but we cannot withhold a word of praise from those men who had been convicted and sentenced: this expedition owes them a tremendous debt of gratitude. Great services were rendered by this mass of long-suffering and willing humanity. They it was who transported all the artillery material, and all the requisites for the medical department and the commissariat, etc. How hard they toiled in the bivouac and in the numerous engineering operations; how bravely they passed through the enemy's line to seek information; how uncomplainingly they went forth to scout and spy, how readily they carried extra ammunition; how courageously they faced the fire to reach a wounded soldier and carry him under cover.

On the 6th of October the whole of West-Mataram was razed to the ground, and after a well-earned rest on the 7th, the work could be begun in the Eastern portion.

A group of old men, women and children, who had been left behind in their dwellings were conveyed to Ampenan. It was soon noticed that some amongst them were suffering from small-pox; they were at once isolated and eventually sent to Labouan Tring.

From information received, it became known that the disease was raging on the East coast. A Doctor Djawa from Boeléleng and a vaccinator were immediately sent to the district, to prevent as much as possible the spreading of the malady, whilst Doctor Vorderman, inspector of the civil medical department in Java, came to Ampenan from Batavia to take further precautionary measures.

As it appeared that various cases of sickness had occurred at Mataram and Tjakra, great fears were entertained lest the infection should reach the camps, so a special medical officer was instructed to re-vaccinate the troops.

Concerning the general condition of the men's healths, at the beginning of October it had been declared excellent, but very shortly afterwards, on the 8th, the sick list was found to be a long one; in fact it amounted to 6 per cent of the troops.

By the 10th October Mataram was in such a position as to run no risk of being re-occupied by the enemy. Still it was quite another month before it could be said that the enemy was completely driven from the neighbourhood, and before an attack on Tjakra Nagara could be thought of.

Let us see how this month was spent.

The attitude of the Balinese at Tjakra Nagara was entirely a defensive one. After the fall of Mataram many had no doubt escaped in a Northerly and North Easterly direction, where they were safe from the fire of our ships and our columns; but, either by force or by promises the prince was able to prevent the greater portion of the people from leaving his capital.

On the night of 4th-5th October there was loud musketry firing in Tjakra. The following morning several Netherlands flags were seen flying from different points and a white one was flying from the Western maingate. What was happening? was there dissension between the followers of the prince, determined at all costs to defend their last stronghold and the party who was willing to surrender? And had the latter got the upper hand at these different points? or was this flying of our flags simply a stratagem of war and were they trying to entice us into a trap?

As no further steps were taken to betoken submission, the latter conjecture was considered the correct one and the work of bombarding Tjakra from Mataram and Pagasangan East was proceeded with.

Had all or perhaps part of the Balinese really intended to surrender? It is not surprising after all that had taken place that the Commanderin-chief should be very suspicious of any advances they might make! From the reports of the spies we learned that there was a split in the enemy's camp; and surely our mode of answering those who wished for peace can hardly be called conciliatory. It would have been easy to ascertain the real facts of the matter; a portion of the troops might have established themselves on the enceinte and thence have judged to what extent our presence was likely to prove valuable or not to those who wished to sever their connection with the prince. Hitherto there was a generally prevailing opinion amongst the Balinese that we would shoot every man who came over to us.

In reply to the roundabout enquiries that were made by the Balinese the Commander-in-chief intimated that all those who surrendered and who were found to be neither instigators nor ringleaders, should be pardoned under certain conditions (such as the giving up of their arms and ammunition and their relegation to a certain appointed place), and their lives should be spared. At a later date, after being empowered to do so by the government, a promulgation was issued, saying that the lives should be spared of all those who surrendered either singly or in a body.

On the 10th October the poenggawa Ida Bagoes Saray of Tjamara (North Mataram) gave up his arms and with 59 fighting men, 26 women and 21 children surrendered to the Commander-in-chief and they were immediately escorted to Labuan Tring; after that but few surrendered. The prince still maintained too much authority and there could be no question of treating with him. Dead or alive he must fall into our hands, nothing less could efface the outrage to our army and our honour could not otherwise be redeemed, nor could the future government of Lombock be established on a sure basis.

From every point of view, the position was now such that there remained no alternative but to seize the capital by force of arms.

The most desirable plan would have been to surround Tjakra either from Kambega on the North or Soekadana on the South, but this was not practicable with the forces available. There was nothing to be done excepting to make the attack straight in front while threatening the flanks. Preparatory to the siege it was essential to strengthen the artillery in the front, besides guarding against possible attack on the north side. The south side of Tjakra could be enfiladed from Pagasangan East.

The demolition at East Mataram was so far advanced that batteries could be erected, while the necessary guns could be brought from the posts at Arong-Arong and Mataram poeri, which were less favourably situated for carry

ing out the proposed project.

On the 14th Octobertwo battalions. of infantry with all the available engineers and train passed through Pagasangan East to Karang Bedil, (the S. E. division of Mataram) where a position was taken on the edge of the rice field opposite W. Tjakra, with the object of raising a post in the Dewa temple close by for the reception of a couple of 12 c.m. B. L. guns. By evening it was sufficiently advanced to leave it to the protection of

a

company of

Faman Radja

Pagasangan

Sketch of the Position at Mataram. Scale: 1 to 4: 5000.

infantry and a section of artillery, while next morning the guns could be conveyed there.

This was reckoning without our host, who in this case was represented by the watery element.

In consequence of the heavy rainfall in the mountains all the small rivers were very much swollen.

The rivier Djangkok had risen considerably and swept away in its

course everything along the roads. The bamboo bridge between Ampenan and Kapitan which had been put up by the engineers was unable to resist the force of the rushing water. Communication with the camp by the sea was interrupted.

There could be no question of transporting guns now.

The worst of the matter was that the 7th battalion which had been covering the work of destruction at Mataram, with 50 men of the naval brigade, artillery, engineers and 800 convicts were cut from Ampenan. All attempt to get the troops across remained ineffectual owing to the rapidity of

the current. The night was spent in the open air, without any covering, exposed to the pouring rain. By means of a small Sassak boat warm food and gin was carried to the troops.

The following day the water had fallen sufficiently to permit of the men crossing a few at a time in the little Sassak boats or else by holding on to a cable which had been thrown across the river. Afterwards the guns were brought across on rafts and in "praos." By half past eleven the whole column had reached Ampenan and as a precautionary measure each man was served with a dose of quinine.

Here too they had had a bad time of it. In times of inundation the little rivers running both north and south are unable to empty themselves into the sea, so they streamed into Ampenan, and the people were knee-deep in water. The lower parts of the town had been evacuated with the least possible delay and shelter sought in the higher lying parts.

Measures had to be taken at once to restore communication and to prevent the recurrence of such

from poert Mataram

Cleared

Kilchen

ground

wire fence

M.B.A.

munition

Battery Karang-Bedil. Scale: 1 to 2250.

an accident, the knowledge of which might have been very much to the advantage of the Balinese, had they but known of it.

The first thing that was done to reopen communication was to fetch one of the lighters belonging to the Royal Steam-packet Company, take it to pieces and carry it to the river, the two pirogues were used as ferries, whilst a temporary wooden bridge was built by the engineers with the help of the marines, which would serve until an iron one could be made.

To facilitate the quicker discharge of the river Djangkok into the sea, a canal was cut from the point of the river where it curves to the south, straight into the sea.

In order to secure a higher and healthier position for the troops and provide that in case of a renewal of this contingency there should be an abundant supply of forces on the opposite side of the river, it was decided to construct a fortified encampment for two battalions of infantry, artillery, cavalry and engineers at Kapitan.

Besides this a dam was constructed to lead the waters of the Sombrok-a river north of Ampenan in a more northerly direction to the Meninting, to prevent the flooding of the camp on the north side.

Many repairs were needed; gales of wind and rain, both in the quarters at Ampenan and at the outposts and also on the roads, had worked considerable damage everywhere. The new everywhere. The new Decauville-line from Ampenan to Pagasangan East by Kaleh, was so deeply imbedded in mud, that preference was given to the old main road: Arong-ArongMataram-Pagasangan East, which was now free.

It is almost unnecessary to say that under the circumstances the disembarking and transport of supplies was a matter of great difficulty and took a great deal of time, especially the transport of artillery material and ammunition.

Although every effort was used to push on the building of the pier, still little progress was made. The shore could no longer be reached by the rafts; and the cases of ammunition had to be opened on the raft