At Kaleh: one company of infantry with 2 horsed field guns; at Arong-Arong: 2 companies of infantry, 2 unhorsed field guns, one detachment of fortress-artillery to serve four 12 c.m. guns and two 20 c.m. mortars.

We must first see what was going on outside the actual area of the battle field.

Besides sheer fighting the art of war resorts to other means of harassing the enemy and precipitating his defeat and amongst these is the cutting off of his supplies, and preventing the importation of all contraband of war.

By decree of 13th September more stringent clauses were added to the June proclamation regarding the imports to and exports from and conveyance through Lombock of such contraband. All import or export trade was prohibited on the West and North coast from Labuan Tring to Ayer Putih for all private individuals, excepting in special cases where licenses were held by Sassaks or Macassars.

"Article I. All import and export to or from the North or West coast of the island of Lombock is prohibited, excepting it be for the requirements of the country or by special leave of the military or civil authority, who is invested with the fullest civil power in this island.

Article II. Infraction of this law, embodied in Article I, will be punished with a fine of from one thousand to fifteen hundred guilders (florins) and confiscation of the goods, with which it has been sought to infringe the law."

The vessels and material (the latter in so far as they are not of a nature to be confiscated on other grounds), by means of which violation or attempted violation of the law has been committed, may be seized to pay the fine and to defray the expenses of the legal process.

Attempt to infringe the law carried with it the same penalty as infringement itself; (art. III) in case of infringement the masters of the ships, or in default of these, all the passengers and crew were held guilty, etc., (art. IV).

On the 5th October still further and more severe clauses were added, it having become evident during the progress of operations that communication between the Balinese kampongs on the N. W. coast with the centres of Balinese power at Mataram and Tjakra (across the Punikan mountains), was very much easier than had been imagined.

While the squadron was cruising round the West and North coast, the Sassaks of Praja and Sekar Bela were appointed to block the road South of Pasinggahan in the direction of Kediri, and the Sassaks on the East coast were to prevent all transport of rice and contraband of war in that district. In order to keep a close watch over these people and to see what was going on amongst them, Controller Engelenberg was sent to the East coast, where he established himself at Teros. On the West coast the civil staff was increased and strengthened by a European commissioner, having in view the same objects as Engelenberg. Further, the Sassaks were incited to possess themselves of all the rice

they could lay hands on and carry it off to their own kampongs, a behest which it was unnecessary to repeat, they being only too willing to fall in with the proposal, not only thereby to coerce the Balinese, but as a preventive against the prolonged famine which was bound to follow from the non-cultivation of the rice fields.

There was only a very limited district on the East of Tjakra, towards Lingsar, from which the Balinese were now able to receive supplies of rice; unfortunately, for the present, our endeavours to induce the Sassaks of Batu Klian to assume the offensive remained without effect.

But on the other hand they were active in the North and on the 14th September burned to the ground the princely palace of Gunung Sari. The kampong of Tandjong, where the Balinese had accumulated large quantities of rice, was bombarded on the 16th and 17th September and on the second day the place was a prey to the flames; satisfied with the result the "Bali" ceased firing, after which the friendly part of the

Sassak population broke into the kampong and finished the work of annihilation, after carrying off no end of arms, amongst which 6 native cannon, with ammunition.

As we have already mentioned, the civil authorities were kept busy with our allies and besides this there was another cause for continuous supervision over the native element.

There is no doubt that an elaborate system of espionage was kept up by the Balinese, which proves that the prince must have possessed a well-filled treasury.

It required endless and incessant superintendence to keep watch over the swarms of Arabs and Chinese who came loitering round the camps with their wares for sale, and over those Sassaks, who had lived among the Balinese, and who partly from fear and partly from love of gain or from relationship, were in favor of the ruling race.

Several of these were arrested, but eventually released from lack of evidence against them; one solitary one, against whom the proofs were overwhelming, was hanged.

As it was essential that we should not be duped by these native spies, and at the same time imperative that we should be informed by them of the enemy's plans, it was necessary that this special branch of the service should be confided to some person eminently fitted for the purpose and the recorder of Batavia, Heer Valette was appointed to the post.

We have already seen that precautions against the West monsoon were taken as regards the bivouacs and the inland lines of communication; the insecurity of the harbour at Ampenan during that season has already been referred to, so it was necessary to provide against being cut off from communication with the warships and the Indian government and the outside world generally. Of course a pier would have been the simplest and best plan, but we have already seen that insurmountable obstacles had prevented the construction of one, long before our arrival.

Would it not have been feasible to open up communication between Ampenan and the sheltered little bay of Labuan Tring, by means of a Decauville train?

Captain Willemstijn was commissioned to go and examine the bay; he went on the steamship Cycloop and made a survey in a Northern direction. He was accompanied by the well-known kampong chief of Ampenan-whose treachery was still unknown at headquarters-and was most assiduously assisted by him. Did he expect by this show of friendship to turn aside all suspicions from himself? If so, he was mightily mistaken, for shortly after Captain Willemstijn's return, reports were received at Ampenan from Lindgreen, proving beyond doubt the chief's guilt, and in consequence he was immediately arrested and conveyed to Surabaya.

The chart drawn by Lieutenant Van der Zwaan as a result of Captain Willemstijn's survey only went to demonstrate the impracticability of the

intended place. It was soon apparent that from one cause or another the obstacles were insuperable.

So there was no alternative left but to come back to the idea of constructing a pier at Ampenan. An examination made by Major Marcella of the engineers, who had come over purposely to study the question, showed the feasibility of the plan, so it was now resolved to carry it out.

In anticipation of the interruption of communication between the posts, certain to be caused by the West monsoon, an an order was given to lay down lines of Decauville railway between the various points. We must not omit to mention the offers of support offered to us by the Princes of South Celebes: the Princes of Goa, of Sidenreng, of Wadjoe and the Princess of Tanette, who all volunteered to send us auxiliary troops.

How were the Macassar princes concerned with Lombock? We have seen that in Chapter IV, in reviewing our early relations with them. Tradition that powerful factor amongst the natives-according to the treaty of Bonay 1667, had decreed how they were to act in cases when we were threatened by any of those petty states, which might be included in this Bonay alliance.

The princes assembled their troops and led them to Macassar, the capital. Here were mustered 2000 Goa and 3000 Bugis soldiers, dressed. in red jackets and short white trousers and armed with Remington rifles and all withdrew to a camp outside the town. The Bugis princes and princesses were received in audience by the Governor of Celebes and Dependencies, Van Braam Morris, and a company of infantry and a detachment of cavalry formed a guard of honour outside Government House.

Here they expressed their wish to stand by the Government and to avenge the treachery, which had raised indignation all through Celebes. The Government, much touched by this proof of friendship, left it to the judgment of the Commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army to reply to this disinterested proposal.

It is beyond doubt that the Macassar and Bugis auxiliaries might have rendered us invaluable services and the history of our Indian wars relates many instances where we have drawn no inconsiderable benefit from the troops of our allies. As they are, however, especially fitted for guerilla warfare their services were hardly needed in Lombock, as we had the Sassaks at our disposal for that.

Besides from a political standpoint it was undesirable to introduce a new element into the island and allow the Macassars to get mixed up with Lombock affairs and perhaps eventually gain too much influence.

The Government therefore in the name of the Commander-in-chief thanked them very politely for their kind offer; much disappointed, the auxiliaries were disbanded by the princes of Bugis and Macassar and taken back to their respective districts.

It is scarcely conceivable that the inhabitants of the capital were much disappointed or felt particularly grieved at the departure of these thousand warriors from Macassar!

IX.

CAPTURE OF MATARAM.

Now comes Mataram's turn! The day fixed for the attack, the 29th September, was kept a profound secret.

In order to mislead the enemy as to the real point of attack, demonstrations had been going on during the last two days towards the North East.

A column composed of a battalion and a half of infantry and a section of mountain artillery advanced on the 27th September towards Rembega, under command of General Segov.

At first they took up their position at Pagarakan and directed their fire against the kampong of Kemasan (see map) North of Mataram. Then they advanced to a point between Rembega and Karang Baru and took up a position facing east and again opened fire against Kemasan, as well as against Mondjok, the North Eastern division of Mataram.

Although the firing created great confusion, which was expressed by rapid movements and an incessant beating of the tom-tom, neither at Mataram nor at Tjakra did the Balinese leave the lines, so our column returned to the bivouac towards afternoon.

The same movements were repeated on the following day by the same column under General Segov, the right wing was flanked by the deep ravine at Karang Baru and the left wing was stationed at Rembega, and from these points they again opened fire against Kemasan.

The inhabitants of Rembega having informed the General that the Balinese had made a sally soon after our departure on the previous day, the column remained in position for a very long time in the hope that the enemy would make a fresh sally.

Once again there was considerable commotion at Mataram and the war drums were furiously beaten at Tjakra; still nothing further seemed to come of the intended sally. Our troops had started on their homeward march and the rear-guard was covered by the cavalry, when the latter suddenly perceived a division of Balinese, about 200 strong, rushing wildly amidst loud yells and shrieks to attack the troops.

The cavalry reported this to General Segov, who immediately despatched Staff-officer Willemstijn with instructions to the retiring troops at once to return and take up the position they had just left.