force, provided with everything needful, was available, an advance presented no obstacle.

To ensure success two or three more precautionary measures were taken. First of all an appeal was made to the Sassaks for their co-operation. Political reasons had stepped in to prevent this earlier, but now that the Lombock government was our avowed enemy, there there was every reason why the Sassak population should share in our action against our common enemy.

A number of trusted Sassak chiefs were furnished with guns and ammunition from the magazine at Ampenan while the Resident went to the East coast on the 8th Sept. on the Argus, in order to discuss with the chiefs a plan of attack against the Balinese.

His reception here, as well as on the North coast where he proceeded later, was very favorable and great numbers of men came up from Praja and other Sassak districts. But although there was not actually any cause for complaint in their conduct, it certainly is a fact that they left us to do the most dangerous and disagreeable part of the work, from which they were to derive so much benefit.

It they did not render much practical service in the way of fightingthey were so undisciplined that their own chiefs had but little influence over them still they were useful in other ways, while the efforts of the Balinese by money bribes and promises were ineffectual in inducing them to desert us; their innate hatred for their former rulers was too deep-rooted.

As a further attempt to bring about different views amongst the Sassaks, we cannot help referring to the fact concerning the Mohammedan son of Anak Agoeng K'Toet, called Datoe Pangeran, who in the beginning of September took refuge with fifteen of his followers in the arms of the well-known chief of Praja, Goeroe Bangkol, alleging as his reason that he had fled from Balinese territory to be with his own co-religionists.

All our endeavour to get possession of the prince's son failed. Our written instructions to send Datoe Pangeran to Ampenan under a strong escort remained as unheeded by Goeroe Bangkol, as did our summons to him to come himself. Controller Engelberg met with no farther success when he was despatched to Praja; Goeroe Bangkol informed him that he could not possibly leave Praja during the present state of affairs and further more that Datoe Pangeran feared his life would be in danger if he went; at last he said point-blank that he did not intend to deliver up the prince nor did he mean to go to Ampenan himself either.

The only result of Engelberg's mission was that Mami Sapian, nephew of Goeroe Bangkol, returned with him to Ampenan.

Later on we shall see the part played behind the scenes by our friend Gusti Djilantik and how his influence was brought to bear on the Praja chief. The second measure consisted in mobilising the Madurese corps of Bangkallan. Out of this corps, composed of 4 companies, 18 officers

and 684 soldiers strong, three companies were formed; in addition to 14 officers and 437 soldiers, the instructors, Captain Otken of the infantry and two sergeants, and also 3 lieutenants and 27 men belonging to the infantry, besides the necessary staff of the medical service and transport were attached to it. This corps set out for Lombock on the 15th September under Raden Majang Koro, whose acquaintance we have already made.

VII.

OPERATIONS FOR THE SIEGE OF MATARAM.

The operations were now in full swing.

On the 4th September a scouting party went out in a N. E. direction, and like those who went out on the 30th August, they were able to see that the enemy was throwing

up breastworks, beginning near the dessa Aroeng-Aroeng in a Southerly direction.

Before however attempting to destroy these defences, it was necessary for us to occupy the Sassak kampong of Kaleh, on the left bank of the river Antjar, and from there we could enfilade the enemy's line. *

This kampong was taken without loss on the 5th September. It was found that the breastworks of the Balinese had no rear-face.

There could be no question of enfilading. Still it was perfectly easy to do some sharp shooting against the enemy's line.

So this point was occupied by 2 infantry companies of the 9th battalion (Major Scheuer) with a section of field artillery.

That same day, two 12 c.m. B. L.

"Soldier of the Topographical department."

guns escorted by a company of infantry were placed in battery against the enemy's position, in a small Dewa-temple, directly East of Capitan and West of the road, since destroyed.

It was decided that the attack should take place on the morning of the

*The whole plan of attack during the further course of the struggle was settled beforehand with maps. This great advantage was due to lieutenant van der Zwaan of the survey corps.

6th under the command of Colonel Swart with his battalion, the 2nd, supported by the 7th (Major Van Blommestein) and the two remaining companies of the 9th, as also by the field artillery and the engineers. The 6th battalion remained behind with the naval brigade to protect the bivouac.

We will quote the orders that were issued to the 2nd battalion the day before the attack; they will show what precautions were to be taken in advancing:

"To-morrow morning at half past five the companies must be prepared for action against Aroeng-Aroeng.

"The soldiers will wear their marching kit without knapsacks, but they will carry their quilts and sling their great coats over their shoulders." "Dry provisions of food for one day shall be carried in the haversacks." "Coffee or tea in the field flasks.

"Each company will take its own pioneer equipment, as well as reserve ammunition cases, containing 400 cartridges; every man was carrying 60." "To each company are allotted 4 'tandoes.'

"With the staff of the battalion will move 30 tandoes; and for each company 8 cases of spare ammunition are available.

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Breakfast is to consist of half a loaf, butter and cheese (or mince or sardines) and coffee, besides rice and smoked meat.

"A dram will be given to each man before starting."

After a heavy preliminary discharge of the artillery's guns, the regular attack was opened at half past ten. The advance was made cautiously and as much under cover as possible. Not a shot was fired by the enemy. At the sound of the first shots they had lost heart, and retreated from the position they had used such strenuous efforts to fortify, leaving behind them a large supply of arms amongst which were several repeating guns.

The only sign of life that was given was the discharge of about four cannon shots from the Western entrance to Mataram; and it is probable that they used one of the field guns we had been obliged to leave behind. The projectiles went however straight into the sea.

Thus it came about that we were enabled, without any loss, to occupy the stronghold of our enemy. And now we were able to appreciate how strong the position was. The road was cut between Ampenan and Aroeng-Aroeng. Behind the chief line of defence, half way to Aroeng-Aroeng, there was a second parapet about six feet high right across the road. There were others in and around the kampong itself, behind the strong Dewa-temple.

A great deal of pains and labour had been bestowed upon the main position. This extended from the S. W. angle of Aroeng-Aroeng in a line running from North to South, to nearly as far as the river Antjar. It consisted of a clay parapet 2 mètres high, one mètre thick at the top and 2 mètres thick at the base and it was perforated with hundreds of holes in which were placed hollow bamboo stems, through which to fire. These loopholes were made in two rows, the upper one at the height of a man's chest and slanting downwards; the lower one at the height