Fortunately the night passed by without disturbance; we say fortunately, for the Balinese had certainly intended it to be otherwise.

Next day, the 25th, a further sum of fls. 250.000 was brought and whilst 10 Amboynese soldiers, under supervision of Captain Manders of the artillery, were counting the coins and testing them, a Balinese, hidden behind a wall, threw a bottle at them; he was seized and carried to Ampenam in chains. The incident was ended but it was another discordant note in the harmony that had been existing.

Between 5 and 6 p.m. Captain Schmidhamer came riding from Ampenam to ask for an interview with the Commander-in-chief; he was the bearer of an ominous report; the truth of which he could not vouch for, but he had been informed by the Klian, Amah Amat of Sukaradja, a Sassak kampong in the vicinity of Ampenam, that the Balinese contemplated attacking the bivouack at Tjakra Nagara that night. The assault had been planned for the night before, but deferred owing to the wife of one of the chief leaders, having died, which was looked upon as a bad omen.

For once we may feel grateful to Balinese superstition, which saved us from worse calamities than even those we have had to deplore.

On receipt of this news the Commander-in-chief lost no time in sending the Resident and General van Ham to Djilantik to ask point blank what he knew of the plan. Captain Kamerman received immediate orders to prepare to leave Tjakra with his men and baggage and withdraw to Mataram; the transport waggons were however with the detached columns. The Resident and the General returned from their visit to Djilantik, who had sworn he knew nothing of an attack and that there was no plot against us; thereupon they were despatched to the crown prince, with strict instructions not to allow themselves to be put off with any plea of sickness, but they were doomed to disappointment, for his Highness was ill and remained ill and they were unable to obtain an interview.

A conference was now held by the Commander-in-chief, the Secondin-command and the Resident; the two latter discredited the rumour and pointed out what a ridiculours figure we should cut in the eyes of the Balinese if we were to take any retrograde step on the strength of it. It was deemed advisable to wait until the following day before finally deciding upon an action savouring of retreat,-instead of this, the bivouac was strengthened by a company, the 3rd of the 7th battalion and a section of the field-artillery, summoned from Mataram by the Commander-in-chief. The two field pieces were so located in the projecting portion of the open space as to command the road both in an Easterly and in a Westerly direction and were loaded with shrapnel; the situation of the guns was early explained to the troops coming from Mataram to prevent any danger to them in case of an "alarm."

For prudence 'sake the last portion of the war indemnity received that morning was transferred to the bivouac at Mataram, while orders were given for the headquarters to be henceforward in the bivouac with

the troops at Tjakra, which arrangement was opposed by general Van Ham who retained implicit belief in Djilantik's assurance of good faith. The Commander-in-chief, taking a less optimistic view of the case, agreed that if any thing happened to his soldiers, it was his duty to be with them and not separated from them. The offices of the General Staff and the field telegraph were vacated; the orderlies, clerks and servants packed up their things..

Written orders were despatched to the columns at Batu Klian and Sukarara to return at once, taking additional precaution. Finally a letter was written to K'Toet, informing him of the current rumour and requesting an explanation of it if true; but if unfounded he was exhorted to use his authority to discover those who had circulated it and punish them. It took a couple of hours to write this letter, the original having to be translated first into Malay, then into Balinese; it was 8.30 p.m. when it was handed to K'Toet's son at the poeri.

At 8 p.m. the Commander-in-chief took supper with his staff in the small poeri and about nine he strolled leisurely to his new quarters in the bivouac; everything was quiet here and though stricter precautions had been taken no serious danger was anticipated.

The officers walked up and down chatting, General Van Ham remarking to captain Kamerman: "You will see, nothing will happen!" later they played cards, the second-in-command taking a hand. At 11 p.m. General Vetter retired to rest! Calm and repose are no doubt admirable qualities, but we think that, in face of all the circumstances we have detailed, especially the altered behaviour of Djilantik, a little more activity would not have been out of place.

Was any real plan of defence prepared in case of an attack? could it honestly and conscientiously be said: "we have done our duty; we are ready; let the enemy come if he dare!" We hardly think so, or surely they would never have persisted in occupying such an unfavourable position.

It was of course too late to have retreated to Mataram as first suggested by General Vetter and General Van Ham was quite correct in pointing out what a sorry figure we should cut by retreating if the rumour proved unfounded. This argument ought not to have hindered our taking up a more advantageous position at Tjakra; reasons of courtesy should no longer have stood in the way of our occupying the two squares of the Dewa temple; the troops coming from Mataram should have brought further food supplies and drinking water should have been provided; and finally we should have insisted upon our ally Gusti Djilantik sharing our bivouac for reasons of his personal safety!

Had such a proposal been made to him, he would have been bound to choose one way or other and a more correct conclusion might have been drawn from his actions than from his utterances.

The question remains, did the Commander-in-chief believe in the rumour or did he not?....

That he did not entirely cast it aside like General Van Ham is

apparent from the measures he took; consequently we are at a loss to understand why he returned to the small poeri with his staff for supper after dusk. By this time the Balinese must have noticed that we were warned and might they under the circumstances not have struck the first blow rather before the appointed time, to prevent our taking any more precautions and thereby entirely frustrate their plans?

The return to the poeri proves great personal courage and coolness, but the risk was too great and it is only owing to the most inexplicable neglect on the part of the Balinese that a decisive blow was not struck.

VI.

THE ATTACK.

The stillness of the night was undisturbed; there was no warning note to advise us of the black betrayal that was being planned and plotted behind the walls that encircled the bivouac; no kindly moon lighted up the firmament; it was one of those dark black nights peculiar to the tropics! only here and there a solitary field lantern, throwing a faint glimmer in the immediate neighbourhood.

Suddenly a shot was heard at a quarter past eleven coming from behind the walls of the artillery stables; it was followed by others in quick succession proceeding from Westerly and South Westerly directions; these first discharges were not without fatal result, for one of the subordinate officers was mortally wounded.

The officers were on their feet at once, the alarm signal given and every man stood armed at his post; the East flank (of the projecting division of the open bivouac) was occupied by the 4th company of Europeans under captain Kamerman; the North West and South sides by the 2th company Amboynese, captain Fuhrhop of the 6th battalion and the 3rd company Madurese, captain Matthes of the 7th battalion. Two sections of the latter companies were held in reserve.

*

We returned the enemy's fire with all our might and main, but it was growing rapidly more and more furious; in the midst of the turmoil sounds of martial music reached us from the kampong and the poeri; the enemy beat their drums vigorously and the intervals were filled up up by the most hideous war cries; the noise drew nearer and approached the bivouac from the West. The advancing natives were greeted with a couple of vollies from the infantry and a discharge from the guns nearest them; this unexpected reception called forth shrieks and yells of disappointment and.... the enemy receded. An hour later a new attempt was made to assault the bivouac on the East side, but here too the welcome accorded them forced them to retire. This second defeat caused the Balinese to alter their tactics, they no longer attacked us in the open but continued their fire on our unprotected troops from behind the walls, which alas! proved more effective; the number of

* Owing to the men being absent with the columns in the interior, the sections were only about 30 men strong. The force at Tjakra consisted of about 400 men.

dead and wounded was rapidly increasing; after shooting down the horses in their stables, they concentrated their attention on the men. Single marksmen kept up an incessant fire from the west angle of the large poeri and many of our artillery were hit, especially in the legs; the Balinese were largely provided with repeaters, thus being enabled to fire several shots consecutively without loss of time. The surgeon, Janssen, soon had his hands more than full.

We will quote an account of these events from an eye witness:

66

I helped in so far as I could," says Rogge, "to dress and wash their wounds with the little drinking water we had left. The large tent where we had but recently dined was soon filled with wounded; unfortunately our lanterns served as targets for the enemy's bullets and more than one whizzed close to my head whilst I was reaching water out of the pails. I looked into the dome pavilion at intervals, where I found a few of the General Staff silently awaiting the course of events; unexpectedly a volley of shots was fired from a sentry-box situated exactly opposite to us and unfortunately they were aimed very straight, but they were replied to by a volley from a section of soldiers stationed in kneeling posture in front of the tent. The noise was deafening, it was as if all the furies of hell had been let loose...."

The Commander-in-chief began to feel alarm lest we should consume too much ammunition and sent repeated messages by his aide-de-camp, lieutenant Kotting and lieutenant de Greve enjoining us to be as sparing as possible. The Balinese made several attempts to fire more into the centre of the bivouac, by placing high ladders against the inner walls of the poeri enclosure and shooting over them; our heavy guns proved too much for them and no longer venturing to show their heads above the walls, they fired at random and too quickly to work much damage, eventually ceasing altogether.

A new danger soon threatened us; we could hear distinct hammering and knocking against the walls, the meaning of which was very apparent; the enemy was boring loop-holes through which to direct their fire, they themselves being completely protected. In vain the artillery tried to blow up the walls; they were too solid, besides the darkness prevented the result from being visible. The only thing we could see were sparks of fire flying here, there and everywhere; the roar of the guns was deafening and bullets were falling around us fast and quick; to the right, to the left, in front, behind and everywhere, causing many a poor fellow to stagger; added to all this was the ear-splitting sound of the tom-tom as an accompaniment to the hammering and boring of the walls.

The convicts whose quarters were located against the high poeri wall were suddenly seized with a panic, and under the impression that the enemy was pushing through the wall, they made a sudden rush for the opposite side of the bivouac; the troops thinking it was the enemy opened fire on them at once and many were seriously wounded. The situation was going from bad to worse: