3rd companies of the 6th battalion stationed there, one section of mountain artillery, one section of engineers, the necessary train, an ambulance, a military surveyor and four cavalry soldiers. They reached Sukarara at 3.30 p.m. and took up their quarters in the bivouac prepared for them by the people, situated in an open sawah about 500 mètres from the kampong.

In accordance with their instructions daily marches were made in various directions to ensure the orders being carried out to dismantle the forts, repair the roads and encourage the people to return to their homes and resume their daily avocations.

The second column under lieutenant-colonel van Lawick van Pabst was similarly composed and was ordered to Batu Klian, its special mission being to capture Daeng Ginoro; they set out on the morning of the 17th August, two Companies of the ninth battalion (the 2nd native and the 4th European) starting from Ampenam and spending one day at Tjakara Nagara where the remainder of the column was made up, only leaving two companies of the 6th battalion at Tjakra Nagara. The next morning after tidings had been received of the unexpected death of Daeng Ginoro the column set out accompanied by the band of the 6th battalion to within a quarter of an hour of

Narmada which was reached about 9 a.m. At 10 a.m. they crossed the S. Babak, a river 40 mètres wide and 1 mètre deep, the bed of which was composed of huge stones, rendering the passage exceedingly difficult for the artillery and the train. Very shortly after leaving Narmada the neglected condition of the road was striking, it soon lost itself in a narrow footpath barely wide enough for two men to walk a-breast and frequently requiring the services of the engineers to make it passable for the artillery. Not a single dwelling was visible between the river and Batu Klian, the whole country resembled a desert and all that remained of Pringarata, a former shooting box of the prince, were a few delapidated walls, showing traces of what once had been a kampong. After a short halt here the troops continued their march through further scenes of ruin and destruction now filling the places of scenery once so much admired by travellers like Zollinger and Treyss but converted into a vast wilderness by the cruel way in which Madé carried on war. At 2.30 p.m. men and horses were able to refresh themselves at a wayside spring and in a couple of hours resumed their march until 7.30 p.m. when they bivouacked for the night at a distance of 2 hours march from Balu Klian; the following morning they started early and reached this once so noted dessa at half past nine. Their reception by the people was all that could be desired and provisions of bamboo and other necessaries for erection of the sheds for the troops were brought in profusion to the chosen spot, close to which was a clear running stream, which had indeed proved one of the chief attraction of the bivouac.

On the 20th August the commandant of the column with a detachment of 75 bayonets to each company and half a section of engineers pushed on to Swangi, a couple of pals* (1 pal = 1506 mètres) south of Sakra, on the East coast, to hold a parley with the principal chiefs there; the remainder of the troops were left to complete the establishment of the bivouac. This column reached Swangi at 2.30 p.m.; all preparations in the way of food had been extensively made, the natives having been informed of their intending visit by an inhabitant of Koupang through which kampong they had passed earlier. After the conference with the chiefs, the return march was made the same day, but by a shorter road; the troops arrived in camp at Batu Klian at 8 p.m. having done 32 miles that day

The next few days were spent in visiting the different neighbourhoods and the engineers superintended the repairing of the roads, where possible. After the morning's march the afternoon was frequently spent in consulation with the chiefs who squatted round the major listening to his orders and suggestions.

Instead of following the columns on their daily excursions we will return to the main body and the chiefs events of the last days preceding the attack. First however we will say a word or two about the wisdom of despatching the columns into the interior, which action has *Pal 1650 yards, i. c. nearly a mile.

given rise to conflicting opinions. On the one hand it is alleged that by sending them to such long distances the main body was considerably weakened and that the forces were much too scattered, thus as it were playing into the enemy's hands; in objection to this it is said that, each column being strong enough in itself to fulfil its appointed task, there can be no question of scattering the forces, that in former campaigns, the entire expedition was often no stronger than one of these separate detachments, which were sufficiently formidable to impress the native enemy. The expeditions to the interior of Lombock partook more of the character of excursions and although such small forces would never have undertaken similar marches in Bali, Boni or Atcheen, they would certainly have made similar ones in the Batak territory, in the thinly populated districts of Sumatra and in Borneo. In forming an opinion on this question one must bear in mind the strength and organization of the enemy to be dealt with and although 300 men may have been considered a sufficient force to reduce Lombock to submission in the previous century, the case is materially altered at the present day and not to our advantage.

We cannot deny that after the division of the forces, Ampenam and Tjakra Nagara were left very weak, especially the latter and as soon as the Commander-in-chief received information of the impending attack his first act was to send reinforcements there.

The point to be decided before forming an opinion, is whether at the time the columns were moving about, there was any thought of hostilities or not; it appears to us that there can have been no fears on that score: the Sassaks were perfectly satisfied and the Balinese appeared to be.

We consider that the situation of the troops whilst marching was far less dangerous than being all gathered together at Tjakra and Mataram, when total annihilation from a treacherous enemy was far more likely than when there was less concentration; besides there was not a single advantage to be gained by remaining in the insufficiently fortified bivouacs, whereas the knowledge of the country obtained during the marches proved very valuable. We think there is everything to be said in defence of the course of the Commander-in-chief, who when he decided upon it, was thoroughly convinced of the sincerity of the Balinese; still we had laid down very stringent conditions, difficult of acceptanceand sure to cause many heartburnings; these facts should have been borne in mind and our attitude regulated accordingly.

The discussions concerning the treaty were at an end and nothing was wanting but the final approval of the princes and notables. When the negociations which had been carried on in Malay were over, the Commander-in-chief said to Djilantik: "Have they clearly grasped the meaning of the conditions?" "I have perfectly," was the reply; "That is not what I mean; I wish to know whether K'Toet who has to carry out the treaty, has understood?"-"Not one single word!"

Controller Liefrinck was instructed to translate the treaty into Balinese; as he handed them sheet by sheet, princes and poenggawas studied each point carefully and minutely and they were not slow to discover that this contract, securing autonomy for the Sassaks, by the presence of our representatives, was the death blow to their power and influence over these people whom hitherto they had trodden to the ground and that henceforth there was an end to all the privileges and benefits which they had so largely enjoyed either secretly or publicly, rightly or wrongly.

Combination was all they could oppose to this curtailment of their privileges and circumstances favored them; during the last few years the Lombock princes had purchased large supplies of the best and most modern weapons and had accumulated an abundance of ammunition. . . . certainly not from any special sense of friendship towards us.

In view of our unexpected arrival-we had so often threatened before-and our incredible display of strength, they had carefully concealed these treasures and adapted themselves to circumstances-they now considered the circumstances altered and they were still possessed of their means of attack or defence, as the case might be. By this time their awe of our strength, our troops and the unknown had worn off; they had grown accustomed to our presence, they knew our habits and they had tried to watch our drill and more especially they had made every endeavour to discover how we handled our guns.

Was it likely that their large numbers, provided with the necessary means of warfare, should tamely submit to a comparatively small force? They thought not; the opportunity now offered by the Netherlands troops being dispersed and having a broken line of communication was favorable to the scheme proposed by the poenggawas to the prince who readily fell in with it.

In fear and trembling he had acceded to all our demands on our arrival; he saw however that no harm towards his person was imminent, that the throne was secured to his dynasty, therefore he too began to be less afraid.

We had however touched his weak spot in forcing him to part with his money; he had spent his life in accumulating and hording it up and now he saw his treasure diminish little by little: on the 20th Augustly fls. 200,000, on the 22nd August by fls. 250,000 and there was more to be paid still!

The temptation to resist our demands was too great both for the prince and the notables.

Ought we not to have been informed of this new current of feeling by our spies?

Had we not, from the time that Djilantik had thrown in his lot with ours, seen most things through his eyes? His officiousness and his assistance, which had rendered him almost indispensable, were quite sincere as long as there was a reasonable prospect of his deriving some advantage from our friendship, but when he found himself completely

ignored in the new contract and was told unceremoniously that he and his troops could go home, without any sort of acknowledgement of his services, we think that a strong temptation to revenge himself must have presented itself to him. He must have hesitated long before deciding, for he really loved General van Ham and it pained him to think that he too would have to be punished with the others; he struggled desperately within himself during the days previous to the attack and endeavoured to obtain forgetfulness by means of opium, which he consumed immoderately.

The day was fast approaching when the expedition would have accomplished its mission; they are only waiting for the last instalment of the war expenses and for the signatures to the treaty. A few of the troops would stay on the island to ensure the carrying out of certain conditions. and improvements, but the main body would return to Java shortly and were looking forward to a joyful meeting with friends after such a magnificent success, attained without the loss of one drop of blood. "But coming events cast their shadows before," and in this instance. the shadows began to assume tangible proportions.

The women and children no longer visited the bazaars (markets) as they had been accustomed to do; the chiefs were less submissive and the order to bring 70 picols to Ampenam to transport supplies to the column at Sukarara was neglected. A sort of passive opposition was shown in not removing the Karangassim troops at once from their outposts on the Sassak frontiers; and even when they finally assembled at Tjakra Nagara on the 23rd August fresh motives were put forward to delay their embarcation for Bali.

On two occasions the indemnity money was overdue when brought and on another delay was asked for on the plea that there was no more money available; finally the day before the attack a small instalment of fls. 25.000 was offered, but of course could not be accepted.

Oddly enough too, when some few details had to be settled about the taxes and the vassal duties, both Anak Agong k'Toet and Gusti Djilantik were too ill to be present.

All that the doctor, sent by the Commander-in-chief to visit Djilantik, could discover, was that he was in a state of stupor produced by opium; the prescribed remedies were however not applied and next day another medical man was deputed to enquire into the matter. His visit was less successful, he waited for two hours but was refused admittance to the patient's room.

What was the meaning of this sudden change in Gusti Djilantik? Although the Commander-in-chief apprehended no serious trouble, he thought it necessary to accquaint the Governor-General with the altered attitude of poenggawas and people. On that same evening, the 24th August, General Vetter gave special injunctions to Captain Kamerman, the Commandant of the two companies (2nd comp. Amboynese and 4th comp. Europeans) left in the bivouac to keep a good watch.