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A NOVEMBER BREEZE.

of the illustrious soldier who now defends them. It probably will be found, however, in the issue that Strasburg has exhibited the best defence of fortified places, and that Von Uhrich is the exemplar soldier of France.

When M. Thiers brought forth his original proposition it was opposed on grounds which now possess a painfully intense significance. While Talleyrand opposed the project on political grounds, Soult said openly that to make a fortified city of Paris was to expose it in the event of war to bombardment and capture. The causa causans of their erection 'strongly illustrates that point in which M. Thiers so strongly illustrates the peculiar temperament of his race. The proposal was made in a moment of rage and groundless panic. M. Thiers had refused, on the part of his government, to have anything to do with arresting the march of the Viceroy of Egypt on Constantinople. England forthwith, in concert with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, after long delays, became joint signatories to a treaty for the protection of the Porte. Lord Palmerston's bold movement in the Mediterranean came like a thunderclap on the French premier, who nourished the Napoleonic idea that the Mediterranean might be a French lake. M. Guizot in London, M. Thiers in Paris, thought it an unpardonable affront to France that this great treaty should be made without her co-operation. It is even said that M. Thiers suggested that the French should seize on Malta

by a coup de main. Louis Philippe

He

was too cautious. He knew that he should be offending the sympathies of the Treaty Powers. substituted M. Guizot as his premier in place of M. Thiers, while, as some sort of answer to England's diplomatic victory, he so far met M. Thiers and the popular feeling, that a vote of four millions sterling was obtained for encircling Paris with fortifications, and putting it in a state of defence. It cannot be doubted but M. Thiers has most materially favoured that war-spirit which has so long been the bane

of France by the nature of his writings. He it is who has told of the Napoleonic war, not in the sober, truth-loving spirit of the true historian, but in that romantic, false way in which Victor Hugo told of the Battle of Waterloo in 'Les Misérables,' and with that brilliant bravado with which Alfred de Musset responded to Becker's Rhine-song. The French people appear stricken with a kind of colour-blindness; they appear to have lost the faculty of discerning truth, the most prominent sign of that corruption and demoralization which have eaten as a canker into French life and society.

If there had been any unsparing critic of the French military system, any one whose stern denunciation of that system has almost risen to prophecy, that man is General Trochu. When he brought out his remarkable book, 'L'Armée Française en 1867,' it ran through sixteen editions in three weeks. The same year produced the Duc d'Aumale's 'Institutions militaires de la France.' General Trochu made various confidential appeals to the war department at Paris, pointing out the imperfections and abuses of the French military system. His prophecies, like those of Cassandra's, were disbelieved, and then he resolved to publish, declaring that no other remedy was left him but publicity. With a resolution that has been justly called heroic, with a frankness that spared no mar's feelings, he laid bare every weakness and every sore, reckless what degree of unpopularity or hatred his uncompromising truthfulness might procure for him. Trochu foreshadowed in his book the results of the present most disastrous campaign. The best hopes would have been for France if she had listened to the words, wise, true, and bold, of her frank soldier, and had learned wisdom from his teaching. General Trochu, we need hardly say, is a strong Orleanist, and it is believed that the government of Paris was with great hesitation and reluctance committed to his charge. But he was one of the best French officers,

had never ceased to be on active service, and his character stood extremely high in general estimation. He had come, we need hardly say, from St. Cyr and the Staff School, and served several years in Algeria under Marshal Bugeaud. He had much of that blunt wisdom and keen sense for which Bugeaud was SO remarkable. He gives Bugeaud's most favourable reminiscences of the English infantry in the Peninsula, with the famous remark that it was the best infantry in the world, but fortunately there was very little of it. Trochu was one of Marshal St. Arnaud's aidesde-camp in the Crimea in 1854, and after the Marshal's death he was made a general, and commanded a brigade of infantry until the end of the Russian war. Like Bugeaud, he confessed to a great admiration of the English. He contrasted their order and discipline with the destructive and marauding habits of the French soldiers. When he was asked how he hoped to improve his troops, he answered,

En les faisant vertueux. In the Italian campaign of Solferino he commanded a division, in which he showed a respect for non-combatants in a manner quite new in the methods of French warfare. It is said that he began by degrading an officer to the ranks for insulting a peasant woman, and wherever he marched his track was distinguishable by the uninjured dwelling-houses and the unharmed mulberry trees still clothed with vines.

The general unsparingly pointed out the gigantic sham presented by the French army. He asserted that that army did not really exceed one-fourth of her nominal effective strength. He denied that this army, such as it was, was in any degree duly trained and fitted for war. He declared that the fundamental principle of every army lay in its motive force and its mechanical power, and in both respects he has some severe criticisms on his countrymen. What he says of French insubordinationhow a French soldier unwillingly pays even the customary signs of

external respect to his officers-has been signally verified in the present campaign. Even at Strasburg this has been mournfully exemplified. He condemns the French commissariat, and does not hesitate to say, in defiance of all traditions of all armies, that recourse must be had to civil mercantile contractors. He condemns as absolutely worthless for military success, that kind of popular enthusiasm which a few months ago prompted the cry à Berlin! He thinks that cavalry will have an increased importance in war-as has been illustrated by the Prussian Uhlans-and points out how the French cavalry have been overladen. He considered that Prussia possessed a much higher degree of the moral elements of military success. The General points out that the first thing for an army is to raise the moral and intellectual standard, in which the French have been so deplorably wanting. He severely criticises some of Napoleon III.'s pet plans. He says that it is quite a mistake to encourage, as the emperor encouraged, old soldiers to re-enlist. An old soldier, he says, is not an old man, but a trained recruit, who has learned his business. Again, he declared that the emperor made quite a mistake by forming picked bodies of troops. The army at large is weakened and demoralized by the subtraction of the best men. We need, hardly point out what singular force of truth belongs to these criticisms, which have all the character of vaticinations. It is popularly said that General Trochu is the best military strategist that France possesses, as well as one of inflexible firmness. It has, however, been answered that he is best as a military critic and theorist, and that his work as a subordinate has not properly tested his powers. In singular contrast with his present position is his Breton home, where the Trochu family first prosperously carried out the innovations modern agriculture, and covered the sterile, heathery, rocky land. near Vauban's fortifications of Belle Isle with woods, pasture-lands, and rich meadows.

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