which, it is to be feared, few or none are wholly free: for who is he (faith the fon of Sirach, Ecclus xix. 16.) that hath not offended with his tongue? In many things (faith St James, chap. iii. 2.) we offend all: and if any man offend not in word, the fame is a perfect man.

So

But how few have attained to this perfection? And yet unless we do endeavour after it, and in fome good mea fure attain it, all our pretence to religion is vain. the fame Apostle tells us, chap. i. 26. If any man among you feem to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain.

For the more diftinct handling of this argument, I fhall reduce my difcourfe to these five heads.

I. I fhall confider the nature of this vice, and wherein it confifts.

2. I shall confider the due extent of this prohibition, To fpeak evil of no man.

3. I fhall fhew the evil of this practice, both in the caufes and effects of it.

4. I fhall add fome further confiderations to diffuade men from it.

5. I fhall give fome rules and directions for the prevention and cure of it.

I. I fhall confider what this fin or vice of evil Speaking here forbidden by the Apofle is: μηδένα βλασφημεῖν, not to defame and flander any man, not to hurt his reputation, as the etymology of the word doth import. So that this vice confifts in saying things of others which tend to their difparagement and reproach, to the taking away or leffening of their reputation and good name: and this, whether the things faid be true or not. If they be falfe, and we know it, then it is downright calumny; and if we do not know it, but take it upon the report of others, it is however a flander; and fo much the more injurious, becaufe really groundless and undeferved.

If the thing be true, and we know it to be fo, yet it is a defamation, and tends to the prejudice of our neigh bour's reputation: and it is a fault to fay the evil of others which is true, unless there be fome good reason for it befides; because it is contrary to that charity and goodnefs which Chriftianity requires, to divulge the faults of

others,

others, though they be really guilty of them, without neceffity, or fome other very good reafon for it.

Again, It is evil speaking, and the vice condemned in the text, whether we be the first authors of an ill report, or relate it from others; becaufe the man that is evil fpoken of is equally defamed either way.

Again, Whether we fpeak evil of a man to his face, or behind his back. The former way indeed feems to be the more generous, but yet is a great fault, and that which we call reviling; the latter is more mean and bafe, and that which we properly call flander or backbiling.

And, laftly, Whether it be done directly and in exprefs terms, or more obfcurely, and by way of oblique infinuation; whether by way of downright reproach, or with fome crafty preface of commendation; for fo it have the effect to defame, the manner of address does not much alter the cafe. The one may be more dextrous, but is not one jot lefs faulty: for many times the deepest wounds are given by theie fmoother and more artificial ways of flander; as by asking questions: "Have

you not heard fo and fo of fuch a man? I fay no "more; I only afk the queftion:" or by general intimations, that they are loth to fay what they have "heard of fuch a one, are very forry for it, and do not at all believe it," if you will believe them and this many times without telling the thing, but leaving you in the dark to fufpect the worst.

:

Thefe, and fuch like arts, though they may feem to be tenderer and gentler ways of ufing mens reputation; yet in truth they are the moft malicious and effectual methods of flander; becaufe they infinuate fomething that is much worse than is faid, and yet are very apt to create in unwary men a ftrong belief of fomething that is very bad, though they know not what it is. So that it matters not in what fashion a flander is dreffed up; if it tend to defame a man, and to diminifh his reputation, it is the fin forbidden in the text.

II. We will confider the extent of this prohibition, To fpeak evil of no man, and the due bounds and limitations of it. For it is not to be understood abfolutely, to forbid us to fay any thing concerning others that is bad. This in fome cafes may be neceflary and our duty, and

in feveral cafes very fit and reasonable. The question is, In what cafes by the general rules of fcripture and right reafon we are warranted to say the evil of others that is true?

In general, we are not to do this without great reafon and neceflity; as for the prevention of fome great evil, or the procuring of fome confiderable good to ourselves, or others. And this I take to be the meaning of that advice of the fon of Sirach, Ecclus xix. 8. Whether it be to a friend or foe, talk not of other mens lives; and if thou canft without offence, reveal them not; that is, if without hurt to any body thou canft conceal them, divulge them

not.

But because this may not be direction fufficient, I fhall inftance in fome of the principal cafes wherein men are warranted to fpeak evil of others, and yet in fo doing do not offend against this prohibition in the text.

1. It is not only lawful, but very commendable, and many times our duty to do this, in order to the probable amendment of the perfon of whom evil is spoken. In fuch a cafe we may tell a man of his faults privately; or where it may not be fo fit for us to use that boldness and freedom, we may reveal his faults to one who is more fit and proper to reprove him, and will probably make no other ufe of this difcovery, but in order to his amendment. And this is fo far from being a breach of charity, that it is one of the beft teftimonies of it. For perhaps the party may not be guilty of what hath been reported of him, and then it is a kindness to give him the opportunity of vindicating himfelf: or, if he be guilty, perhaps being privately and prudently told of it, he may reform. In this cafe the fon of Sirach adviseth to reveal mens faults, Ecclus xix. 13. 14. 15. Admonish a friend, (fays he), it may be he hath not done it and if he bave done it, that he do it no more. Admonish thy friend, it may be he hath not faid it: and if he have, that he fpeak it not again. Admonish a friend for many times it is a flander; and believe not every tale.

But then we must take care that this be done out of kindness, and that nothing of our own paffion be mingled with it; and that under pretence of reproving and reforming men, we do not reproach and revile them, and

tell

tell them of their faults in fuch a manner, as if we did it to fhew our authority, rather than our charity. It requires a great deal of addrefs and gentle application, fo to manage the bufinefs of reproof, as not to irritate and exasperate the person whom we reprove, instead of curing him.

2. This likewife is not only lawful, but our duty, when we are legally called to bear witness concerning the fault and crime of another. A good man would not be an accufer, unless the public good, or the prevention of fome great evil, fhould require it. And then the plain reafon of the thing will fufficiently juftify a voluntary accufation. Otherwife it hath always among well-mannered people been efteemed very odious for a man to be officious in this kind, and a forward, informer concerning the mifdemeanor of others. Magiftrates may fometimes

perfons, think it fit to give encouragement to fuch

to fet one bad man to catch another, becaufe fuch men are fitteft for fuch dirty work: but they can never inwardly approve them, nor will they ever make them their friends and confidents.

But when a man is called to give teftimony in this kind, in obedience to the laws, and out of reverence to the oath taken in fuch cafes, he is fo far from deferving blame for fo doing, that it would be an unpardonable fault in him to conceal the truth, or any part of it.

3. It is lawful to publifh the faults of others, in our own neceffary defence and vindication, when a man cannot conceal another's faults, without betraying his own innocency. No charity requires a man to fuffer himself to be defamed, to fave the reputation of another man. Charity begins at home. And though a man had never fo much goodness, he would firft fecure his own good name, and then be concerned for other mens. We are to love our neighbour as ourselves: fo that the love of ourfelves is the rule and measure of our love to our neighbour and therefore firft, otherwife it could not be the rule. And it would be very well for the world, if our charity would rife thus high; and no man would hurt another man's reputation, but where his own is in real danger.

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4. This alfo is lawful for caution and warning to a

A 3

third

third person that is in danger to be infected by the company or ill example of another; or may be greatly prejudiced by repofing too much confidence in him, having no knowledge or fufpicion of his bad qualities: but even in this cafe we ought to take great care, that the ill character we give of any man be spread no further than is neceffary to the good end we designed in it.

Befides thefe more obvious and remarkable cafes, this prohibition doth not I think hinder, but that in ordinary conversation men may mention that ill of others which is already made as public as it well can be; or that one friend may not in freedom speak to another of the mifcarriage of a third perfon, where he is fecure no ill ufe will be made of it, and that it will go no further to his prejudice; provided always, that we take no delight in hearing or fpeaking ill of others; and the lefs we do it, though without any malice or defign of harm, till the better; becaufe this fhews that we do not feed upon ill reports, and take pleasure in them.

be ne.

Thefe are all the ufual cafes in which it may ceffary for us to fpeak evil of other men. And these are fo evidently reafonable, that the prohibition in the text cannot with reafon be extended to them. And if no man would allow himself to fay any thing to the prejudice of another man's good name, but in thefe and the like cafes, the tongues of men would be very innocent, and the world would be very quiet. I proceed, in the III. Third place, To confider the evil of this practice, both in the caufes, and the confequences of it.

1. We will confider the caufes of it. And it commonly fprings from one or more of thefe evil roots.

1ft, One of the deepest and most common caufes of evil-fpeaking, is ill-nature, and cruelty of difpofition; and, by a general mistake, ill-nature paffeth for wit, as cunning doth for wisdom; though in truth they are no thing a-kin to one another, but as far diftant as vice and virtue.

And there is no greater evidence of the bad temper of mankind, than the general proneness of men to this vice: for (as our Saviour fays) out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. And therefore men do commonly incline to the cenforious and uncharitable fide; which

fhews